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ABSTRACT 
Since the beginning of offshore petroleum activity in 1964, the petroleum industry in the 
United Kingdom Continental Shelf (UKCS) and the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) 
have been subject to various regulations by the British and Norwegian authorities, 
respectively. In particular, for many years, the two governments' regulations favored the 
use of domestic goods and services in production. This study uses unique input and 
output data to test the extent to which these regulations created inefficiencies in the 
UKCS and NCS activities. Measured by data envelopment analysis (DEA) and stochastic 
frontier analysis (SF A), the results are largely consistent with the presence of such 
inefficiencies. Accordingly, the results provide an important insight into UKCS and NCS 
production techniques and governments' abilities to influence private sector behavior 
through contracts and tendering. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 Objectives and Contribution of the Study 
The emergence of the North Sea as a potentially oil-rich region in the late 1950s, and 
successful oil and gas exploration less than a decade later, attracted the attention of all 
those whose daily activity, in one way or the other, was dependent on petroleum as a 
main source of energy. The importance became more significant when the world 
witnessed its vulnerability and over-dependency on oil supplied by the politically 
unstable Middle East, as early as 1973. 
The steady petroleum production of the North Sea, mainly from the United Kingdom 
Continental Shelf (UKCS) and Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS), has brought about 
two major achievements. On one hand, it has, to a certain degree, safeguarded the oil-
importing nations from the unilateral decisions of the Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) with regard to the production level and pricing of oil. On 
the other hand, the massive investment, large number of people involved in the activity, 
and enormous national income in forms of various taxes and states' direct and indirect 
share, has turned the industry into one of the most important sector of the two countries' 
economIes. 
The importance of North Sea petroleum production is appreciated by a number of 
economists across the world and is reflected in enormous volumes of literature 
concermng almost every aspect of the activity. However, as far as the regulatory 
frameworks of the United Kingdom and Norway and their effect on the performance of 
the operating oil companies are concerned, to the best of my knowledge, less work has 
been done, no study has examined the interaction between these policies and the industry 
performance. 
Why is it important to study a possible link between the regulation and the efficiency of 
performance? It is important not only because the North Sea accounts for one of the most 
9 
important petroleum-rich regions outside OPEC, and not least because of the enormous 
capital invested in the industry during the past four decades. It is also important because 
of the efficiency losses that might have been incurred due to government intervention in 
the day-to-day operation of the fields. 
The British and Norwegian petroleum activity started when both countries were in dire 
need of the international oil companies for their capital investment, expertise, and 
technology. Parallel to their negotiations with the oil companies concerning the timing, 
speed, and amount of exploration and production, the authorities of the two countries 
were asking the oil companies for their support for domestic offshore-related suppliers. 
Considering the infancy of the latter, the negotiations led only to informal 
"understandings" between the oil companies and the host states, with no obligation for 
the former. Not surprisingly, by the end of 1960s, the amount of domestic goods and 
services in the two shelves hardly exceeded 20% of the whole investment. 1 
By the early 1970s, Norway, and soon after the UK, began to change their policy. The 
international oil companies were now required to prove their benevolence towards the 
domestic economies to be eligible for taking part in the North Sea activity. In Norway, 
the national oil company, Statoil, was given extraordinary privileges in operating 
consortia and was assigned to increase the Norwegian offshore-related suppliers' share of 
the total procurement of the NCS. In the UK, the similar role was given to the Offshore 
Supply Office (OSO). Subsequently the share of domestic goods and services rose to 
above 60% (in both countries) before the end of 1970s2. By 1985, the share rose to 82% 
and 89.3% in the UK and Norway, respectively3. 
The changes in the two countries' policies in 1985, when Statoil's role as the care-taker of 
the offshore supply industry was taken away in Norway, and the requirement to "buy 
British" was removed in the UK, brought changes in the domestic offshore suppliers' 
share from the procurement on the respected shelves. In the UK, the increasing pattern of 
I Nelsen (1991), 71&74 
2 Ibid, 74 
3 SSB 1996, and The Brown Book, 1986, respectively. 
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this share peaked in 1987, when 87% of the goods and services applied in the UKCS was 
supplied by British suppliers. This share dropped to 78% in 1991.4 
In Norway, the pattern was similar. The peak-year for the Norwegian offshore suppliers 
was 1988, with almost 90% share of the total procurement made in the NCS. The share 
dropped to less than 80% in 1993 and below 70% in 1996. 
The strictness of the two governments' policies seems to have a positive correlation with 
the share of domestic goods and services applied in the two shelves. The only exception 
seems to be the years 1985 to 1988 when, despite the changes, the share of domestic 
suppliers continued to increase. Considering the fact that the companies' adjustment, if 
any, to the new policies would have taken time, and that the fields whose development 
started after 1985 did not come on stream before 1987/88, the lag between the policy 
change and reduction of the domestic suppliers' share does not seem to jeopardize the 
validity of the above argument. 
Establishing the link between the two states' policies and the level of domestic goods and 
services is one of the objectives of this study. The correlation can be established through 
looking at the figures representing the share of domestic goods and services in different 
periods of time. More formally, this can be checked by 1- examining the policies in more 
depth, and 2- by seeing whether the policies had national economic impact. One would 
assume that if the domestic goods and services were competitive in various specifications 
(i.e. quality, price, time of delivery, et.) there should have been no reason for the 
countries in question to use regulatory measures to impose them. Why would a profit 
maximIzmg oil company hesitate to apply more efficient inputs for their production 
lines? 
Other factors equal, if there is a link between the applied level of domestic goods and 
services and the strictness of the two countries' policies, one should expect inefficiency in 
./ There is no official statistics for the share of British offshore-related suppliers after 1991 due to the 
abolishment of oso. 
1 1 
the performance of the industries when the requirement to "buy domestic" was in force. 
relative to the time when the companies had (relative) freedom in their procurement 
process. 
Another issue this study is to examine is the comparative effects of the changes in the two 
countries' policy on the efficiency of the fields in the two shelves. In Norway. eliminating 
Statoil's role as the main caretaker of the offshore-supply industry caused the state to lose 
its main scrutiny instrument. As far as the domestic goods and services were concerned, 
however, the companies were still required to prove their benevolence towards the 
national economy. 
In the UK, on the other hand, the government had to bow to the pressure imposed by the 
European Commission, in 1985, to remove the requirement of "buy British" as the pre-
condition for international oil companies to be eligible to apply for a production license. 
Despite the abolition of the requirement, the companies were still required to report their 
procurement activity. Thus, in both countries the regulation became softer in one aspect 
and remained intact in the other. We will see whether, in practice, the fields in one of the 
shelves have gained higher efficiency, relative to the other shelf, as a consequence of the 
policy change. 
The contributions of this study to the field of Economics can be divided into two areas. 
As far as the economics of the study is concerned, the study identifies some interesting 
facts linking the trend in domestic input use with changes in policy towards North Sea 
contracts. To test whether these policies influenced input use (and the efficiency loss if 
this happened) I will use both parametric and non-parametric approaches to measure the 
relative efficiency of the fields over various critical times. The study will use appropriate 
techniques in data envelopment analysis (DEA) and stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) to 
examine the link between policy and input use, rigorously. 
Another contribution of the study is the gathering of a unique set of data covering many 
aspects of the North Sea petroleum industry on field-by-fieldlannual bases. As mentioned 
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earlier, the economics literature covers many aspects of the industry but has said little 
empirical about the efficiency of the fields. This, most probably, is because of the 
difficulty with gathering such, in some cases confidential, information. I begin to fill this 
gap in the literature. 
The other aspect of this study's contribution is related to the states' petroleum policy. As 
we will see, the petroleum policy of the two countries, especially when dealing with the 
issue of domestic suppliers, has generated high level of inefficiency in the performance of 
the fields in question. The results could be a warning to the policy makers that their 
policies may have side effects; in this case costly investment in order to keep inefficient 
domestic goods and services in the market. 5 
1.2 Plan of the Study 
Chapter Two of this study begins by reviewing the national, as well as the international, 
effects of the emergence of the North Sea petroleum industry. We will see how the 
unpredictable, costly, and challenging petroleum reservoir beneath the North Sea changed 
the United Kingdom from a petroleum importing country to self-sufficiency and then a 
net oil and gas exporter. It will discuss Norway's changing position from having a small 
economy to become the largest oil exporter in the world, second only to Saudi Arabia. 
The chapter continues to discuss the interaction between the major parties involved in 
North Sea petroleum industry. It will show that why the critical time points of 1975 and 
1985 are going to be used as benchmarks for evaluating the efficiency of the two shelves 
in the later chapters. 
The Norwegian and British offshore petroleum industries were formed by two mam 
parties, namely the government and the international oil companies. At the beginning, 
while the states assumed the roles of provider of the territory, regulatory body, and 
enforcer of rules of fair conduct, the international oil companies were to provide capital, 
5 However, the study cannot pick up the losses that were caused by protective policies providing no 
incentive to become efficient. 
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expertise, and state-of-the-art technology. As far as the economy of each field under 
exploration/production was concerned, this framework would allow the oil companies to 
operate the fields with the liberty of applying the most efficient goods and services to 
produce the optimum level of petroleum within the capacity of the technology, or up to 
the limit permitted by the depletion regulation. The government, on the other hand, was 
to impose various taxes to take a fair share for the nation as the owner of resources. If the 
aim of the two sides were merely the highest possible profit from each field, cooperation 
between the states and international oil companies would pave the way. 
The interaction between these two parties, however, altered shortly after. The chapter will 
discuss the changing attitude of the two governments with regard to both the level of their 
involvement in the activity and the level to which the domestic economy would have to 
benefit from the investment made in their respective continental shelves. The introduction 
of state partnership, establishment of the national oil companies, and conditioning the 
international oil companies' participation in the industry's activity on the level of 
domestic goods and services applied were part of the two states' instruments to enlarge 
the nations' take from petroleum activity. Though expressing their concern by objecting 
to the states' decisions, the oil companies had no choice but to obey the rules or just 
simply leave the shelves. The new policies increased the governments' financial 
involvement in the activity and domestic offshore suppliers were increasingly involved in 
the procurement process of the North Sea. 
The early 1980s witnessed the states changing some of their early policies. In the UK, the 
European Commission regarded the requirement of "buy British" as discriminatory to its 
member states and asked for its abolition. Under pressure, the UK government withdrew 
the requirement in 1985, while the companies were still required to report their 
procurement process to OSO. In the same year, Norway reduced Statoil's privileges 
within the consortia and freed the company from its role as the caretaker of the offshore-
related supply industry. Despite the absence of Statoil as the state's monitoring 
instrument, the requirement of "buy Norwegian" was still in place. 
1..+ 
Chapter Three discusses the theoretical background of the study. Figure 3-1 (in Chapter 
3) shows the various stages that the offshore petroleum industry involves. The activity 
begins when the state announces an area (also called a block) open for exploration and, 
possibly, production. At this stage, the considerations behind the state's decision with 
regard to factors like rate of exploration, level of production etc. are what tend to be 
discussed in the literature of energy economics. 
The chapter discusses the evolution of the literature on natural resources. In the early 
stages the main focus was on the issue of the depletion rate of natural resources and the 
balance between the present and future exploitation of natural resources. The basic 
assumption of the early literature was the exhaustibility of the natural resources in the 
sense that the intertemporal sum of the services provided by a given stock of an 
exhaustible resource is finite. 
Adelman, however, later challenged the assumption that petroleum resources are finite. 
Referring to global petroleum resources, rather than limited capacity of a certain field, 
Adelman pointed to the growing proven petroleum resources, while huge amounts of oil 
and gas were being used every day. While advancement in technology enables us to 
explore resources that were unthinkable a few years earlier, the question of limited 
petroleum resources and the dilemma of the balance between the present and future 
extraction seemed insignificant to him. 
Adelman's approach was followed by many energy economists whose main focus shifted 
from the issue of exploration and exploitation rate to the issue of the cost of these 
activities. The "cost" approach found more advocates when the interaction between the 
oil importing countries, international oil companies, and the oil exporting countries 
reduced the latter's power in manipulating the international oil pnce by 
increasing/decreasing the production level. Even if one does not consider the individual 
oil exporting countries as price-takers, the oil market situation since the early 1980s does 
not provide many countries with the opportunity to manipulate the global oil market 
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single-handedly. While Saudi Arabia could be one of the few exceptions, OPEC, as a 
whole, is not included in the above equation. 
The importance of cost as a significant factor in determining the conditions for 
exploration and production takes us to the second stage of the states' decision in Figure 3-
1, namely the bidding system. Chapter Three continues with a brief discussion of 
common bidding systems with particular focus on the dominant bidding systems when an 
oil (or gas) track is to be leased. 
The efficient practice in these situations is that the owner of resources hands over the 
exploration and production rights to the company that is willing to compensate the owner 
with highest cash bonus. In addition, the resource owner charges the company a 
percentage of the petroleum produced (royalty). Despite the popularity of this system and 
despite the fact that the system brings substantial cash to the exchequer, the British 
(except one occasion in early 1970s) and Norwegians have continuously insisted on their 
discretionary system, where the exploration and production right is given to the company 
(or a number of companies) with the most satisfactory working plan. The working plan 
includes the exploration/production schedule, level of production, and most importantly 
the technology and the sources providing the goods and services in the various phases of 
the field's activity. Arguably the latter is the main reason for the application of the 
discretionary licensing system in the UK and Norway. 
Though limited in number, the literature comparing the discretionary system with the 
bonus-based system confirms the inefficiency of the former. We will see that even if the 
two states use the discretionary system to maintain the high quality of operation, this 
system is not sustainable. As Branco (1997) stresses in the absence of symmetric 
information between the two parties, "there is no way to implement the optimal 
mechanism by requiring the winner to provide the quality submitted in its bid" (p. 71). 
If the economists who believe the discretionary bidding system does not provide the 
owner of natural resources with the best outcome are correct, why have the two states 
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insisted on a second best option? The answer might be found in the influences on 
governments' decisions. Unions and industrial associations, as we will see in Chapter 
Two, have been lobbying the governments to enforce the application of domestic goods 
and services. If this is the case, then the two states have perhaps bowed to the pressure, 
not necessarily unaware of the inefficiency generated by their action. Chapter Three will 
also give a brief review about the role of pressure groups in governments' decisions. 
Chapter Four discusses the two mam approaches in evaluating the efficiency of 
production processes. A key aim of this study is to measure the efficiency of the fields 
brought on stream in the Norwegian and British continental shelves. This would allow us 
to examine the performance of fields under the various regulatory regimes operated in the 
North Sea since 1964. There are two general approaches to the question of efficiency and 
productivity. These evaluations are based on parametric and non-parametric approaches. 
The non-parametric approach is based on Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and 
Malmquist Productivity indices. DEA estimates the best practice frontier from the set of 
units in question and compares the rest of the units to the frontier. DEA, however, is 
static in the sense that it does not provide the analyst with a decomposition of efficiency 
change over time. The Malmquist approach, on the other hand, is used when the units in 
question are performing in various periods of time. The technique allows one to 
distinguish between different reasons for efficiency changes over time. These include the 
change in technology over time, or scale efficiency change. It could also be that the units 
have really gained efficiency over the periods studied. 
The parametric approach is based on Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SF A). Like DEA, the 
efficiency of each unit in question is measured against the frontier. SF A, however. 
requires the specification of a parametric frontier based on a behavioral maximization 
hypothesis. A more detailed description of these techniques is provided in Chapter Four 
in preparation for their use in later chapters. 
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The above approaches can only be used when appropriate input and output data are 
available. In the case of the North Sea petroleum industry, the enormous number of 
inputs in the exploration, development, and production phases makes a fully detailed 
study almost impossible. 
In Chapter Five, we will have a closer look at the data concerning the individual fields in 
the North Sea I have collected. These include the annual output, construction costs, the 
annual costs incurred in the production phases of each individual firm, number of 
partners in each consortium, technical and geological characteristics of each field, etc. 
They cover all fields since North Sea petroleum activity began in 1964. 
The empirical study of the fields in the UKCS and NCS aims to distinguish between the 
fields' performance under different regulatory frameworks. We begin the assessment by 
measuring the efficiency of the Norwegian fields in Chapter Six. Though the first 
licensing rounds in Norway took place before tough requirements for domestic inputs 
were in place, the exploration of the major oil fields was almost co-existent with the 
changing regulatory framework in Norway. In effect, almost all of the early fields began 
their construction phases when the companies were required to increase the application of 
domestic goods and services. Thus, as far as NCS is concerned the comparison is 
between the two periods pre-1984 and post-1985, inclusive. 
The efficiency measurement of the fields in the UKCS is the objective of Chapter Seven. 
The activity of the UKCS began with lenient regulation allowing the companies to adopt 
procurement policies according to the roles of competitive market. The fields in this 
period were explored, developed, and brought on stream using, supposedly, the most 
appropriate (i.e. profit maximizing) goods and services. However, the situation between 
1975 and 1984 was different. The oil companies were to choose between competitive 
inputs and their long-term presence in the shelf. At the best, they had to find a way to 
combine a portion of both. In 1985 the companies experienced another change in the 
government's policy, removing the requirement to "buy British", while the procurement 
monitoring process was still in place. 
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Other factors equal, if the substituted goods and services in the 1975-84 period were of 
less quality (price, technology, time of delivery, etc.) compared to the previous period 
(pre-197 4), then one should expect higher efficiency in the pre-1974 period. There is a 
potential problem with the comparative study between these two periods. The problem 
may occur if there is no tangible difference between the average efficiency of these two 
periods, or if the study points out the 1975-84 fields as the more efficient ones. In this 
case one could attribute the difference between the two periods' efficiency to the likely 
technological progress after 1975, which as a matter of course increases the efficiency of 
the fields that were developed after that. However, the effect of the technological change 
can not be detected by using the Malmquist index approach due to the low number of 
fields in the pre-1975 period. 
With regard to the comparative study of the fields whose development and production 
started between 1975 and 1984, and the fields whose development and production started 
after 1985 one additional point should be noted. The fact that even after 1985 the 
compames were to report their procurements, which might affect their procurement 
behavior, could still affect the efficiency of the fields in that period. This is in addition to 
the problem of technological change mentioned above. The absence of the post-1985 
fields in the previous periods makes it quite difficult to assess the technological changes 
after 1985. The only way to evaluate the progress is to examine the technical behavior of 
the fields whose development and production started between 1975 and 1984 and 
generalize it to the post-1985 fields. 
The last empirical part of this study, Chapter Eight, deals with the comparative effects of 
the two countries' offshore petroleum policies on the performance of the fields that have 
been brought on stream in the UKCS and NCS. As far the requirement of "buy domestic" 
is concerned, the similarity between the policies during 1975-84 in the UK, and before 
1984 in Norway leads one to presume that the relative efficiency of the fields in the two 
shelves should not have been significantly different. The fact that competition between 
the two states to attract the highest possible number of oil companies should have 
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resulted to each country's offering competitive terms and conditions strengthens that 
assumption. 
The comparative situation of the two shelves in the post-1985 period, however, is not 
equally clear. In the UK the requirement of "buy British" was dropped but the companies' 
procurement activity was monitored. On the contrary, in Norway the requirement 
remained intact while the monitoring policy of the government was, arguably, weaker. 
Assessing the cross-country relative efficiency of the fields in different critical points 
may contribute to the understanding of the impacts of various policies. 
The study comes to its end when Chapter Nine gIves a brief summary of the issues 
discussed in, and the results of, this study, followed by a brief discussion about the 
shortcoming of this study and how it might be improved in the future studies. 
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Chapter Two: North Sea Petroleum and Government Policy 
Introduction 
This chapter is to discuss the evolution and development of the North Sea petroleum 
industry, in general, and to analyze the governments' policies with regard to the use of 
domestic goods and services, in particular. The chapter seeks three interconnected 
objectives. First, it is to highlight the significance of North Sea oil at both international 
(section 2.1) and national levels (section 2.2). Partly related to this, the second objective 
is to demonstrate how a particular sector of the two countries' economies, namely the 
offshore supply industries, has increasingly benefited from the petroleum activity of the 
two shelves (section 2.2). The third goal is to begin to explore whether there is any link 
between the increase in the share of domestic goods and services and the policies applied 
by the governments of the UK and Norway (sections 2.3 to 2.5). The reader may find a 
summary of the events that links the second and third objectives in Tables 2.3 and 2.4. 
We will see that before 1975 the UK had a lenient policy towards the international oil 
companies' activity in the UKCS. The companies were to choose the inputs for 
construction of the fields that they deemed most efficient. In this period the level of 
domestic goods and services applied by the companies was at its minimum level of 20% 
to 25% of the total procurement made in the UKCS6. By the year 1975 the policy 
changed and now the oil companies were required to use as much domestic inputs as 
possible to increase their chance of being awarded a production license. Between 1975 
and 1985, when the policy changed again, the share of domestic inputs increased 
substantially to 83% of the total procurement of the UKCS in 1985. With the abolition of 
the requirement to "buy British" in 1985 the share of domestic goods and services began 
to drop (with a time lag of 2 years), and by 1991 the share of British goods and services 
was about 78% of the total procurement in the UKCS. 
In Norway, the requirement to "buy Norwegian" was set up almost simultaneously with 
the development of the first oil and gas fields. In the licensing process, the applicants 
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would be evaluated largely based on records of their contribution to the Norwegian 
economy. In Norway too, the share of domestic goods and services had a sharp increase, 
from less than 20% in the early 1970s to more than 89% in 1985.7 In 1985, the 
monitoring role of Statoil as the caretaker of the domestic offshore supply industry was 
taken away from the company. Like the UK, the share of domestic goods and services 
began to fall. In 1996 (the last year of availability of official statistics in this regard) the 
share of Norwegian inputs applied in the construction and production phases of the NCS 
fields was less than 70%. 
This chapter looks at the history of the UKCS and NCS to start to explore the reason for 
the sharp increase in the application of domestic inputs by looking at the policies and 
their timing. To that end, the chapter is constructed as follows. 
The first section gives a brief review of the North Sea's position in the global oil market. 
The significance of North Sea oil is reflected in the magnitude of the oil and gas reserves, 
production, and exports of the two countries. In 1972, the total production of the region 
counted for about 0.02% of the world's total production. However, in less than three 
decades, the North Sea petroleum industry has made the UK self-sufficient in oil, and 
ranked Norway as the world's largest oil-exporter after Saudi Arabia. Today, the proven 
oil reserves of the North Sea account for 9% of the world's reserves. 
The second section discusses the significant effect of the petroleum industry on the 
economies of the two countries in question. In the UK, the share of petroleum in GDP in 
1976 was 0.45%. In less than a decade it reached a peak of 5.45%. After the privatization 
of the industry in 1987, the importance of petroleum in GDP began to decline and 
reached its lowest level (1.32%) in 1991 and 1992. From 1993, the industry began to 
recover its importance and by 1996 it reached the level of 2.6% of the British GDP. 
6 All the figures related to the UK are gathered from The Brown Book (1975-1999). 
7 All the statistics related to Norway on this page are gathered from NSSB, 1996. 
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In 1996, the investment made in the industry accounted for 53% and 18% of the total 
investment made in Norway and the UK, respectively. In the same year the petroleum 
industry had a total share of 2.5% and 15.6% of British and Norwegian GDP, 
respectively. 
The share of British and Norwegian goods and services from the total procurement of the 
UKCS and NCS, respectively, is shown in Table 2.1. As we can see, the North Sea 
petroleum activity has increasingly had applied domestic goods and services in the 
development and production phases of the fields' activity. The question is whether these 
inputs have gained in efficiency, or the domestic offshore-supply industry was supported 
by interest groups and their political intervention in developments of the North Sea? Or 
perhaps a culture of intervention caused the protectionist policies of the two 
governments. 
These questions bring us to the next three sections, which discuss the evolution of the 
United Kingdom and Norwegian regulatory regimes. Since the very first stage, 
combining economic efficiency with political expediency was a challenge to both 
countries. Neither of the countries had the means to conduct, if desirable, petroleum 
activities on their own. The lack of experience in petroleum operation, and the 
impossibility of having immediate access to knowledge concerning resource potential 
and/or the economic consequences of petroleum discovery, if any, led them to rely on the 
pri vate sector. 8 
Both countries had witnessed the interactions between the international oil companies 
and the oil producing OPEC countries and the price the latter had paid for their heavy 
dependency on the major oil companies.9 In addition, in Norway, there was an inherited 
preference for government interference in industries 10, which as a matter of course was 
also to be applied to the petroleum activities regardless of their special character. Thus 
8 Andersen (1993) 
9 For a comprehensive discussion of OPEC countries' relationships with the multinational oil companies, 
see, among others, Yergin 1991. 
10 Noreng. Preface to Andersen (1992). 
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the challenge was to elaborate an institutional system combining incentives and rewards 
with a control mechanism. 11 
The third section discusses the first regulations of the two countries, which introduced the 
state as merely the distributor of territory and enforcer of rules of fair conduct. This 
involvement was characterized by minimal intervention, leaving most of the important 
decisions regarding the exploration and production of petroleum to the oil companies. 
The oil companies had enough room to maneuver but, at the same time, were under a 
certain amount of pressure to maintain their exploration activities. This softness in both 
governments' policy was mostly due to the unpredictable future for this new and 
undiscovered region, on one hand, and the governments' needing the oil companies to 
undertake exploration, on the other. 
The discovery of petroleum in the North Sea, the higher global oil prices, and the world-
wide trend toward greater national control of petroleum resources contributed to a 
dramatic transformation in the petroleum policies of the two countries during the first 
half of the 1970s. The fourth section discusses the situation prevailing in that era and the 
changes that took place in the two countries' policies. 
In the early stages both countries applied similar "soft" policy to attract as many investors 
as possible. In the second stage authorities emerged not only as the regulator, but also as 
the participants with predetermined goal of involving domestic suppliers in the activity. 
In Norway, though the introduction of state participation to the second licensing round 
(1968) indicated the government's intention to change the system, the turning point came 
only with the discovery of Ekofisk (late 1968) as a major oil field. This improved the 
Norwegian government's bargaining position vis-a.-vis the oil companies, and finally led 
to the introduction of the state as the major participant in the NCS through the creation of 
Statoil (1972). 
11 Andersen (1992) 
The British authorities generally favored a smaller presence on the continental shelf than 
Norwegians, but they were eventually persuaded to adopt a policy of participatory 
intervention. I2 The chronic budget deficit on one hand, and the fear of facing another 
shortage in petroleum supply (as was the case in 1973-74), on the other, led the UK to 
take a similar action to that of Norway. The establishment of BNOC (1974-5) was a 
move to have a greater share of offshore activity and to secure the country's access to its 
own petroleum in a time of crisis. 
The governments' intervention was not, by any means, restricted to state participation per 
se, directly or via the state-owned oil companies. From the very first stages, both 
governments made it clear that the host countries' economy, as a whole, should benefit 
from the new industry. This aim was reflected in the requirements an international oil 
company had to satisfy to be eligible for a production license. This included the 
company's past and planned contribution to the country's economy through the use of 
domestic goods and services in the exploration and development phases of each oil and 
gas field. 
In Norway, while claiming that the requirement was not applied as a discriminatory 
instrument against any company, in practice, the authorities made it clear that any 
company's hesitance in applying domestic goods and services meant its elimination from 
the licensing process. 13 In the UK, by contrast, the issue was discussed, and agreed upon, 
with the oil companies, and reflected in Memorandums of Understanding between the 
parties involved. However, the companies active in the UKCS were well aware that the 
British government, like the Norwegian one, would not hesitate to withhold a license 
from them if the requirement was not fulfilled. 14 
The fifth section sees how the differences in the considerations behind the governments' 
intervention led, finally, to disparity (at least in appearance) in the petroleum policies of 
the two countries. Having met the target of petroleum self-sufficiency, and secured the 
12 Nelsen (1991) 
\J Ibid 
14 Ibid 
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state's access to its petroleum output in the time of crisis via legislative measures, the 
British government did not see state control over the industry through a national oil 
company as a necessity any longer. Thus, BNOC's role as a policy instrument began to 
decline in the early 1980s, and the company was totally abolished before the second half 
of the decade. This was soon followed by the government's decision to put the petroleum 
sector in the hands of private sector and assume, merely, the role of industry regulator. 
As in Britain, the Norwegian state-owned oil company, Statoil, was the subject of radical 
changes in the country's petroleum policy in the mid-1980s. Statoil, which principally 
was subject to the state's control, had become so huge a company, compared to the size of 
Norwegian economy, that it was not quite apparent if the government was regulating the 
company or the company was influencing the authorities' decision. From 1985, Statoil, 
which was established as a policy and control instrument, changed to a semi-ordinary oil 
company, without its original privileges, (although a government representative 
continued to sit at the top of the Board of Directors). 
Despite the seeming divergence in the two countries' policy after 1985, one could still 
observe a similarity between the two movements. In Norway, Statoil's changed position 
did not reduce the state's concern for the Norwegian offshore-related industry. The 
companies were still required to use Norwegian goods and services, though the degree of 
scrutiny of the actual implementation of the regulation might have been reduced. In the 
UK, on the other hand, the requirement to "buy British" was abolished, while the 
regulations concerning monitoring the companies' procurement activity, and the state's 
instrument for so doing, remained intact. Thus, one could say that in both countries the 
regulations changed in one account and remained intact in the other. How much the two 
policies, in practice, have effected the oil companies' performance remains to be 
investigated. 
The final section of this chapter summarizes the issues discussed and briefly explains 
how we will proceed to the following chapters. To have a comprehensive review of the 
evolution in the North Sea petroleum industry, the legislation passed by the authorities of 
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the two countries has been studied. I have translated the Norwegian legislation and 
government reports, and the results will be used throughout this chapter. 
2.1 North Sea in the World Oil Market 
For many centuries the North Sea has provided the adjacent countries with a rich source 
of food, highway of commerce, and a gateway to the world. The Sea gave these nations 
the opportunity to conduct trade of staple products, i.e. salt, cloth, timber, and fish with 
the latter being initiated by Dutch in the fifteenth century. And when the Sea was in 
relative decline as a fishing zone and avenue of trade, a new resource in the form of 
petroleum deposits was discovered beneath the seabed indicating the beginning of a new 
era for the North Sea. 
However, this latest treasure from the North Sea proved difficult and costly to exploit. 
The exploration for oil and natural gas reservoirs beneath the stormy water and rock 
presented challenges that pressed the frontier of technology, capital, and human 
endurance. However, despite the difficulties, the discovery of the giant Groningen gas 
field in the northern coastal region of the Netherlands in 1959 aroused great interest 
among the international oil companies. The majority of the early excitement was focused 
on the Dutch and British portions of the North Sea. However, a few companies, led by 
Philips Petroleum turned their sights further North toward what later became known as 
the Norwegian Continental Shelf. 
By the mid-1960s, two legal questions were resolved by the Geneva Convention (and its 
ratification by the Norwegian and British parliaments): (1) who owned what lay on or 
under the nations' seabed, and (2) what were the boundaries of the nations' continental 
shelves. 
In the UK, the first drilling started in 1964, and in September 1965 a large quantity of 
natural gas was found in a Southern Basin field, later named West Sole. Within two years 
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three more major gas fields had been discovered, opening the opportunity for Britain to 
triple its gas consumption in five to six years. IS 
In Norway, the first well was drilled in July 1966. However, the first attempts to track 
petroleum were not satisfactory until the gas condensate field Cod was discovered in 
1968. The field, however, was judged (by both Philips Petroleum - the operator - and the 
Ministry of Industry) too small to be profitable. Eventually, in December 1969, the 
Philips Company struck a giant oil and gas field called Ekofisk. 16 
The shock from petroleum industry nationalization in the OPEC countries struck the oil 
companies in the early-1970s. This, together with rapidly increasing oil prices, and the 
close proximity of the North Sea to the major industrial markets in Western Europe, as 
well as the political stability of the North Sea petroleum producers, resulted in the 
region's petroleum developments being regarded with considerable interest by the 
international oil industry. Shortly after, North Sea oil production, which was marginally 
profitable (at best) a few years earlier 17, became the subject of competition among 
practically all the major international oil companies. 
The oil and gas fields which have been discovered, are among the largest concentrations 
of hydrocarbons to be found since the Second World War. Today more than 90 oil 
companies are active in the Norwegian and British parts of the North Sea. 
In 1971 the aggregate UKCS and NCS oil production accounted for 3,580, barrels a day, 
or about 0.02% of world oil production. Production reached 719,415 barrels a day in 
1979, more than 20,000% of that of 1971, while world production had increased by only 
23%. In 1996, Norway and the UK produced 1,134,966 and 959,286 thousand barrels of 
oil, respectively, which in aggregate accounted for more than 7.5% of world oil 
production (see Figures 2-1 to 2-6). In that year, Norway and the UK were respectively 
15 United Kingdom, Ministry of Power, Fuel Policy, November 1967,7. 
16 Report No.95, Ministry of Industry, Norway. Author's translation. 
17 In 1970, the cost of importing a barrel of oil was about $3 (1980 prices). while the average cost of North 
Sea oil production was $5 a barrel. By the time UK production started, oil prices had risen to $ J 2 a barrel. 
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the sixth and the ninth major oil producer of the world with a production of 3.2 and 2.8 
million barrels a day. Further, in 1996 Norway exported an average of 3 million barrels a 
day of crude oil, second in the world only to Saudi Arabia. 
Table 2-1: Share of Domestic Goods and Services from Total Procurement 
UK Norway 
1974 42.0% 25.0% 
1975 55.0% 32.0% 
1976 60.0% 41.0% 
1977 62.0% 54.0% 
1978 66.0% 62.0% 
1979 79.0% 64.2% 
1980 71.0% 69.5% 
1981 67.0% 74.3% 
1982 73.0% 79.2% 
1983 72.0% 81.1% 
1984 74.0% 83.2% 
1985 80.0% 89.3% 
1986 82.0% 84.2% 
1987 87.0% 84.9% 
1988 84.0% 90.0% 
1989 81.0% 75.0% 
1990 77.0% 81.7% 
1991 78.0% 81.4% 
1992 81.3% 
1993 75.4% 
1994 78.6% 
1995 71.9% 
1996 69.3% 
Sources: The Brown Book (1979-1992), Jenkin (1981), and The Fact Sheet (1995-1997) 
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2.2 The Economic Impacts of Petroleum Production 
The impact of the petroleum industry on the North Sea producing countries stems from 
the position of North Sea oil and gas in the international market. This position is, in tum. 
affected by the historical events of the international oil industry, as well as the 
social/political situation of the other petroleum producer countries, in general, and the 
Middle East suppliers in particular. During the last two decades the world has 
experienced four oil shocks and several oil-price fluctuations, due, basically, to the 
political upheavals in the Middle East. I 8 
The over-dependency of the world, particularly the industrial countries, on oil as their 
main source of energy made them vulnerable to price volatility and insecurity of supply. 
A politically stable region and a promising petroleum resource, in terms of supply of 
crude oil, plays a vital role in the international petroleum market. The North Sea has both 
these characteristics. 
Over a medium period (5-10 years), the North Sea is able to act as a pressure valve for 
the price variation. High oil prices attract international oil companies to explore more oil 
fields in this relatively costly region. The exploration and production of new fields also 
have major effects. They cause the supply side of the market to meet the demand with 
secure North Sea oil, which lowers the prices, and reduces the importance of the other 
oil-rich provinces, as it has already done. 
The natural gas side of the petroleum industry enhances the importance of the political 
stability of the involved parties. The natural gas deals involve massive capital 
investments I 9 in building the pipelines linking the suppliers and the buyers of the 
commodity, and involves them in a long-term commercial relationship. The political 
stability of both the UK and Norway along with the geological location of the North Sea, 
which is close the Western Europe consumers, provide both sides of the contracts with 
18 The 1986 price cut, caused by the Saudis, decision to abandon their role as a swing producer, could also 
be regarded as a political decision if one took into consideration the Saudis, willingness to see the end of 
the Iran-Iraq war. The Saudis' regaining their market share would, in addition to improving the country's 
economic situation, break down these two counties' war efforts financed by the pre-1986 high oil prices. 
the peace of mind necessary for signing a gas deal. This situation, reinforced by 
considerable natural gas resources of the North Sea, seems to guarantee the market 
position of Britain and Norway for decades to come. 
The global importance of the North Sea as an oil-rich province has been mirrored 
domestically in the growing importance of oil and gas in the British and Norwegian 
economIes. 
In the UK, the discovery and exploitation of oil in the North Sea improved the country's 
position from a total dependence on imported oil, through self-sufficiency, to becoming a 
significant net exporter as early as 1980. By 1985, the UK's production had risen to 
almost one billion barrels a year, and the country became the fourth largest producer in 
the non-Communist world, after the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Mexico. 
The gross value of oil production in the first half of the eighties accounted for 6.5% of the 
national income?O In 1989, UKCS oil and gas production amounted to £7.5 billion and 
£2.1 billion, respectively, or, in aggregate, about 2% of the country's GDp21(see Figures 
2-8 and 2-9). This share peaked at 2.7% in 1987, and thereafter decreased to the level of 
1.3% in 1991. Since 1991 the oil and gas share of GDP has begun to recover and in 1996 
it reached its highest level of the 1990s, at 2.5%. 
In nominal terms, in 1984 and 1985 the contribution of petroleum production activity to 
British GDP was £16.5 billion and £15.6 billion, respectively. This amount declined to 
£5.8 billion in 1989, due to the withdrawal of the British government from its direct 
participation in the activity a few years earlier. During the period between 1990 and 
1996, the country enjoyed an average income of around £8 billion from royalties and 
19 The development and extraction of the Troll field (NCS) cost required more than $8 billion. 
20 Bean (1994) 
21 The Brown Book 1991. 
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taxes.22 Since the start of oil and gas production in the UKCS, more than £130 billion (in 
1994 money) has been paid to the British government in the form of taxes and royalties.23 
In 1996, there were around 30,000 people working in the offshore sector while ten times 
that figure, some 300,000 jobs relied upon the activities of the offshore industry.24 These 
range from specialist offshore-related jobs through high-tech computer and 
telecommunication companies to those who provide catering and laundering services for 
the offshore employees. 
The total capital investment of the industry during the development and production 
period of nearly three decades is well above £ 140 billion, in 1994 values.25 The industry 
has spent this on the development of more than 200 fields, with a total of 300 platforms 
and floating production systems, and nearly 4,000 miles of high-tech under-sea pipelines 
of various diameters. Petroleum's contribution to the country's economy "is such a large 
item that it swamps performance of other sectors".26 
As far as Norway is concerned, the petroleum industry has had a major economic impact 
on foreign exports, on national income, and on employment. The oil and gas share of 
total exports has been growing for most of the period since production started in the early 
1970s. In 1996, oil and gas accounted for 38.8% of Norway's exports (see Table 2-2). 
This share was 28.50/0 in 1989. Petroleum-related activities contributed only 0.5% to 
GDP in 197427, while by 1984-85 this share reached the level of 20%?8 The price 
decrease of 1986 pushed this share to its lowest level in the 1980s of 11.1 % in 1989 and 
since then it has begun to recover. In 1996, oil and gas production accounted for 15.6% 
of the country's GDP.29 
22 The Brown Book 1997. 
23 Hughes (1994). 
24 The Brown Book, 1998 
25 The Brown Book, 1998 
2(, Hughes (1994). 
27 SSB Norway (1997). 
28 SSB, Norway, 1989. 
2<) SSB, Norway, 1997. 
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Norwegian petroleum operations account for a substantial proportion of overall 
investment in the country. Capital spending by this sector represented about 30% of the 
total investment in Norway during 1984-1990. This proportion was substantially higher 
in the beginning of 1990s and was about 65% in 1993.30 
In the 1997 National Budget, the total wealth (net present value of the estimated future 
cash flow) of the industry was estimated to be around $150 billion, with the state's share 
close to $135 billion.31 
In 1980, Norway's petroleum-related industries employed some 37,500 people, or 2% of 
the country's workforce. By the late 1980s a total of around 58,000 (3%) were so 
employed. During the 1990s the number of employees reached its highest (in 1993) when 
more than 78,000 were employed. The number decreased to almost 73,000 which is more 
than 3.8% of the total workforce of the country, in 1996.32 
30 The Fact Sheet 1997, MPE, Norway. 
31 The Fact Sheet 1997, MPE, Norway (with 7% discount rate). 
32 The Fact Sheet 1995 & 1997, MPE, Norway. 
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Table 2-2 
Norway: Economic Consequences of the North Sea Petroleum Production 
Oil & Gas Share of Oil & Gas Share of Employment Share of 
Production GDP Export Total Export Total 
£ billion £ billion Thousand Employment 
1987 5.77 10.30% 5.77 28.80% 53.1 2.60% 
1988 5.03 8.60% 5.15 24.10% 53.5 2.60% 
1989 7.6 11.10% 7.49 28.50% 57.8 2.60% 
1990 9.5 13.20% 8.99 30.60% 58.8 2.70% 
1991 10.04 13.20% 9.85 31.90% 63.6 3.10% 
1992 10.13 12.90% 9.87 32.90% 71.8 3.40% 
1993 10.85 13.00% 10.57 33.50% 78.2 3.90% 
1994 10.88 12.50% 10.85 32.40% 74.1 4.60% 
1995 11.4 12.30% 11.54 32.50% 72.5 3.70% 
1996 15.71 15.60% 15.8 38.80% 73.0 3.60% 
1997 14.38 15.70% 13.42 37.50% 65.7 3.24% 
1998 9.63 11.10% 9.70 29.8% 68.1 2.84% 
1999 13.53 14.60% 13.10 36.3% 65.5 2.85% 
Source: The Fact Sheet, Oil Directorate, 1995-2000 
Table 2-3 
The UK: Economic Consequences of the North Sea Petroleum Production 
Oil & Gas Share of Investment Share of Employmene 
Production GDP Tot. Investment 
£ billion £ billion Thousand 
1986 11.9 2.50% 2.6 16.00% 22.3 
1987 12.6 2.70% 2.0 12.00% 28.2 
1988 10.4 1.70% 2.1 11.00% 29.3 
1989 10.3 1.50% 2.7 12.00% 30.7 
1990 12.0 1.50% 3.5 14.00% 36.5 
1991 12.1 1.30% 5.1 21.00% 33.2 
1992 12.2 1.50% 5.4 22.00% 29.5 
1993 13.8 1.70% 4.7 20.00% 34.2 
1994 15.9 2.00% 3.5 16.00% 27.2 
1995 17.8 2.10% 4.2 18.00% 29 
1996 21.0 2.50% 4.4 18.00% 24.5 
1997 22.1 2.58% 4.4 18.10% 33.0 
1998 27.4 3.10% 5.1 19.20% 28.4 
Source: Energy Report, DTI, 1987-2000 
1. The employment figures covers the manpower in offshore installation, construction 
workers, personnel on mobile rigs, ... etc. The number of manpower in offshore-
related activities exceeds these by 10-12 times. The total number of employees 
in those sectors were more than 300,000 in 1996. 
Investment Share of 
Total 
£ billion Investment 
3.47 27% 
2.97 24% 
3.2 30% 
3.22 34% 
4.31 48% 
4.95 54% 
5.76 65% 
5.62 60% 
4.81 51% 
4.90 53% 
4.95 53% 
6.20 59% 
5.23 56% 
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Figure 2-7 
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2.3 Period of Rapid Exploration and Governments Leniency 
The discovery of Groningen gas field in the Dutch section of the North Sea attracted the 
attention of some major multinational oil companies to the petroleum potential of this 
region. When the legal issue of exploitation of natural resources beneath the coastal area 
was resolved, both Norway and the UK began to construct licensing systems that would 
set conditions for companies to obtain exploration and production rights. 
The process of formulating a licensing policy began in Britain. The Committee that was 
set up within the Ministry of Power to draw up legislation took four factors into 
consideration.33 First, it appreciated the uncertainty and risks involved in exploration for 
petroleum activity. Second, the committee considered the beneficial impact the discovery 
of oil and gas would have on the British economy in terms of security of petroleum 
supplies and the balance of payments. Third, the committee considered the evolving 
relationship in the Middle East between host governments and oil companies. It was 
decided to avoid any policy decision that would encourage the oil-producing nations to 
increase their demands on the companies, including British Petroleum (BP). Finally, the 
Committee recognized the potential benefit to British industry that exploration activity 
would bring. 
The Committee divided the continental shelf into blocks of approximately 250 square 
kilometers each and allocated them at the discretion of the Ministry of Power rather than 
auctioning them as in the United States. The committee rejected the auction system 
because it "does not permit the same range of detailed control that a discretionary 
licensing system does". 34 
The discretionary system would allow the Ministry to choose companies willing to carry 
out a demanding exploration program, and would, it was assumed, speed up the 
exploration of such an unknown territory as the UKCS. In addition, the system would 
:13 Committee of Public Accounts, Report 25. 
34 Committee of Public Accounts, Report 3. 
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allow the Ministry to have more favorable policies towards British companies and the 
multinationals that were making extensive use of domestic goods and services.35 
The actual terms under which the Ministry of Power was to award licenses were set in the 
Petroleum (Production)(Continental Shelf and Territorial Sea) Regulations, 1964. As part 
of the application procedure, an oil company had to submit a detailed work program 
including the company's financial and technological ability as well as its past experience 
in offshore petroleum exploration/production. 
Despite the initial concern for the application of domestic goods and services, no extra 
pressure (except informal commitments of companies to apply those goods and services) 
was envisaged in the early regulation. There seem to be two basic reasons for this. First, 
the UK sought a speedy rate of exploration and production, and second, the profitability 
of the offshore industry, and consequently the future of North Sea petroleum production, 
was questionable. As in the 1967 Fuel Policy Review, the government continued to 
believe that oil would remain cheap for many years to come. At the time the price of 
crude oil was around $2 a barrel and large profits from the new North Sea fields were not 
expected. The priority was given to attracting as many oil companies as possible, with the 
highest exploration/production speed. In addition, the licensees were also required to land 
all the petroleum produced on the UKCS in Britain, unless prior approval was granted by 
the Secretary of State for Power. 
The tendency in Norway was quite similar. The Norwegian licensing system that 
emerged in 1965 was a combination of the country's tradition of regulating foreign 
investment (based on the Concession Act of 1917) and inspiration from the British 
licensing system.36 The Act of 1917 required foreign investors, particularly those wishing 
to invest in natural resources, to, among other factors, commit to apply as much 
Norwegian goods and services as possible. 37 However, being confronted with the same 
.15 Nelsen (1993) 
36 Petroleum Press Service, May 1965. 
37 Kresl (1976) 
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difficulties as the UK, the Norwegians' first regulatory framework offered terms and 
conditions modest enough to attract as many investors as possible. 
The 1965 Decree created two types of licenses: reconnaissance and 
exploration/production licenses. The former could be applied for at any time and granted 
to the holder, for a yearly fee, the nonexclusive right to conduct a variety of exploratory 
tests, excluding drilling, over a certain area for a period of three years.38 As far as 
exploration/production licenses were concerned, the Norwegian regulators developed a 
system very similar to that of Britain. The intention was to give the oil companies enough 
room to maneuver while keeping a certain amount of pressure on them to maintain their 
exploration activities. 
The Norwegians' first interest was to find out how much petroleum reserve, if any, they 
had. To that end, they followed the British in providing strong incentives for companies 
to explore the acquired territory quickly and thoroughly. However, unlike Britain, this 
proved to be a short-run commitment to speed. Norwegian officials did not face the 
balance of payments or security of supply problems faced by British.39 
However, there were also some differences in the two licensing systems. For instance, 
realizing the competition between the UKCS and NCS in attracting the companies, 
Norwegians divided the shelf into blocks with areas of 500 square kilometers each, large 
enough to attract the oil companies, and small enough to explore thoroughly in a 
reasonable amount of time. 
The Norwegians also applied a discretionary licensing system based on the companies' 
working plan. Like the case in the UK, the plan should include the company's financial, 
technological and know-how ability as well as its past and planned contribution to the 
Norwegian economy, although the latter was mentioned as an understanding between the 
government and the companies. 
38 Norway, Ministry of Industry, Storting Report No. 22 (1965-66) 
39 Nelsen (1991) 
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With regard to taxation, oil companies in the UK were to pay a 12.5% royalty on the 
petroleum they produced, payable in cash or kind at the Secretary of State for Power's 
discretion. In addition, normal corporate income tax of 53.75% was also payable. 
The Norwegian Royal Decree of 1965 predicted softer financial liabilities for companies 
than the British Petroleum Act of 1964 did. The royalty rate was set at 10% of the gross 
value of the extracted products, to be paid in cash or kind at the Ministry's discretion. The 
companies were also required to pay normal corporate income tax of 50.8%. In all, the 
tax system was to take between 54 and 57 % of oil companies' profits. 
The second licensing round (1965) in Britain underwent some modifications. In addition 
to the first round's requirements, the applicants had to report their past performance and 
their past and/or planned contribution to the British economy. However, the latter took 
the form of companies' informal commitment to use competitive British goods and 
services. The government did not have any monitoring means to implement the 
requirement in earnest and there was concern that any push in that regard would 
discourage speedy development of the UKCS. 
Norway was confronted with a similar problem. The size of the overall Norwegian 
industries, the lack of experience and expertise in the offshore industry, and the already 
expensive nature of North Sea oil exploration and production resulted in authorities' low 
bargaining power. These prevented the authorities from reaching a better agreement than 
companies' verbal commitment to the application of domestic goods and services as long 
as they were competitive in price, quality, delivery time, etc. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the 
result was not to the government's satisfaction. The companies' unwillingness to switch 
from their traditional suppliers to Norwegian ones meant that under 20% of the total 
goods and services applied in the development and production phases of North Sea 
petroleum activity an the beginning of 1970s was supplied by Norway.4o 
40 Nelsen (1991) 
41 
This dissatisfaction, in particular, and the change in Norwegian performance towards 
more government involvement in the offshore activity, were reflected in the formation of 
two committees by a royal decree (1970). The first committee was to "submit proposals 
relating to future governmental organization for exploration and exploitation of 
submarine natural resources" .41 The second committee was responsible for proposing 
changes to the 1965 licensing system. 
The discovery of Cod field (though not commercial at the time) and later Ekofisk field 
caused a turning point in Norwegian petroleum policy. In addition, shortly after the two 
committees commenced work in late the 1960s, the events in the Middle East altered the 
balance of power between the companies and producer governments, including Norway. 
The extraction of significant price concessions from the oil companies, by the OPEC 
countries, in negotiations held in Tehran and Tripoli, and the wave of nationalization and 
state participation agreements in those countries, made some form of government control 
of petroleum development and production the norm. The Norwegian government made a 
clear attempt to follow the international trend. 
In the UK, however, the government's policy during 1960s and early 1970s continued to 
be based on speedy exploration. In effect, this aspect of British policies overshadowed all 
other issues such as taxation and participation of British industry in the North Sea market. 
If there was any pressure from government it was in the form of companies' informal 
commitments to use specified British capacity in the conduct of their exploration drilling 
programs. However, the next section discusses how the British followed the Norwegians 
to increase their take from, and control over, their section of North Sea activity. 
The two states' lenient policies were, by and large, successful in attracting the oil 
companies attention to the newly born oil-rich region. However, the policies did not 
heavily involve the two countries' offshore supply industries in North Sea petroleum 
41 Norway, Ministry of Industry, Report No. 76. Author's translation. 
activity. The goods and services of each country hardly reached the level of 20% of total 
procurement of the respective shelf.42 
2.4 Period of Government Intervention 
As Norwegian supply assurance developed, attention began to turn to the domestic 
benefits the new industry might bring. Based on the result of the first committee's report, 
the Storting, the Norwegian parliament, voted in June 1972 to reorganize petroleum 
operations by creating three state entities: the Petroleum and Mining Department within 
the Ministry of Industry, the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD), and a state-owned 
oil company called Den Norske Stats Oljeseleskap (Statoil). 
The Petroleum and Mining Department had the responsibility of formulating legislation, 
overseeing the licensing process and coordinating the petroleum-related activities of other 
ministries. The Directorate was to make sure that the wishes of the Ministry were being 
carried out, and also to gather and analyze all the geological information available on the 
NCS. Finally, through a state-owned oil company, Norway sought to have an integrated, 
state-owned company to take active part in, and have direct influence upon, the 
management of all stages of operations. 43 
Statoil was subject to political control. The Minister of Industry was designated its 
"general assembly" (its shareholder) and given supreme authority in Statoil. However, to 
avoid a possible conflict between political and economic considerations behind Statoil's 
creation, the company was given the freedom to pursue its business interests, like a 
private company, by "conducting, on its own or by cooperation with other companies, 
exploration for, and production, transportation, distribution, and marketing of petroleum 
and its products".44 
42 Nelsen, 1991 
4, Norway, Ministry oflndustry, Storting Proposal No. 78 (1972-1973). Author's translation. 
44 Norway, Storting, Report No. 316 (1972). Author's translation. 
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Statoil was formed to establish and secure the state's active presence in the North Sea 
petroleum industry. To that end, the company was given a minimum of 50% stake in 
every license issued after 1972. The share could rise up to 80% depending on the size of 
the discovered field base on a "sliding scale" principle. 
Statoil had no liability over the costs incurred in the exploration phase 45, as the other 
partners were required to bear Statoil's share.46 Further, Statoil was given a seat on all 
Boards of Directors with the right to veto any decisions made against the perceived 
Norwegian national interest. According to legislation, Statoil needed approval of only 
one other partner to impose its decisions on the Board. Statoil was a financially 
independent body in the sense that all returns to the state, pecuniary or non-pecuniary, 
had to be channeled to government via Statoil. This, in practice eliminated the need for 
the company to seek the state's permission at every step of its business activities. 
In the UK, the idea of establishing a national hydrocarbon corporation was first mooted 
in 1968. The government was, at the time, considering a national company to take over 
all unlicensed blocks as well as the interests of the Gas Council and the National Coal 
Board in existing onshore and offshore production. However, it was only with the passing 
of the Petroleum and Submarine Pipelines Act (November 1975) that the British National 
Oil Corporation came to existence. 
The Act allowed BNOC to be involved in all ventures concerned with oil and its 
derivatives, not only in the North Sea and the UK but also in other parts of the world, 
with the consent of the Secretary of State. Further, the Corporation was entitled to acquire 
a 51 % stake in offshore operating groups, in addition to taking over the National Coal 
Board's interests in the North Sea. The Corporation was to act under direct supervision of 
the Secretary of State, and to tender advice on any matter connected with petroleum that 
it considered appropriate. 
45 From 1979, Norsk Hydro and Saga would pay their share of exploration cost and Statoil as much as the 
sum of these two Norwegian companies. The international companies were liable for the remaining, 
according to their share in the consortium. 
46 "Can·ied Interest" Principle. 
44 
Like Statoil, BNOC was to operate as a commercial oil company, while also acting as an 
instrument of government policy. On paper, BNOC and Statoil were subject to similar 
control mechanisms, but BNOC was to be more financially dependent on the 
government. As expected, the funds required to perform the duty was provided by the 
government. However, the Act emphasized that the financial support would take the form 
of loans to the Corporation, which should be reimbursed, with interest, when the 
corporation was financially able to do so. The Corporation was not considered as a 
servant or an agent of the Crown and was not to enjoy exemption from any tax, duty, levy 
or other charges. 
BNOC was the only known national company worldwide that could not retain its own 
profit.47 The profit would go into the National Oil Account and BNOC could then have it 
back in so far as it was able to persuade the Secretary of State for Energy that it was 
needed for the Corporation's tasks. The corporation was responsible for its share of the 
construction and production costs of the fields it had shares in. However, the corporation 
would reimburse its share of the exploration cost if the exploration resulted in a 
commercial discovery. 
The British National Oil Corporation was established, mostly, to keep control of North 
Sea resources in British hands In that respect, BNOC confronted no major resistance 
from the international oil companies when acquiring 51 % share in the existing oil and gas 
fields, taken over from other companies after its establishment. However, despite its 51 % 
share, and unlike Statoil, BNOC did not practice the role of a full partner in those fields. 
Rather, the corporation's share gave it the right to buy 51 % of the oil and gas produced 
from the other partners. The partner companies on the other hand, had the option to buy 
back the oil at the very same price. Such participation did not make the internationals too 
opposed, as the buy-back system made the effective participation minimal. With this 
principle, the government intended to secure the country's access to its energy resources 
in times of crises, as it kept the right to determine the destinations of the products 
whenever it deemed it necessary. 
47 Arnold (1978) 
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Another consideration behind the establishment of BNOC was the UK government's 
desire to ensure a higher involvement of British offshore suppliers in the UKCS 
activity.48 The Corporation's presence in the partnerships and its role as operator of some 
of the fields meant that it could encourage international companies to apply as much 
British-made goods and services as possible. BNOC was able to provide the authorities 
with first-hand information regarding procurement activities on the UKCS. The 
Corporation was, also, given the task of providing the country with the expertise to 
conduct the offshore activity of UKCS. 
The other advantage for the corporation stemmed from its access to a wide range of 
confidential information from operating committees throughout the Continental Shelf. 
This enabled it to identify high quality territory. BNOC could secure the ownership of 
those territories without having to compete with other applicants. 
Both Statoil and BNOC were to protect the interests of their respected country. However, 
Statoil's role in protecting the offshore suppliers' interest in North Sea activity was more 
direct. The company's voting and vetoing rights, in addition to the company's opportunity 
to dictate decision concerning procurements for up to roughly £1,000,000 (£500,000 
when it was not operating the field) every time, provided domestic suppliers with a good 
opportunity to remain active in the North Sea deals. 
Norway's new policy was not restricted to the new institutions. The need for serious 
measures to increase Norwegian offshore suppliers' involvement in the North Sea activity 
was particularly reflected in the new terms and conditions for awarding 
production/exploration licenses. In that respect, the Royal Decree of 8 December 1972 
required licensees to use Norwegian goods and services. To monitor compliance with this 
rule, the Ministry established a system of reporting that opened the bidding process to 
government scrutiny. The Ministry also made it clear that a company's record of letting 
contracts to Norwegian firms would playa substantial role in the awarding of licenses. 
48 Nelsen (1991) 
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The Norwegian policy favoring domestic suppliers was immediately followed by the UK. 
In 1972, the International Management and Engineering Group (IMEG), a private 
consultant institution, was assigned to investigate the British offshore suppliers' potential, 
and to assist the government to establish a powerful and highly involved industry parallel 
to the UKCS offshore activity. By 1973, the IMEG consultants provided the first 
comprehensive description of the state of the British offshore supply industry and 
recommended injection of further life into it. Among other suggestions, the group 
recommended that the government should make it clear to the international oil companies 
that their application would be reviewed in a more favorable light if they gave British 
suppliers a full opportunity to take part in the north sea petroleum industry. In addition, a 
public body was recommended to audit the companies' procurements to prevent the oil 
companies from discriminating against British suppliers.49 
From the government's point of view, the auditing, if effective, could have a very rapid 
impact upon the pattern of demand within the offshore supply market. The auditing could 
be accomplished using traditional administrative techniques. The IMEG Report was 
prepared in such a way that the government could not avoid taking a view of the offshore 
supply industry and its prospects. 
Upon publication of the IMEG Report, the British government established an Offshore 
Supply Office (OSO) to oversee its policies towards the industry. In addition, the 
companies were urged to report their procurement, in detail, with the source of supply, 
magnitude of procurement and the name of the British companies approached prior to the 
finalization of the contract. According to the first Director-General of OSO, an efficient 
audit operation was a prerequisite for change in established supplier-customer 
relationships. 
By requiring the oil companies to reveal the exact nature of their offshore purchases of 
goods and services, the government intended to ensure that oil companies were 
continuously aware of its concern with the offshore supply issue. The international 
49 for more about the report see Nelsen, 1991, p-p 74-76 
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companies' reaction to this requirement was rather soft, or at least it appeared to be that 
way. This was possibly due to the fact that after adverse publicity in 1972 regarding the 
oil companies' huge revenue from North Sea, they were keen to appear compliant with 
the authorities' request. Under this system, the companies were to report all purchases 
over £25,000, along with the other information mentioned above. 
Despite the authorities' enthusiasm and endeavor for having a high British supplier 
involvement in the offshore industry, the degree of British engagement in 1974 did not 
seem to reflect the country's standing as a major industrial nation. 50 The main reason for 
this was that some oil companies active in the UK were engaged in a number of practices 
that were designed to ensure that British firms were not able to compete with foreign 
suppliers in bidding for contracts. Instances of this included using commercial codes in 
specifying contracts not standard or recognized in the UK (meters instead of inches, for 
example), and imposition of unrealistic delivery time. In addition, some oil companies 
attempted to overstate their purchases of British goods by acquiring foreign-made 
equipment through UK-based suppliers and then counting such purchases as British in 
their reports. Due to these considerations it became clear to the authorities that they 
should "require other devices than simple auditing if it was to exert substantial influence 
in the critical area of contract tendering". 51 
In addition to the above considerations, two other events, namely the Arab-Israeli war, 
and its subsequent supply-shortage and price rise, and the national coal miners strike 
(both during 1973-74), persuaded the authorities to have a stricter policy with regard to 
the application of British goods and services in the UKCS. More importantly, the 
government was convinced that in order to avoid another shortage in the country's oil 
supply, the oil and gas fields of the UKCS had to be developed as fast as possible. 
However, this emphasis on speed of development was in contrast to the government's 
ability to pursue a higher application of domestic goods and services. This is because the 
50 Jenkin (1981). 
51 Jenkin (1981:29) 
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switch from established to British suppliers might delay field development, especially 
when new and inexperienced suppliers were involved. In this regard, a monitoring group 
within OSO was set up to check on a variety of delivery problems, which the offshore 
supply industry had encountered, and to make sure that British firms did not lose supply 
contracts for being late in meeting their delivery deadlines. 
The unsatisfactory results of the government's action forced the authorities to approach 
the international oil companies and express their, and trade unions', concern about the 
question of offshore suppliers. The results of months of negotiations between the parties 
was a Memorandum of Understanding (MU), signed by the British government and 
international oil companies, in 1975.52 The MU consisted of a set of rules, which would 
govern the commercial procedures involved in placing tenders. According to the MU, 
those bidding for a contract would have an equal period of time to prepare and submit a 
bid. It also directed the oil companies to phrase their tenders in such a way as to take 
account of British industrial specification standards. In order to make sure that the 
procedures were followed, the OSO was authorized to examine tender documents and the 
list of bidders asked to tender for contracts. 
In practice, the MU obliged oil companies to inform the OSO of their intention to place 
contracts over £500,000 (nominal price), in the case of construction and service, and over 
£ 100,000, in the case of materials and manufactures. The OSO was also able to examine 
the contracting procedure in the case of contracts of £5,000 or more. The OSO was to be 
provided with the list of firms that would be asked to tender for a contract, and only after 
OSO approval could the tender be sent out to the firms concerned. 
The Memorandum of Understanding, consisted of policing the "gentlemen's agreements" 
which committed operators to placing 70% of their orders with UK companies. Though 
the Memorandum and the agreement were not legally binding, the companies understood 
that violating them meant probable exclusion from future licensing rounds. No body had 
any doubt in mind that giving British companies full and fair opportunity meant, in fact, 
52 Jenkin, 1981. 
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"buy British". 53 Hence, the average share of the British goods and services from the total 
procurement of the North Sea petroleum industry, which was hardly above 20% in the 
early years of 1970s, reached to 60% before the end of the same decade. 54 This is while 
the Norwegian share of North Sea procurement rose by more than 220%, from less than 
28% in 1975 to more than 62% in 1978.55 
Norway, however, did not restrict itself to demanding short-term application of domestic 
goods and services. In order to have a sustainable Norwegian suppliers' presence in NCS 
activity, the government used the licensing process to encourage foreign companies to 
assist in the development of Norwegian industry in general. The companies, besides other 
qualifications, should offer research and industrial cooperation projects to relevant 
Norwegian industry. The ministry was particularly interested in projects that resulted in a 
transfer of technology to Norway, or access to a new market for Norwegian products. 
The Norwegian approach to the issue of involving multinational companies in creating 
and/or improving a domestic offshore supply industry seems different to Britain's. This 
may stem from the far lower level of industrialization in Norway, and the lack of 
domestic experts for the task. The Norwegian authorities also recognized the need for 
new technologies to develop successfully the petroleum resources that were bound to be 
found in deeper and more challenging northerly waters. The government made it clear 
that the companies were expected to carry out 50% of the research needed to develop 
these technologies in Norway.56 This, again, indicates that Norway was more interested 
in long-term development than UK. 
The Norwegian Royal Decree of 1972, which led to the creation of Statoil and the Oil 
Directorate and introduced the state as an active partner through Statoil, was the comer 
stone of the licenses issued in the 1970s. The first opportunity to apply the new licensing 
terms came in March 1973. Statfjord field, the largest petroleum field in the North Sea, 
53 Cook and Surrey (1983) 
54 The Brown Book, 1981 
55 Storting, Report No. 53 
56 Storting, Report No. 53 
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was awarded, between formal licensing rounds, to Statoil and a group of other 
international companies. Statoil was awarded a 50% share of the license, thus 
establishing a precedent for the future. 
The Norwegian policy to ensure involvement of Norwegian offshore suppliers in North 
Sea activity seems to have stemmed from pressure exerted on the government by the 
latter group. 57 Leading the fight for more pressure on the companies to award contracts to 
Norwegian firms were the Association of Machine Industries (MVL) and the unions, 
particularly the Norwegian Iron and Metalworkers Union. Privately the coalition of 
industrialists and workers rejected free trade in offshore supplies as harmful to their 
interests, but in public they argued that Norway had to use means at its disposal to 
counter the unfair practices of its competitors. 58 
It was believed that most of the civil servants in the OED realized that Norwegian 
offshore supplies policy fostered inefficiency in Norwegian offshore industry and raised 
costs on the continental shelf far above those in other areas of the world. Nevertheless, 
their actions were constrained by the political considerations of the cabinet. 59 
The Norwegian Conservative Party came to office (1981) promising a less protected 
environment for domestic offshore industries. However, they bowed quickly to pressure 
and reversed their policy. In late 1982, Elf announced its plans to order a deck support 
frame for its Heimdal field from a German company. The plan was fiercely opposed by 
the offshore supply industry. The case was closed with the government's intervention, 
persuading Elf to use a government-subsidized Norwegian yard.6o 
Another trouble arose under the next government (Coalition). In 1984, Philips Petroleum 
placed a $50 million order for a steel platform with the Dutch Company Heerema. 
However, after changing their mind and awarding the contract to a Norwegian company, 
57Nelsen (1991) 
58 North Sea Letter, 29 January 1986. 
59 Nelsen (1991) 
60 NoroiL November 1982. 
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Aker-Verdal, the company openly claimed that it was forced to make a decision which 
was "not based on sound business criteria" .61 The press reported that the company had 
been threatened with exclusion from future licensing rounds if it refused to accept a much 
higher Norwegian bid.62 
However, when similar cases involving a Norwegian company took place, the 
government's reaction was totally different. This may question the extent to which the 
government's offshore supplier policy applied to the Norwegian companies. For instance, 
in the summer of 1988, Norsk Hydro announced the award of a $65 million contract to a 
Spanish company whose bid was 25% lower than the lowest Norwegian contractor's bid. 
The award was strongly criticized by the offshore industry, but the government held fast 
and refused to intervene. 63 
The policies applied by the two countries throughout the 1970s seemed similar though 
perhaps with different considerations behind them. The similarity even continued when 
the two countries decided to change their policies with regard to the respected national oil 
companies. Yet again the UK and Norway had different motivations for their changing 
attitude. 
Towards the end of the 1970s, there was a rise in political opposition to Statoil's growing 
power. The importance of the petroleum sector for the Norwegian economy gave 
considerable importance to Statoil, as the state's arm in the industry. Statoil's financial 
strength, compared to the size of country's economy, and its growing political strength 
were unheard of in Norway and its novelty was interpreted as potentially precarious. 64 
Further, the company had easy access to information and had very close tie to the 
Ministry. There were growing fears that the company was in a position to overwhelm the 
petroleum policy-making structure and the entire Norwegian economy65. 
hI Norwegian Oil Review, no. 6, 1984. 
(,2 European Economic Review, May 1984. 
63 Wo1dsdal (1988) 
64 Noreng in the preface to Andersen (1993) 
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In the UK, on the other hand, the new Conservative government of 1979 was committed 
to reducing the role of government in the economy by, among other things, shrinking the 
public sector and reducing government regulation. As far as BNOC was concerned, the 
first attempt was made by the Treasury to sell part of the corporations' North Sea assets, 
worth over £2 billion, to raise money for the Exchequer. However, the company 
remained intact due to the government's recognition of the Corporation's value, especially 
in times of crises. In such times the Corporation would be a powerful actor in the oil 
market as the nominal controller of almost one million barrels a day of crude oil, and the 
trader of approximately half of that on the open market. The Iranian Revolution of 1979 
brought about the second oil crisis and BNOC could assist the government in fulfilling 
the aim of security of supply for the country. 
The governments' strict policy to involve the domestic offshore supply industry in their 
offshore petroleum industry seemed to be quite fruitful. In about one decade (by 1985), 
the level of domestic goods and services used in the UKCS and NCS reached to 
approximately 80% and 90%, respectively, of the total procurement made in the two 
shelves.66 
However, the changing attitude towards the national oil companies had begun. The next 
section addresses the destiny of these corporations. 
2.5 Changing Policies, again 
As far as the Norwegian state was concerned, the dual identity of Statoil as a policy 
instrument and as a profit-maximizing enterprise proved to be incompatible. As a policy 
instrument, Statoil, besides other tasks, had to secure the presence of the Norwegian 
offshore-related industries in North Sea petroleum activity. To that end, the corporation 
was given the opportunity (as a major shareholder) and the authority to have access to all 
procurement documents. This, along with the company's financial strength, stemming 
65 Nelsen (1991) 
66 The Fact Shhet (Norway), 1995 and the Brown Book (the UK), 1987. 
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from its share of the NCS and as the care-taker of the state's take from the industry, gave 
the company an almost unique opportunity to perform as an enterprise. 
As early as 1974 the ability of the authorities to control Statoil was questioned in 
Storting. The Parliament was asking the company to become more forthcoming with 
internal information, while Statoil was concerned that its commercial dealings with 
private companies would be jeopardized by public scrutiny of its plans. 
There was also some evidence that the NPD was unable to stay ahead of developments on 
the continental shelf and in Statoil. The NPD's budget growth was far less than that of 
Statoil. "Statoil was continuously poaching NPD's and other public employees. By the 
end of the 1970s there was growing concern that the NPD lacked the resources to control 
effectively activities on the continental shelf". 67 
However, prior to 1980, the voices raised in opposition to Statoil were either unheard, or 
ignored, as the political consensus in favour of a strong economy was very strong. In the 
early 1980s, on the other hand, the state's attempt for greater control of participation in 
offshore petroleum activities began to lose its momentum. The first sign was the growth 
of political opposition to Statoil, which had its base of support in the Norwegian business 
community. 
In 1982, a committee was set up to study the Company's position vis-a-vis other parties, 
public organizations and private sectors, active in the North Sea offshore sector. In 1983, 
the commission presented its report to the government stating their view that "it is 
considered quite inappropriate that a state-owned company, whose strength rests in a 
state-owned cash flow, could have a dominating size compared to the size of Norwegian 
industry" .68 
67 Nelsen (1991 :78) 
68 Storting. Report 16, 1983. Author's translation 
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Based on the Commission's report, and after deliberating on the issue for more than a 
year, Statoil's position as the government's main instrument to exert state control over 
NCS activity underwent some dramatic changes. 
From March 1985, Statoil was no longer entitled to an automatic 51 % share in all 
licenses. The company, like other Norwegian and international companies, had to apply 
for exploration and production licenses, while bearing the exploration and production 
costs according to its share in the consortium. Further, Statoil lost its privileged voting 
and vetoing right, and was entitled to vote in proportion to its share only. Further, the 
government's tax and royalty takes were no longer to be channeled through Statoil. 
However, the company was still in charge of selling the government's share of oil and 
gas. 
The elimination of part of Statoil's privilege, such as the reduction of its guaranteed share 
of 51-80 percent to 20 percent, did not decrease the magnitude of the state's involvement 
in the North Sea. The Norwegian State, taking into account Statoil's share, would still 
have its traditional majority of the shares in each consortium, called The State's Direct 
Financial Interest (SDFI). The difference was that the part of the state's overall share that 
was not given to Statoil was the government's direct involvement in the North Sea affair. 
The government's share carried no voting right, and the partners would vote according to 
their relative share of the consortium. Though Statoil was given the responsibility of 
operational and financial management of the state's direct interest, the generated revenue 
would be directly channeled to the state. In 1987, a special fund, called Oljefund (Oil 
Fund), was established to accumulate all state profits from its direct participation. 
According to the SDFI arrangement, the state pays a share of all investment and 
operating costs incurred in the exploration and production phases of each field. The SDFI 
now represents an extensive involvement in petroleum operations. SDFI accounted for 
roughly 400/0 of all capital spending on the Norwegian Continental Shelf in 1996. 
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The process of state participation has remained unchanged ever since the introduction of 
SDFI as an alternative for Statoil's services. The European Parliament's Decree of 1995 
had no bearing on this issue either. The Decree asked merely that Statoil's role as a 
corporation and its role as the state's agent should be kept separate. 
The elimination of Statoil's presence as a policy instrument did not affect the Norwegian 
long-term goal of dominating the NCS, and neither did it affect the means of reaching 
that target. As far as the presence of Norwegian oil fields in the N CS was concerned, 
Statoil's absence could be filled by two other Norwegian companies, Norsk Hydro and 
Saga Petroleum. 
Norsk Hydro was Norway's largest, most international industrial corporation and an 
experienced oil producer, with government holding 51 % of its shares. As Norway's 
corporate giant, Norsk Hydro had commanded tremendous respect among business and 
po Ii ti cal leaders. 69 
Saga Petroleum, on the other hand, was a completely private company, but the state had 
played a crucial role in its creation when in 1971172 the authorities directed a number of 
small companies with interests in the North Sea to pool their resources. Eventually 96 
companies joined to form a partnership in 1972. Saga was the favorite of the political 
right, and enjoyed strong support in the Storting.7o 
The government's strong backing for these companies emerged well before the changes 
made to Statoil. In the third licensing round (1974-78) these two companies gained shares 
in 12 (out of 20) awarded licenses being operator in 4 of them (3 for Norsk Hydro and 1 
for Saga Petroleum). In 1978, one of the biggest North Sea oil fields was awarded 
exclusively to Norwegian companies, with Esso involved as technical assistant to the 
operator, Statoil. In the next licensing round, the two companies secured 4 licenses (out 
of 8 licenses awarded), being appointed as operator in half of them. 
69 Visher and Remoe (1984) 
70 Nelsen (1991) 
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The path of favouring the Norwegian companies continued in the 1980s. The government 
of the early 1980s, used, in part, the licensing system to raise the positions of Norsk 
Hydro and Saga in order to undermine Statoil's role. In the next licensing round (1980-
82) Norsk Hydro and Saga were awarded 6 and 3 operatorships, respectively, while 
Statoil received only 5, out of20 licenses awarded. 
Towards the end of the 1980s, the primary goal of having activities on the continental 
shelf dominated by Norwegian companies was confronted with technical challenges and 
falling oil prices. This gave Norwegian officials a new appreciation of the abilities of the 
major international oil companies, whose presence in the NCS seemed more secure than 
ever. The rest of the 1980s and 1990s witnessed the Norwegian government's favouring 
the Norwegian oil companies, but also including a small group of international firms, 
namely Esso, Mobil, Conoco, Shell, BP, Elf, Total, Agip, and Fina. 
The British National Oil Company did not have a better destiny than Statoil. Though, as 
we have seen, the corporation escaped the first attempt at selling a part of its assets, a part 
of its privileges were eliminated in the summer of 1979. Backed by the private oil 
companies, the Department of Energy announced that the Corporation would no longer: 
gain an automatic 51 % share in new licenses, though keeping its right to 51 % of the 
oil produced on the same buy-back basis as before, 
have the right to sit on operating committees where it did not have an equity interest, 
receive preferential treatment in the awarding of licenses, 
be able to apply for licenses outside of licensing rounds, 
serve as advisor to the Department. 
However, until 1981, BNOC not only remained a public corporation, but also was 
looking stronger, as it was stripped of its governmental duties and thus free to operate on 
a wholly commercial basis. 
In July 1981, the government declared its decision to privatize key public sector 
industries like British Telecom, the Electricity Council, British Gas and BNOC. The 
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government's policy was summarized as "no industry should remam under state 
ownership unless there is a positive and overwhelming case for it so doing.,,7l 
Following the government's decision, BNOC was to create a new company, called 
Britoil, out of its exploration and production arm and transfer the shares to the Secretary 
of State. The latter would then dispose of 51 %, or more, of the shares. The remaining part 
of BNOC, the trading part, would continue as a public enterprise and as a party to the 
participation agreements. By this, BNOC was reduced to an oil trading company by 
spinning off its offshore operations. 72 
This plan, however, still left a significant portion of BNOC to the state. This was due, 
partly, to the government's continued concern about security of supply, and partly to the 
government's attempt to exert influence on world crude oil prices. 
With approximately 870,000 barrels of crude oil passmg through it every day, the 
remaining part of BNOC assumed a leading role in the international market as a short-
term price-setter. For instance, in the time of an oil glut, as in 1982, the corporation did 
not have the tools to manage an excess supply of crude oil. BNOC was tied, through 
participation and other agreements, into long term and inflexible purchasing contracts 
with North Sea companies that committed it to receiving approximately 435,000 barrels a 
day at an agreed term price.73 Under the terms of these contracts, the sellers did not have 
to buy the oil back from BNOC, as did sellers in traditional participation agreements. 74 In 
addition, BNOC traded state crude oil, received as royalty in kind, accounting for another 
260,000 barrels a day. Thus the Corporation was required to accept a large amount of 
crude oil every day with limited ability to control the flow, or without having any down-
stream storage facilities for stock. When the spot price was below regular price, the 
Corporation found it difficult to keep its regular customers and had to sell to them at a 
loss. 
71 Riddel (1983: 101) 
72 Nelsen (1991) 
73 Nelsen (1991) 
74 Mabro testimony, Government Oil Price Policy, the UK, 1984 
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In both late 1984 and early 1985, the government approached Parliament to ask for a total 
of £65 million to cover part of BNOC's trading losses of £85.7 million in the fourth 
quarter of 1984 and the first quarter of 1985.75 The Corporation could no longer serve the 
purposes it was established, or adapted, for. 
In March 1985, the government announced in Parliament its intention to dissolve BNOC. 
Given the Conservative Party's commitment to privatization the announcement did not 
come as a surprise. However, the issue of security of supply was still important to the 
government. Thus, parallel to the abolition of BNOC, an organization, called the Oil and 
Pipelines Agency (OPA), was established to act as guardian of the participation 
agreements and to trade oil that the state would receive as royalty in kind and to manage 
the nation's strategic oil pipeline and storage systems. In March 1986, the transition of all 
BNOC's assets and liabilities to OP A was completed and BNOC was dissolved. 
However, when the international oil market finally calmed after more than three years of 
turmoil following the Iranian Revolution and Iran-Iraq war, the Conservative government 
went ahead with its initial plan and sold 51 % of Britoil's share in the financial market. 
The rest of the shares (41 %) was dealt with in the same manner as in 1985, and thus the 
whole company was in the hands of private owners. 
With the dissolution of BNOC and privatization of Britoil, the government did not end its 
participation in all North Sea fields. The passing of the state's offshore territory into the 
private sector did not affect the participation agreements that licensees continued to sign 
with the state. Those agreements were not ownership documents but contracts that 
guaranteed the state certain rights of control in national emergencies. This right was 
transferred to OP A. 
With the total privatization of the British energy sector in 1987, OPA was also abolished, 
and the government has had no involvement in the UKCS offshore activity, except as the 
license awarding body and the regulator of the affairs. 
75 North Sea Letter, 5 June 1985. 
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In the United Kingdom, it was not only government policy towards the shelfs petroleum 
activity that underwent changes: the offshore-related industry also lost a powerful 
supporter. When in office, Labour made the oil companies realise that though the MU 
was an informal agreement, companies' hesitation to use British goods and services 
would seriously jeopardize their chance of being included in the upcoming licensing 
rounds. The point was well-taken by the companies and, as we have seen, the share of 
domestic goods and services rose significantly. 
Despite having basic differences with Labour's energy policy, the new Conservative 
government of 1979 pursued similar policy on the issue of British goods and services. 
Domestic offshore suppliers were strongly supported by the authorities and the 
companies knew that the agreement still should be honored. However, this does not mean 
that the Memorandum was implemented easily. On some occasions the gap (either price, 
quality, or delivery time) between the domestic and foreign suppliers was so wide that 
without the government's interference the domestic supplier had little chance to 
compete. 76 Eventually, one company, however, chose to challenge the government. 
In 1984, an American oil company, Sun Oil, was awarding a £ 125 million contract for a 
new floating production platform, to operate in the Balmoral field, to a Swedish 
company, Gotaverken Arendal. As Sun Oil claimed, a British company, Cammell Laird, 
had been approached, but could not meet the necessary specifications, especially with 
regard to the time of delivering the rig, which was an absolute necessity for this marginal 
field to be profitable. 77 Despite its decision to award the contract to the Swedish 
company, Sun Oil promised to fulfill its 70% commitment, under the Memorandums of 
Understanding agreement. However, the deal was unacceptable for the authorities and the 
offshore supply industry, which had not seen a rig contract go abroad since 1978. The 
Department of Energy threatened the company with exclusion from future licensing 
rounds. The Department promised to scrutinize every phase of the Balmoral field's 
development project to see that British firms were given "full and fair opportunity" to 
76 Nelsen (1991) 
77 Lawson (1984) 
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compete for remaining contracts, even if the closer monitoring meant costly delays for 
the project. The Department clearly held Sun Oil, and not its partners, responsible for the 
incident, and rejected the company's applications in the ninth round as an example for all 
to consider. 78 While the Department had made threats to the partners, which included 
Britoil, formerly BNOC's exploration and production arm, the partners were able to 
distance themselves from Sun Oil, whose voting strength in the consortium made it 
difficult to defeat, and escape punishment. 
The published documents from the case 79 make it clear that initially Sun Oil solicited bids 
exclusively from UK companies. Only after these bids were thoroughly analyzed, and the 
companies given further opportunities to bid again, were they declared unacceptable and 
the Swedish company was approached. The government's strong reaction reflected a fear 
that Sun Oil's decision might encourage other companies to follow suit, causing the 
whole system to crash down. "This case is important and compelling because it provides 
a rare glimpse of the way the system really worked.,,8o 
This was certainly the view held by Britain's EEC partners, many of them hurt by the 
exclusion of their products from the UKCS. In the summer of 1984, the West German 
mechanical engineering association filed a complaint with the EEC Commission in 
relation to the ninth round. The commission launched an inquiry that focused specifically 
on the allocation criteria announced before each round that included the terms related to 
the contribution applicants had made, or intended to make, to the UK economy, and the 
extent to which they intended to involve British suppliers in UKCS activity. As a result of 
the Commission's action, the British government agreed to drop the criteria for future 
rounds. The action satisfied the Commission and the inquiry was stopped. The terms have 
never been repeated as requirements since the tenth licensing round. 
78 North Sea Letter, 29 May 1985. 
79 See North Sea Sun Oil's Decision to Place Abroad a Contract for a Floating Production Vessel. 
Pari iament, session 1983-84, July 1984 
80 Nelsen (1991: 100) 
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In spite of the changes in the requirements, OSO continued its initial responsibilities. The 
organization still remained responsible for monitoring of orders placed by the oil 
companies active in the UKCS. However, in 1992, the Secretary of State for Energy 
decided that, due to the maturity of the industry and the firm establishment of the 
offshore supply industry in the country, the detailed monitoring of orders for the UKCS 
was no longer necessary. This, in practice, put an end to the state's direct support of the 
British offshore supply industry. 
In Norway, on the other hand, the formal elimination of use of domestic goods and 
services as a requirement for awarding licenses did not happen before 1995. Throughout 
those years the government made it clear that excluding the Norwegian offshore-related 
industries from the procurement process would cost the company its chance of being 
awarded another production license. 
The European Parliament intervened in Norwegian policy towards domestic suppliers 
almost one decade after they did in the UK. Effective from July 1995, the European 
Parliament and Council's Directive urged Norway to modify some of the terms and 
conditions for awarding any petroleum exploration/production licenses. Regarding the 
companies' contribution to the country's economy (i.e. application of Norwegian goods 
and services) as a requirement in the licensing process, the Norwegian government could 
no longer apply discriminatory criteria in evaluating applications. Though this should be 
omitted from the government's list of requirements, how much in effect the authorities 
would weight the multinationals' disregard of domestic goods and services remains to be 
seen. 
2.6 Concluding Remarks 
The emergence of the North Sea as a petroleum-rich region has had significant effects on 
the global oil and gas market, as well as on the economy of the two countries, Norway 
and the UK. On a global basis, Norway and the UK are ranked as the sixth and ninth 
major oil producers, respectively, with Norway as the second oil exporter in the world. 
The two countries' total production accounts for some 9% of global oil production. 
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The impact of the petroleum industry on the economies of the two countries can be 
assessed by two distinct, and yet inter-related, aspects. The first is the effect of income in 
forms of tax, royalty and the state's share from participation where applicable. States' 
decisions to increase their take by increasing the tax and royalty percentage and the 
companies' resistance to major increases have been a common feature in almost all oil 
producing countries throughout the history of the global petroleum industry. Division of 
rent generated from the petroleum activity is a major issue between the parties involved 
in the industry, namely oil companies and the host governments. 
The second aspect of the effect of North Sea petroleum industry on the economies of the 
UK and Norway surrounds the companies' application of domestic capacity in the 
construction and production phases of each oil and gas field's development. The North 
Sea has witnessed a drastic increase in the share of domestic goods and services in both 
continental shelves. The question is whether this improvement stems from the efficiency-
gain of the offshore-related industry during the lifetime of the activity or is rooted in the 
governments' support for the industry in a political/ economical fashion. 
The policies adopted by the two countries in the early years of North Sea activity were, 
by and large, similar. The requirements were soft enough to attract as many oil 
companies as possible. At the same time the authorities kept the right to engage or 
dismiss any company in a discretionary licensing system, rather than the conventional 
bonus-based auction. The discretionary system was claimed to protect the nations' 
sovereignty over their natural resources. 
However, the mere "sovereignty" reason seems to oversimplify the real consideration 
behind adopting the discretionary system. The UK and Norway have shown, in practice, 
that the discretionary system could be used for reaching other objectives, i.e. allowing the 
domestic offshore related industry to be one of the main beneficiaries of the North Sea 
offshore industry. 
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This proved to be the case in both countries when the Norwegian authorities decided to 
have more say in NCS activity, and the UK followed suit. State participation, foundation 
of national oil companies, and the requirement of the use of domestic goods and services 
are examples of measures taken by the two countries to enlarge the countries' take, 
directly and indirectly, from their respective continental shelves. While the first two 
measures were relatively well taken by the companies, the issue of the application of 
domestic goods and services was opposed, and sometimes challenged, by the oil 
companies. The companies active in both shelves have declared several times that some 
of their procurement decisions were not based on sound economic criteria, but imposed 
on them by the domestic authorities. s1 
As far as the application of domestic goods and services is concerned, the similarity 
between the two policies began to, seemingly, fade away in the mid-' 80s. In 1985, the 
UK had to withdraw the "buy British" requirement as a condition to award development 
and production licenses to multinational oil companies. The state, however, kept the right 
to monitor the oil companies' procurement activity. 
In Norway, on the other hand, the change occurred when Statoil was freed from its public 
duties and became closer to its entrepreneur nature. The corporation was no longer 
responsible for the presence of the offshore-related industry in the NCS' petroleum 
activity. At the same time the requirement of companies' contribution to the Norwegian 
economy remained intact, and the Norwegian authorities declared that the Oil Directorate 
would be closely controlling the companies' procurement procedure. 
The fact that the multinational oil companies' presence in North Sea activity has been 
partly, if not mostly, contingent to their procurement policy has evoked severe protest 
from these companies and finally forced the European Commission to intervene. The 
protest stems from the entrepreneur, or profit maximizing, nature of the oil companies. 
This characteristic makes the companies demand inputs as long as they are efficient in 
terms of price, quality, delivery time, etc. An unwillingness to use a particular input 
81 See Nelsen (1991pp. 74-105) 
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would appear to imply its inferiority when compared with feasible substitutions. Had the 
domestic offshore-related industry possessed the necessary efficiency to compete with the 
respective industry in other parts of the globe, there would have been no reason for the 
government to continue the imposition of the requirement. There is no reason to believe 
that the multinationals would tum abroad to less efficient goods and services while they 
could find more efficient ones at home. 
However, if the domestic offshore-related suppliers still suffered from inefficiency, 
relative to their international counterparts, the only solution for the governments would 
be to impose the requirement. This may be a testable prediction of the situation in the 
NCS and UKCS. In the UK, before 1975 the companies were, in practice, free to choose 
the necessary input based on its efficiency. In 1985, the British government withdrew the 
requirement, which allowed the companies to practice their business according to the 
rules of competitive markets (though still monitored by the state). Other factors equal, the 
above regulations, one would suspect, should have resulted in more efficiency in the 
performance of the companies active in UKCS before 1975 and after 1985, relative to the 
1975-84 (inclusive) period. 
In Norway the requirement to "buy Norwegian" was not abandoned until mid-'90s. Thus, 
in terms of the impact of domestic goods and services, the above test may not reflect the 
same results as the case in the UK. However, the role of Statoil within the NCS may be a 
turning point as far as the current study is concerned. Statoil's changing position as policy 
instrument and especially as the caretaker for the offshore-related industry should have 
affected the efficiency of the fields developed before and after the change. If Statoil's 
changing position left a vacuum in the state's monitoring tools then we should be able to 
see efficiency improvement in the post-Statoil era (i.e. post-1985). 
Is there a way to examine empirically the positive link between the level of domestic 
goods and services and the strictness of the governments in their "buy domestic" 
requirement? Providing the availability of relevant data, the answer is yes. This is what 
the forthcoming chapters intend to do. In the next chapter we see what economists 
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believe about the prevailing practice mentioned above, followed by a discussion about 
the appropriate techniques to test the hypotheses and description of the data. The study 
then proceeds with the empirical works. 
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Table 2-4: The main events in the Norwegian Continental Shelf 
Event 
1965 First License 
First drilling 
Cod gas Field discovered 
1966 
1968 
1968 First signs of State-participation attempt 
1969 Ekofisk discovered 
1971 First Production 
1972 Formation of Statoil, Petroleum and Mining Department, 
And Oil Directorate. 
Beginning of the opposition to Statoil's power 
Consequence 
No official obligation for domestic G&S. 
No official obligation for domestic G&S. 
Oil Production start in "Ekofisk" Area 
Requirement of "buy Norwegian is set up, 
Statoil to protect the suppliers' "fare" share 
1980 
1982 
1982 
1984 
1985 
1987 
Elfs motion to accept a German company's better offer is curbed The contract is signed with a Norwegian company. 
Formally reviewing Statoil's position in the industry by Storting Statoil's power was considered quite inappropriate 
Philips motion to accept a Dutch company's better offer is curbed The contract is signed with a Norwegian company. 
Statoil no longer caretaker of the offshore-supply industry. 
Establishment of Oil Fund 
1995 European Committee expresses its concern 
Over "buy Norwegian" requirement 
1996 Last year of official statistics of 
The share of Norwegian goods and services 
Oil Directorate takes over monitoring. 
State's total share of the NCS remained the same. 
The requirement is abolished 
Source for the figures: The Fact Sheet, Norway, 1995-2000 
Table 2-5: The main events in the United Kingdom Continental Shelf 
Event Consequence 
1964 First License & First drilling 
1965 West Sole gas field discovered 
1967 First Production Gas Production Started in 'West Sole" gas field 
1975 Foundation of BNOC and OSO. Requirement of "buy British is set up, 
Memorandum of Understanding OSO to monitor the procurement procedure. 
1979 First attempt to sell a part of BNOC Iran-Iraq war changes the decision, but 
the corporation losses its privileges. 
1981 BNOC was split into two companies, Britoil and BNOC. BNOC reduced to an oil trading company 
1984 Sunoil- (Swedish) Cammell Laird contract was opposed by state Sunoil excluded from next licensing round. 
1984 
1985 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1992 
A German engineering company complains against the 
requirement to the EC. 
The abolishment of the requirement of "buy British". 
Britoil was privatized. 
BNOC was abolished. 
OPA dissolved and the whole offshore industry was privatized. 
No more monitoring the companies procurement activity 
European Commission reviews the UK policy. 
The companies still has to report their 
procurements 
Last year of availability of data for goods and 
services. 
Source for the figures: The Brown Book, the UK, 1976-2000 
Domestic 
Suppliers 
Unknown 
Unknown 
Under 20% 
Under 20% 
about 20% 
about 20% 
69.50% 
79.20% 
79.20% 
83.20% 
89.30% 
84.90% 
71.90% 
69.30% 
Domestic 
Suppliers 
Unknown 
Under 20% 
79% 
67% 
74% 
74% 
80% 
80% 
82% 
87% 
78% 
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Chapter Three: Literature Review 
Introduction 
The previous chapter provided some interesting facts about the interaction between the 
governments of the UK and Norway and the oil companies active in the UKCS and NCS. 
We saw how, over the years, the national economies, in particular domestic offshore 
suppliers, benefited from the petroleum activity of the two shelves. We also studied some 
policies potentially relevant to the issue of the contribution of the offshore industries to 
economies of the two countries. This chapter aims briefly to study what economics has to 
say about the factors influencing oil and gas production. The chapter is structured as 
follows. 
The first section looks at the basic economics of natural resources. It will show its static, 
as well as dynamic, elements and discuss important controversies such as the effect of 
whether resource supply is finite or infinite. The latter issue, as economists argue, 
determines where the focus of the study of natural resources should be placed. 
The interaction between the oil companies and the government is a continuous process 
throughout the various stages of the exploration, development, and production activity. 
Each stage has its particular characteristics, and requires specific relationships between 
the two parties to maintain efficiency in the whole system. Realizing the importance of 
each stage, economists have shown significant interest in analyzing each step. 
As Figure 3-1 shows, the first step is to adopt a system for evaluating the applications for 
exploration and production activity of a specified area. The second section discusses the 
various systems for evaluating applications to work on a particular field. The importance 
of this phase stems from the fact that use of a sub-optimal auctioning system has financial 
consequences for both parties involved, and may result in the inefficiency of the whole 
activity in later stages. The latter seems to be the case in both continental shelves in 
question. 
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However, if a particular auctioning system generated inefficiency in the exploration 
and/or production phase of the activity (which is the case as we will see), why would the 
authorities adopt such policies? The third section seeks the opinion of political 
economists. We will see how a particular layer of society (called pressure or interest 
groups) can influence the decisions of policy makers, and how the latter may bow to the 
pressure in order to remain in office. 
When the licenses are awarded, the next phase, as shown in Figure 3-1, involves 
exploration and production activity. It is in these stages that almost all the expenditure 
associated with the exploration, development and production of a field incurs. The 
operator's responsibility, when conducting daily operations, includes all the activities 
within the process of procurement of goods and services, from announcing the needs, 
evaluating the offers, and signing a procurement contract. In this process, the operator 
acquires information about various specifications of the goods and services offered by 
various suppliers. If the government does not possess the necessary means to get access 
to the operator's information, revealing the true nature of these specifications is a private 
option of the operator. Typically referred to as the principal-agent problem, this is an 
important issue in regulation literature. The fourth section of this chapter looks at the 
relationship between the companies and the two governments active in the North Sea as a 
principal-agent relationship with asymmetric information, and explains why monitoring 
technology (Statoil for instance) might be important in implementing "inefficient" 
policies. 
The final section of this chapter discusses the empirical works that has been done on the 
North Sea inefficiency issue. We will see that there are two common methods (parametric 
stochastic frontier analysis, SF A, and non-parametric data envelopment analysis, DEA) 
to examine the (in)efficiency of the two shelves, but that no-one has, so far, addressed the 
Issue. 
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3.1 Exploration and Production 
Study of the economics of natural resources exploration and production dates back to the 
early years of this century. Considered an exhaustible resource, petroleum exploration 
and production faced the dilemma of trading off current and future consumption. In this 
regard, the questions of the appropriate price, economic rent for the parties involved, the 
rate of interest, etc. were raised and discussed by energy economists. However, the 
exclusion of petroleum from the category of exhaustible resources by Adelman (1972), 
due to successive technological changes and discoveries in the international petroleum 
market, along with structural changes in the market (as discussed in the previous 
chapter), changed the focus of natural resource economics. This section is to review 
briefly the evolution of the energy economics literature. 
3.1.1 Early Approaches 
The literature about economic aspects of exploration and exploitation of natural resources 
dates back to the beginning of this century. In 1913 and 1914 Lewis Cecil Gray's work 
develops the theories of mining and of the extensive margin of extraction. Gray 
recognizes the conflict between the motives of future production (i.e. the next 
generation's welfare) and those of the present appropriation (i.e. reinvestment of the 
revenue generated from the activity in the presence of a positive rate of interest). Gray 
shows that an increase in the price of the extracted resources both tilts the extraction path 
to the present and increases the total resource stock, and decreases the quantity demanded 
of the extracted resource, which, in turn, decreases the rate of extraction. Hence, he 
concludes that the overall impact of a (permanent) price increase at both the extensive 
(delaying extraction) and the intensive margin of extraction is ambiguous. Gray implicitly 
suggests that a decrease in the rate of interest will lead to similar ambiguities, for the 
higher the rate of interest, the smaller is the present value of benefits expected from the 
resource. 
Gray also tries to focus on the problem of the aggregate depletion of natural resources 
and intergenerational equity. He strives to find the optimal state of conservation given an 
intergenerational equity constraint, which equally weights the utilities of the present and 
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future extractions, however remote in time.82 The optimal state of conservation IS 
therefore compatible with a nonzero discount rate. 
However, in 1940, Gray has a different opinion about the rate of discount that would 
optimize conservation. He suggests a zero discount rate, which would lead to a constant 
rate of production at maximum average profit per period and to a finite horizon. The new 
suggestion was based on his new findings, derived by sUbstituting an average social 
utility function - a function of extraction rate - for the average profit function he used in 
1913. 
Harold Hotelling, perhaps the best-known natural resource economist, exammes the 
behavior of an industry involved in the exploration and exploitation of a known, finite 
stock of an exhaustible natural resource. In a famous paper, Hotelling (1931) discusses 
the case where a producer chooses a time path for resource extraction that maximizes the 
present value of the stream of net benefits from the extraction. The producer faces the 
constraint of the non-renewable nature of the resource, which is that total extraction can 
not exceed the initial resource endowment. 
Let q(t) denote the extraction level at time t, So denote the initial endowment (the total 
content) of the resource. If the gross benefits from the resources are denoted by 
B(q(t),s(t))and extraction costs are denoted by C(q(t),s(t)) , where s(t)denotes the 
remaining stock, then the producer solves83 : 
ct) 
Maximize f[B(q(t),s(t)) - C(q(t),s(t))]e-Ol dt 
o 
• as 
set) == - = -q(t) 
at 
Subject to: set) ~ 0 
q(t) ~ 0 
s(O) = So 
82 Crabbe (1983) 
83 I n the original model the price was net of extraction costs. However this form of presenting the Hotelling 
model does not violate the results. The above model is presented by Krautkraemer (1998). 
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where 0 denotes the interest rate. The static efficiency condition is given by: 
Bq(q,s) - C/q,s) - A = 0, (0) 
Wh B d C d 8B d 8C . I d . ere q an If enote - an - respectIve y, an A IS the multiplier on 
8q 8q 
• 
the set) = -q(t) constraint. The economic interpretation of A is the current value shadow 
price of the resource stock, alternatively called the user cost. 
The condition (0) requires that at each point of time, the marginal benefit from extracting 
the resource equal the marginal cost of extraction plus the user cost of depleting the 
resource stock. 
Let i denote the time derivative of user cost with respect to s. Using calculus of 
variations, the dynamic efficiency condition is, thus, given by: 
A = OA - B s ( q , s) + C\, ( q , s) , or 
i + B\ ( q, s) - CsC q , s) = 0 
A A 
The latter requires that the rate of return to holding the resource stock (the sum of the 
capital gain and the marginal net benefit from the resource stock) is equal to the rate of 
discount. When there are no stock effects (Bs = Cs = 0), the shadow price of resource 
stock should increase at the rate of discount. Further, the marginal benefit of 
extraction, B If ' which is the resource price, equals user cost when the marginal extraction 
cost is zero. In this case the resource price increases at the rate of discount. 
However, the Hotelling model is also capable of tackling the situation when marginal 
extraction cost is positive. Assuming that the marginal cost is proportional to the 
extraction rate, Cq = r , and differentiating the static efficiency condition with respect to 
time, yield: 
pet) =O[l_~]+L 
p(t) pet) pet) 
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where r is the exogenous time derivative of marginal extraction cost. Let B = ~ . 
pet) 
Thus: 
pet) = 8[1- B] + B r 
pet) r 
When marginal extraction cost, C q' is constant over time, that is r = 0, the rate of 
increase in the resource price is still positive, but less than the rate of discount. However, 
the resource price can be decreasing if for some reasons (e.g. technological change) 
marginal extraction cost falls and marginal cost is close to price. On the other hand, since 
the relative weight on the discount rate increases as the user cost increases and marginal 
cost decreases, the rate of price increase becomes larger and eventually must be 
positive. 84 Thus, technological progress that lowers marginal extraction cost over time, 
can result in aU-shape price path with the extracted resource price declining over some 
interval and then increasing. 
The basic assumption of the Hotelling model is that production is from a known, finitely 
available resource stock. What Hotelling meant by "exhaustible resources" is later 
defined by Dasgupta and Heal (1979) as " [what will be] used up when used as an input 
in production and at the same time its undisturbed rate of growth is nil. .... the 
intertemporal sum of the services provided by a given stock of an exhaustible resource is 
finite" (p. 159). Thus, a specific oil field can be regarded as en exhaustible resource. 
As far as the extraction of petroleum from a particular field is concerned, the economy of 
the field may, other factors equal, be discussed in the light of the above model. An oil/gas 
field contains a finite stock of resource and is bound to be used up, at least as far as 
current human knowledge allows us to infer. However, as far as North Sea oil 
production, as a whole, is concerned the oil companies are still confronted with other 
issues not discussed by Hotelling. With regard to the question of price. the level of 
production from each field is incapable of changing the equilibrium price of petroleum 
84 Krautkraemer (1998) 
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set in the global oil market. Further, the production level of each field is often set in 
conjunction with the government-in-question's general energy policy, as well as the 
technology applied in the construction and production phases of each field. The latter is, 
in tum, a function of the level of the authorities' intervention in the industry and/or the 
ceiling set by each consortium for the cost. Thus, in order to have a comprehensive 
understanding of the oil companies' behavior in given fields, analysis of other factors 
affecting an operator's decisions is also necessary. 
The analysis of behavior of the petroleum industry as a whole, however, confronts 
Hotelling's basic assumption of limitation in the availability of hydrocarbon resources 
and Dasgupta and Heal's definition of exhaustible resources. Technological progress has 
made it possible to dig into territories unthinkable 50 years ago and find economically 
sound resources. For instance, U.S. oil reserves increased from 13bn barrels in 1930 to 
20bn barrels in 1990, while production in that interval was 124bn barrels. 85 Between 
1953 and 1972, the world's proven oil reserves rose by a factor of 5.7, while oil 
consumption rose by a factor of 4. 86 Thus, Dasgupta and Heal's definition seems to apply 
to a particular oil/gas field only, rather than to global and/or regional hydrocarbon 
resources. This suggests difficulties in the application of Hotelling's model to the 
activities of the petroleum industry as a whole. Adelman (1972) expresses this by saying: 
"Whatever is left in the ground is unknown, but surely unimportant, a geological fact of 
no economic interest". 
The literature following this controversy mostly deals with the uncertainty associated 
with the cost and size of the findings as well as uncertainties associated with prices in the 
market for oil and gas. 
Deshmukh and Pliska (1980) consider the optimal management of the stock of a natural 
resource when the resource on hand can be increased through exploration whose results 
are uncertain. They show that there exists an optimal policy of consumption and 
85 Adelman (1993). 
86 Oasgupta and Heal (1979). 
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exploration, which maximizes the net expected discounted social benefit. Under this 
optimal policy the world will never experience lack of the energy resource in question. 
However, the conclusion is based on the assumption of activity in a free environment 
with no government intervention. 
Devarajan and Fisher (1982) discuss the impact of uncertainty on the cost and rent 
(natural resource scarcity, or the shadow price of resource in the ground) of an 
exploration activity. They show that firms' rent from exploration can be measured by 
what they are ready to spend in exploration, in order to make the resource available. 
Following Adelman (see above), the basic assumption in their work is that there is no 
limit to the availability of resources. The authors conclude that while in the case of 
certainty marginal discovery cost is exactly equal to rent, uncertainty could lead to 
reduction in the level of discovery effort. Devarajan and Fisher use discovery cost as a 
likely upper-bound for resource rent, and show (theoretically) that the reduction in the 
level of discovery effort lowers both marginal discovery cost and rent, but lowers rent 
more. 
Lasserre (1985), however, establishes that the sum of discovery cost and the rent on 
exploration prospects (not discovery cost alone) is a good approximation for resource 
rent. He further argues that since rents on exploration are often auctioned, rents on 
exploration prospects are an important element in measuring resource scarcity because 
they express the extent and the limit to which reserves can be produced. Exploration costs 
are the only criteria for rent, Lasserre argues, if and only if exploration prospects are 
limitless. 
3.1.2 The Cost Approach: 
The basic assumption of Hotelling with regard to marginal cost of exploration being zero 
has been relaxed by economists since 1970s. Chevalier (1973) believes that the evolution 
of cost structure (passing from a diminishing stage to a growing stage) conditions the 
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structure of the oil industry and modifies the balance of power between the actors. 87 In 
other words, the interaction between the government as the owner of the resources and 
the companies as the operators varies according to the level of the cost. 
The cost approach was first introduced by Adelman (1972). He provided a detailed study 
of production costs, which enabled him to highlight long-term trends in the industry. He 
concluded that the high-cost producers sell all they can produce ... the low cost producers 
restrict output to keep up the price. They run a monopoly. However, Adelman does not 
discuss the situation where the two types co-exist. 
While Adelman discussed the cost effect on a cross country basis, Kemp & Van Long 
(1980) showed that at the domestic level, low cost fields would be exploited first if the 
marginal costs of fields were different, from deposit to deposit, but valued equally. 
Levhari & Liviatan (1977) and Peterson (1978) show that extraction costs may rise as 
extraction proceeds, because the better quality sources will be exhausted first. 
Levhari & Liviatan also showed that it is quite possible for the firm to stop producing 
before physical exhaustion occurs (as was the case in Hotelling's model), that is at a stage 
where reserves still exist but under conditions which make further extraction too costly. 
May be this is why the Norwegian and British authorities have prevented the oil 
companies from abandoning the fields with highest marginal cost before complete 
exhaustion of the resource occurs. 
With regard to increasing extraction cost, Schulze (1974), Weinstein & Zeckhauser 
(1975), Peterson & Fisher (1977) showed that the rate of increase in royalty payable to 
government must equal the opportunity cost of deferred extraction-foregone interest, less 
the savings in future extraction costs. 88 This would neutralize companies' incentives to 
abandon fields with high marginal cost. 
87 Quoted in Lasserre (1985). 
8S See Devarajan and Fisher (1981) 
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The cost approach made by all the mentioned economists shares the assumption of a free 
and competitive market where the companies, away from authorities' intervention, seek to 
maximize their profit. The government, in turn, sets the various taxes (including royalty 
rates) bearing in mind the decisions made by the companies, to maximize the social 
welfare function. Other forms of intervention (such as those described in Chapter 2) are 
excluded. 
3.2 Auctioning and Bidding Systems 
The first stage of government involvement in petroleum activity is with the choice of an 
appropriate auctioning system. The governments of both countries have had the 
opportunity to generate revenue at this stage, depending on the prospects for oil and gas 
at the time.89 However, as we have seen, both countries (except from one licensing round 
in the UK) chose to disregard the immediate revenue and instead went ahead with an 
alternative system based on the companies' working plans. The choice may be for sound 
reasons but it opens the question of "why" . 
This section reviews the state of the art in the auction literature by discussing the two 
alternative systems. We will see the considerations behind widespread choice of sealed 
bids and the economic consequences of allowing discretion will also be discussed. We 
will also study the theoretical characteristics of a work-based system (or discretionary, 
which is based on the bidder's working plan for, say, developing a field) relative to the 
alternative bonus-based auctioning system, in which the bidder with the highest bid pays 
money (the amount depends on the type of auction and tender's bid) to acquire the right 
of developing the field. 
3.2.1 Bonus-based Auctions 
The word auction is derived from the Latin augere, which means "to increase". McAfee 
and McMillan (1987) define an auction as "a market institution with an explicit set of 
rules determining resource allocation and prices on the basis of bids from the market 
89 Of course, by choosing the timing of the auctions, the authorities can influence commercial perceptions 
regarding these prospects. 
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participants" (P.702). Auctions, rather than selling at a fixed price, are typically used 
because some products have no standard value.9o An auction is also defined as a public 
sale in which articles are sold to the highest bidder.91 However, the term auction can also 
be used when a single buyer wishes to purchase some item from one of a set of potential 
suppliers.92 Thus the term auction describes both offering to sell and bidding to buy. 
Klemperer (1999) provides a comprehensive review of auction theory. He distinguishes 
four basic types of auction when an item is to be bought, or sold: the ascending-bid (also 
called oral, open, or English auction), the descending-bid (also called Dutch auction), the 
First-price sealed-bid auction, and the Second-price sealed bid auction. 
In the English auction the price is successively raised by the bidders until only one bidder 
remains. The essential characteristic of the English auction is that at any time each bidder 
knows the level of the current highest bid. 
The Dutch auction is the converse of the English auction. The auctioneer calls an initial 
high price and then lowers the price until one bidder accepts the current price. Again, 
some information on others' performance is observable to other bidders. 
In the First-price sealed-bid auction the potential buyers submit sealed bids and the 
highest bidder wins the auction. In this form of auction, the bidders do not observe the 
others' bids and, consequently, can not revise their own bids. 
The Second-price sealed-bid auction goes through similar stages as the First-price sealed-
bid auction. However, while the highest bidder wins the auction, s/he pays the price of 
the next highest bid. 
90 Cassady (1967) 
91 Oxford English Dictionary 
92 McAfee & McMillan, 1987 
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Asymmetry of information, both between owner and bidders and among the bidders, is 
the crucial element of the auction problem93 . This is so because on one hand the owner is 
unaware of the bidders' valuations of the commodity. On the other hand, the valuations 
differ from one bidder to the other, due to individual tastes, appraisal, etc., with no one 
prepared to reveal his/her valuation prior to the auction. Thus, committing to an auction 
by the auctioneer and bidders involve uncertainty as a result of this information 
asymmetry. How the parties involved in an auction respond to this uncertainty depends 
on their attitudes toward risk. Assuming risk neutrality of the bidders, independence of 
valuations, and symmetry of the underlying distribution of valuations, Vickrey (1961) 
developed the Revenue Equivalence Theorem.94 According to the theory the owner of the 
item receives, on average, the same revenue from the auction no matter which of the four 
auction types is chosen. 
Myerson (1981) and Riley and Samuelson (1981), show that the theorem applies very 
generally and that the bidders will also make the same bid, as a function of their signal, 
regardless of the type of auction. 
Much of the later literature on auction theory has focused on relaxing one or more of the 
assumptions of the revenue equivalence theorem. Maskin and Riley (1984), Matthews 
(1987), and Klemperer (1999), analyze the theorem when the assumption of risk 
neutrality is relaxed. Myerson (1981), Milgrom and Weber (1982), Riley (1984), and 
Cremer and McLean (1985) relax the assumption of independence of the bidders' 
valuations. Myerson (1981), Bulow and Roberts (1989), and McAfee and McMillan 
(1989) relax the assumption that the bidders' private values were drawn from a common 
distribution. Generally speaking, the above discussions conclude that the original three 
assumptions are fundamental to the revenue equivalence theorem, and that the theorem 
fails to hold if one or more of the assumptions are relaxed. 
93 McAfee and McMillan, 1987 
94 Under some specific assumptions. For more information and a simplified proof of the theory see 
Klemperer (1999, Appendix A). 
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Bulow and Roberts (1989) focus on bidders marginal revenue. In their model there are an 
arbitrarily large number of bidders whose values are independently drawn from a bidder's 
value distribution. When bidders have independent private values, a bidder's marginal 
revenue is defined as the marginal revenue of the firm, whose commodity is on auction, 
at the price that equals the bidder's actual value. Bulow and Roberts show that under the 
assumption of the revenue equivalence theorem the expected revenue from an auction 
equals the expected marginal revenue of the winning bidder. 
Based on the latter results, Bulow and Klemperer (1996) show that when the bids are 
symmetric (when the signals are drawn from a common distribution) and if bidders with 
higher signals have higher marginal revenue, then the winning bidder has the highest 
marginal revenue. So under the assumption of the revenue equivalence theorem, all the 
standard auctions are optimal. 
Riley (1988) also discusses the case when the winner's value can be observed ex-post 
(even though imperfectly). Riley considers an oilfield as a practical application of an 
auction in which public information about the value of the object becomes available after 
the auction. He shows that in this case, the seller can extract most, if not all, of the rent by 
making the winner's payment depend on the ex-post information. More specifically, the 
seller's expected revenue increases with the introduction of a positive royalty rate. 
Wilson (1977) considers an auction with many bidders. Each bids according to his 
valuation of the item stemming from his/her sample observation. Wilson shows that in 
any kind of a sealed-tender auction where an item with a definite but unknown monetary 
value is to be sold, the selling price is almost surely equal to the true value of the item, 
even though each of the many bidders observes only incomplete sample information. 
The conventional bidding system to lease an area for the purpose of finding and 
extracting hydrocarbon was established in the USA, in 1954.95 The bidding variable at 
those (bonus-based) auctions was a cash payment plus a royalty equal to a specific 
95 Porter (1995) 
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fraction of the value of any hydrocarbons produced.96 During the past four decades, many 
studies have been conducted to examine the effectiveness of this bidding system and 
different type of bidding within the system. 
Hughart (1975) discusses the role of information asymmetry in the bidding system in 
offshore oil-lease sales. Hughart argues that a risk-neutral firm bids the expected value 
for an unsurveyed tract. If other firms make surveys and adjust their bids accordingly, the 
uninformed firm will be outbid on all productive fields and win the bidding on 
unproductive ones. The only defense for this firm is either to make surveys itself or bid 
no more than the lowest value that a survey could place on the field. In his model, 
Hughart assumes that the seller has no further information about the true value of the 
field in auction than the bidder does. He, therefore, argues that there exists private 
incentives and advantages for the firms to produce or to obtain information about the 
resource. 
Hughart further argues that obtaining information generates socially undesirable costs. 
He reasons that a firm, which has made surveys, has obtained superior information about 
the value of an offshore tract. The information enables the firm to outbid the uninformed 
companies, and reap extraordinary profits. Thus, the government's goals of encouraging 
competition and establishing a price that gives assurance of fairness are not reached. The 
failure could be avoided if many or all the firms conduct surveys. This, in tum, causes the 
cost of multiple surveys, which is socially undesirable. Hughart believes that to avoid this 
two-sided problem, the companies should make the results of the survey public. 
One problem with Hughart's solution is that once a company is unable to enjoy the 
asymmetry of information gained by its costly survey, it has no incentive to conduct the 
survey. In this case, no survey would be conducted and the companies are bidding based 
on the least possible knowledge about the value of the tract. 
96 Reece D. (1978) 
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Kretzer (1994) considers the evaluation of pre-bid exploration and its expected effect on 
bid premium. Within the context of a capital investment decision, lower resource 
uncertainty increases the expected value of a lease, and hence increases the value of the 
optimal bid or the optimal work program. On the other hand, exploration is costly and in 
the context of pre-bid exploration carries the additional risk that if the lease is not won, 
the exploration cost is sunk. Thus the decision on whether or not to conduct exploration, 
and the extent of the exploration, prior to bidding needs to take into consideration the 
expected effect of exploration on the optimal bid, the expected profitability of that 
bidding strategy, and the cost of the exploration. 
U sing simulation Kretzer shows that with exploration, resource uncertainty is reduced 
and expected profit increased. This demonstrates the advantages of conducting 
exploration over and above that conducted by other bidders. The company considering 
exploration will expect this to increase its lease valuation and enable it to bid more 
relative to other bids. This would increase its expected chance of winning the auction. 
Furthermore, the company's expected margin also increases with exploration. Kretzer 
shows that the company's optimal bid is higher in the case of low uncertainty than under 
high uncertainty. Thus, the company has a dual incentive to reduce its resource 
uncertainty. 
Reece (1978) believes that survey cost accounts for a small fraction of production 
revenue and does not have a major impact on society once the social benefit of the survey 
is taken into account. He argues that the government's revenue is sensitive to the degree 
of uncertainty and number of bidders. Reece shows that the expected value of each field 
for the firms might be less than its actual value, and that this difference decreases as the 
number of bidders increases or the uncertainty associated with the lack of knowledge 
drops. Hence, the government is better off when the firms obtain information about the 
geological situation of the fields even if it means that the government undertakes a part of 
the cost of appraisal process. The result seems in contrast with the governments of the 
North Sea (Norway in particular) who not only do not contribute to exploration cost, but 
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also have typically required companies to carry the government's share of expenses in the 
appraisal, exploration and production phases. 
Reece (1979) further discusses alternative procedures for selling off oil leases. The 
argument is based on the assumption that "the popUlation of leases to be sold contains 
tracts having both positive and negative true values and that firms are able to obtain 
informative, but highly uncertain estimates of the true value of each tract" (P. 660). He 
shows that the government's take is higher under a profit sharing scheme97 , than under 
royalties and bidding with bonus schemes. The latter scheme, he concludes, generates the 
lowest government take among the three schemes. 
Moody's (1994) empirical evidence from the US Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) supports 
Reece's conclusions. Moody analyzed participation in the OCS's various bidding schemes 
and showed that the number of companies' participating in the bidding and the bonus 
offered by them is higher under bonus bidding than under royalty and profit sharing 
scheme. Given the fixed rent associated with each oil tract, the results are consistent with 
those of Reece since when the government captures more rent under one scheme, it 
leaves less rent for the companies, and consequently reduces the popularity of that 
scheme. 
3.2.2 Discretionary System 
Besides the above mentioned conventional auction systems, there is an alternative system 
based on the bidders' plans to conduct the job (discretionary system), which enables the 
auctioneer to choose the one who maximizes hislher satisfaction according to 
predetermined criteria. For instance, in developing offshore tracts, the companies may be 
asked to specify the minimum number of the wells they would drill during the course of 
the lease on the blocks for which they are applying. The bids (applications) may also be 
evaluated on the basis of other factors such as the exploration and development record of 
the company or its financial and technological ability. 
97 In profit sharing the firm agrees to pay the government a fraction of net profits received on production 
instead of a royalty. 
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The Norwegian and British licensing system, with the exception of one licensing round 
(early-1970s) in the UK, has predominantly been based on the government's discretionary 
measures, i.e. a bidding system based on the companies' working plans. As we have seen, 
the companies bid for areas to explore and, if successful, produce petroleum. In this 
system, companies compete over licenses by the means of their development plans and 
their past, as well as their plans for future, contributions to the host country's economy. 
With respect to the choice of a licensing system, Fraser (1991) and Kretzer (1993) have 
theoretical comparative studies of (bonus-based) auction licensing and licensing based on 
the size of the work program (capital in this case), i.e., a discretionary system. Fraser uses 
simulations of a model of a company's decision about the maximum bid value and the 
optimal investment program for a resource tract. The model involves uncertainty about 
the size of resource stock and the selling price of products. The company involved is a 
risk aversion one. The results of simulations show that the discretionary auctioning 
system is not affected by developments, which cause major revisions in the company's 
valuation of the resource tract. The same shows that royalty, because it enhances risk 
sharing quality, is potentially of considerable benefit to government revenue. Fraser 
concludes that "a conventional auction system provides the government both with better 
information about a company's perception of the value of a resource tract and with the 
potential for considerably higher revenue from its licensing" (P. 280). 
In Kretzer's study the company is risk neutral and the uncertainty about the selling price 
is absent. Like that of Fraser, however, Kretzer's analysis incorporates uncertainty about 
the size of the resource (even after seismic surveying in the pre-allocation exploration 
phase). Kretzer addresses the effect of the two licensing systems on the size of capital 
investment. However, the capital investment in the discretionary system based on 
working plan is assumed to be fixed98 (a commitment undertaken by the company), while 
in the conventional system it is modifiable according to the further information gained in 
the exploration and development phases. 
98 In North Sea consortiums, the partners set a cost limit that does not change under "normal situations". 
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Considering the discretionary licensing system, Kretzer regards the optimal level of 
capital investment as that which minimizes the sum of two costs, ex post under-
investment and ex post over-investment.99 Once a chosen level of capital investment 
k, has been installed, the extraction level over the period of lease will be limited by the 
amount of capital investment. The amount of resources, and consequently the required 
capital, may well tum out to exceed the estimated level of investment. On the other hand, 
the level of capital may turn out to be in excess of what is required to extract the 
resources. In this case the company is left with idle capital. Thus, the expected profit of a 
single period lease is given by: 
where 
EII(k,O) = POlf(O)dO+ Jlf(O)dO )-Ck 
B is the units of resources; 
k is the unit of capital investment (one unit of which is required to extract one 
unit of the resource); 
feB) is the company's subjective probability destiny function of the amount of 
resources; 
p is the unit price of resources; 
c is the unit price of capital. 
(1) 
F or an (expected) profit maximizing firm, the optimal capital investment, k *, is given by 
solving the first order condition, which yields: 
CIJ 
ff(B)dB = ~ 
k" P 
The second-order condition establishes that ETI(k* ,B) is a local maximum: 
ETIkk (k,B) = ~(p jf(B)dB - c) = -pf(k) s 0 
dk k 
This means that: 
99 Over and under investment are not costs per se, but rather will lead to cost generation. 
(2) 
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ETIk (k,B) ~ 0 when k ~ k" , and 
ETIk (k,B) ~ 0 when k ~ k* (3) 
The result shows that the optimal choice of capital investment is dependent on the 
resource uncertainty, f (B), and the cost/price ratio, that is k * increases as capital costs 
decrease relative to resource price. 
In the conventional auction licensing the bid is based on maximized expected profit. The 
company will bid some amount, b(n) , below this maximum, where n is the number of 
bidders in the auction. Thus the expected profit margin of the company is given by: 
ETI(BID) = ETI(k* ,B) - b(n). (4) 
Assuming b( n) is increasing in n, the company will reduce its profit margin in the face of 
increased competition. No matter how much the bid value is, the company will still plan 
to execute its optimal work program ( k * ) if it wins the auction. 100 
A company competing for a lease on the basis of its proposed work, on the other hand, 
must consider the expected profitability of its bidding strategy, which is: 
ETI(BID) = ETI(k,B).G(k,n) (5) 
where G(k, n) is the probability distribution function of winning the lease given a work 
program bid of k (capital investment) and n other bidders. G(k, n) is monotonically 
increasing in k . The optimal k maximizing (4) is given by: 
Gk(k,n) 
G(k,n) 
(6) 
In order to have a positive expected profit (ETI(k,B) > 0), ETIk (k, 8) must be ~ 0 since 
bothG(k,n)andGk(k,n)are non-negative. In other words, in order to maximize the 
expected value of its bidding strategy, a company must select a work-pro gram-based bid 
100 In order to avoid the "winner's curse"(where the winner had to offer more than the real value to win the 
auction), Kretzer argues, bidders may adjust their bids downward to that amount which they would have 
bid if they were informed that they had won the auction. 
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above its optimal capital allocation (equation (3)). This demonstrates that if competition 
for leases is carried out on the basis of the size of work program, competitive pressures 
will move the bidder to submit a level of capital investment in excess of the profits-
maximizing level. The extent of the increase in k over k * depends upon the trade-off 
between the marginal decrease in the expected value of the lease and the marginal 
improvement in the probability of winning the lease, as expressed in Equation (6). 
It should be noted that the above results stem from the assumption that the company in 
question takes the strategy of other competitors as given (i.e. Nash equilibrium). If the 
company were to assume that its competitors were similarly adjusting their work program 
bids upward in order to win the license allocation, the bid of our company would be still 
higher. Thus, if the aim of government is to encourage a high rate of exploitation of 
hydrocarbon resources then this overcapitalization may be counter-effective. This is 
because the company's commitment to an unnecessary level of investment may exhaust 
the resources necessary for an optimum level of exploitation. 
Kretzer (1994) also considers the evaluation of pre-bid exploration and its expected 
effects on bid premiums and the size of the proposed work program. With the same 
argument as before, Kretzer considers a company that is to maximize its expected profit 
of the form: 
En(B/D) = [En(k)]· p(winlk,n) 
with p(winlk,n) = [H(k)y-l. where H(k) is the subjective cumulative distribution 
function of other bidders' work program bid. The first order condition implies an optimal 
work program, kb is implicitly defined by 
En k ) __ En'(kb)H(kb) 
( b - (n -l)H'(kb ) 
(7) 
Assuming En(k) > 0, and since H'(k) > 0 and H(k) > 0, (8) implies that En'(k) < 0 
which can only be the case when kb > k. This, once again, proves Kretzer's point that 
competition in the discretionary allocation raises the capital investment proposed in the 
working plan beyond the optimal level. 
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Equation (7) can be rearranged to: 
EIJ'(k) H(k) 
EIJ(k) . H'(k) = -(n-1) (8) 
Thus, at the equilibrium, the elasticity of expected profits in response to a change in the 
probability of winning would be a negative constant dependent on the number of bidders. 
The effect of an expected reduction in resource uncertainty on the optimal work program 
bid, kh' depends on the expected change in the distribution of expected profits, EIJ(k). 
Since it is not possible to make general assumptions about the EIJ(k) function, Kretzer 
conducts a simulation for resource uncertainty to determine the effect of exploration on 
the bid and the optimum number of pre-exploration samples. She concludes that since, in 
a discretionary system, a reduction in resource uncertainty may have no effect on the 
optimal work proposal or the expected probability of winning the lease, so the pre-bid 
exploration may be unprofitable. If the aim of the resource owner (government) is to 
maximize revenues from the resources, Kretzer concludes, it is in the state's best interest 
to award production licenses to those that value the resources most highly. That is, the 
companies that are most efficient (have lower costs) and/or those who have more 
information on the value of the resources (through exploration and appraisal). Thus, the 
discretionary system does not serve the government's revenue maximizing objective. 
What does Kretzer's work mean in the context of our discussion in Chapter 2? In 
Kretzer's study the price, or level of investment, is the unique strategic dimension. 
However, the North Sea governments' concern goes beyond the mere revenue-
maximizing objective. The interaction between government and companies provides the 
former not only with the opportunity to set terms and conditions to optimize its take from 
the venture, but also to secure targets for other factors such as the timing of proj ect 
completion, level of production, and level of application of domestic goods and services, 
to mention a few. Thus, the comparison is between Kretzer's one-dimensional auction 
mechanism and governments' multidimensional objectives. However, the conclusion that 
the discretionary system may cause sub-optimal decisions probably still holds. 
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Che (1993) analyzes the design of multidimensional auctions in which both price and 
quality are of importance to the procurer, assuming the independence of costs across the 
firms. In such auctions the bids would be presented by a pair of quality and price. The 
quality proposed by each firm is a function of that firm's private information. The 
procurer would then evaluate each bid, using a scoring function that converts each pair 
into a single number. Che shows that simple generalizations of the standard auctions can 
be used to implement the optimal mechanism as long as the procurer uses the appropriate 
scoring function, putting less weight on quality than that attached by the welfare function. 
However, with regard to the assumption of quality and cost, the environment of Che's 
model seems different than that of the North Sea petroleum industry. Knowing the 
government's expectation in the use of domestic goods and services, an oil company's 
perception of the "quality" required by the authorities cannot be totally independent of 
that of the other oil companies. The exception may occur when a firm totally ignores the 
requirement, in which case stands no chance of winning the auction. Thus, since Che 
relates the cost directly to the level of quality, the independence of cost across the oil 
companies seems not to apply completely. 
Branco (1997) studies the design of a multidimensional auctions, taking into account both 
price and quality of the goods in question. Branco allows for correlation among firms' 
cost, which is also a function of the quality applied by the firm. He also considers the 
case in which bidders submit bids with the relevant characteristics of the project 
(including price), then the procurement agency gives a score to each bid and makes its 
decision based on these scores. Branco argues that, unlike the case in the independent-
cost model presented by Che, the optimal quality cannot be achieved just through the 
bidding process. As a result, a mechanism for the implementation of the optimal quality 
will require an auction in the first stage to select the winner, and a second stage for the 
definition of quality to be provided. As Branco stresses, "there is no way to implement 
the optimal mechanism by requiring the winner to provide the quality submitted in its 
bid" (p.71). 
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Two-stage bidding and negotiation is what has been happening in the UK and Norway 
over the last three decades. But, unlike Branco's prediction, the two governments hold a 
series of intensive negotiations with the companies prior to the bidding deadline. 
However, the major difficulty with Branco's assumptions is the absence of any 
asymmetry of information between the firm and the auctioneer. He asserts that "contrary 
to standard auctions, this outcome [awarding the proj ect to the firm that generates the 
largest virtual welfare lOI ] cannot be achieved by setting the appropriate reserve price or 
quality standards and limiting the access of the firms to the mechanism. All firms have to 
reveal their types before the procurer is able to conclude that a contract should not be 
awarded" (p.68). The contrast with the North Sea case arises when one considers the fact 
that the operator of each field is responsible for the daily operation of the field, from 
development phase until the field ceases production. The responsibility includes the 
procurement of goods and services through auctions or any other means the operator 
deems suitable. Throughout the activity the operator has access to information which can 
be hidden from the government. Though the latter may apply tools to minimize the 
asymmetry of information (through Statoil in Norway or scrutiny of procurement 
documents in the UK, for instance), the fulfillment of complete scrutiny seems 
impossible. This is because the procurement of goods and services involves many firms 
whose nationality can be somehow related to the country in question and thus relates the 
items to domestic suppliers. 
The specific auction mechanism used in the North Sea petroleum industry seems not to 
be compatible with any of the mentioned theoretical works. The problem may arise, one 
can argue, from two sources. The first factor might be the existence of externalities that 
force the authorities to apply policies that do not necessarily safeguard a welfare-
maximizing outcome. The role of the Norwegian Association of Machine Industries 
(MVL) and Iron and Metal Workers Union in pushing the authorities towards the 
requirement of more domestic goods and services, was briefly mentioned in the Chapter 
101 By virtual welfare Branco means the generated welfare taking into account the public cost of leaving a 
rent to the firm. 
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2. These external influences, known as the interest (or pressure) groups have, arguably, 
played substantial roles in the decision-making process of democratic countries. 
The second possibility is that the governments may not have enough information to 
implement their policies successfully. In this case the governments have to offer credible 
inducements towards the use of their favorite, and presumably inefficient, inputs. In this 
case the government should apply necessary means to monitor the companies' behavior in 
using the inputs in question. 
These two problems will be discussed in the next two sections. The first section briefly 
discusses the literature about the role of interest groups in the decision-making process of 
a government. The section will be followed by looking at the government-companies 
relationship in the light of principal-agent theory. 
3.3 Interest Groups and Decision-Making Process 
Assumption of all discussion presented above has been that government's priority is to 
maximize its take from petroleum activity. As a partner, the government should have 
encouraged the operators to use the most efficient inputs. And as a revenue-maximizing 
auctioneer, the government is expected to use the most efficient auctioning system to 
increase the state's take. The two governments' behaviors, which have frequently violated 
both principles, may suggest the existence of other considerations behind their adopted 
policies. This section is to discuss, briefly, alternative sources of influence, besides 
economic considerations, in governments' policy-making process. It does this to see 
whether there are reasonable grounds for believing that governments may not behave in 
benevolent fashion and may promote "inefficient" policies. 
Few issues elicit greater agreement among economists than the proposition that society'S 
welfare is maximized where there is free trade. lo2 Yet, regulation, tariffs, quotas, and 
other restrictions on international trade make governments' trade policy a constant subject 
of political debate. 
102 Findlay and Wellisz (1986). 
Friedrich (1963) defines a policy as a proposed course of action of a person or 
government (called public policy when is set by government) within a given environment 
providing obstacles and opportunities to reach a goal or realize an objective. Anderson 
(1975) believes that policy should designate what is actually done rather than what is 
proposed and defines policy as a purposive course of action followed by government or 
its agents in dealing with a problem or matter of concern. What may distinguish a public 
policy from a policy made by an individual, Anderson (1975) believes, is that public 
policy is a purposive or goal-oriented action. The authorities receive signals that a 
problem exists, make decisions to solve the problem by means of statutes, legislation, or 
decrees, and take necessary actions to implement the legislation and solve the problem. 
Anderson attributes factors such as political and social pressures, economic conditions, 
procedural requirements (e.g. due process), previous commitments, and pressure of time 
as criteria influencing a public policy. Depending on the issue at hand, one or a number 
of these considerations may out-weigh the others and form the core consideration behind 
formation of a particular policy. 
Latham (1965) argues that the interaction and struggle among groups is the central fact of 
political life. A group is defined as a collection of individuals that may, on the base of 
shared attitudes or interests, make claims upon other groups in society. A group becomes 
a "political interest group" when it makes a claim through or upon any of the institutions 
of government. Latham stresses that public policy is the product of group struggle to 
influence the policy in their favour. Latham seems to follow Truman (1951) who believes 
public policy, at any given time, will reflect the interests of dominant groups. As groups 
gain and lose power and influence, public policy will be altered in favor of the interests 
of those gaining influence against the interests of those losing influence. 
The first issues to consider are the area of, and reason for, the interest groups' activity. 
Traditionally, lobbying takes place for government protection for a particular sector or 
industry, competing for a share of industrial or import licenses, inducing legislatures to 
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enact monopolistic barriers to domestic entry, utilizing resources to evade pnce or 
command governmental regulations, etc. 103 
Economists generally believe that rent seeking is the force behind the interest groups' 
struggle. Rents, in general, emanate from two sources. They arise naturally in the price 
system by, for example, shifts in demand and supply curves. Under these circumstances 
rent seeking is equivalent to profit seeking. The rent seeking associated with the activity 
of interest groups, however, is defined as what is "contrived artifiCially through, for 
example, government action. The fact that rents are contrived, however, does not mean 
that they are exempt from competition, and this is where rent seeking comes into play" 
(Tollison, 1982, p. 575). Thus, unlike profit-seeking, rent seeking involves a wasteful use 
of resources in the competition for rent. 
A handful of the interest groups and the areas of their activities have been subject of 
theoretical and empirical study of many political economists. The theoretical analysis of 
tariff evasion is studied by Bhagwati and Hansen (1973), Johnson (1972), Bhagwati and 
Srinivasan (1973), Sheikh (1974), Kemp (1976), and Ray (1978) to mention a few. The 
theoretical analysis of activity whereby claimants compete for premium-fetching import 
licenses began with Krueger (1974) and was extended by Bhagwati and Srinivasan 
(1980). The theoretical analysis of revenue seeking, where economic agents (the interest 
groups) try to get a slice of the tariff revenue resulting from the adoption of a 
protectionist tariff, is studied by Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1980). The analysis of tariff 
seeking, on the other hand, where the interest group lobbies and seeks protectionist trade 
tariffs, has been studied by Brock and Magee (1978) and developed by Bhagwati (1980), 
Feenstra and Bhagwati (1982), and Wellisz (1982). In non-theoretic literature there has 
also been growing concern with lobbying. This includes studies by Tullock (1967, 1980) 
and Posner (1975). 
Feenstra and Bhagwati (1982) labels these activities as "directly unproductive", that is " 
they yield pecuniary returns but do not produce goods and services that enter a utility 
103 Feenstra and Bhagwati (1982) 
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function directly or indirectly via increased production or availability to the economy of 
goods that enter a utility function" (p. 989). Feenstra and Bhagwati includes tariff-
seeking lobbying, tariff evasion, and premium seeking for given import licenses in the 
category of" directly unproductive". 
The second issue to consider is how a particular factor receives more importance than the 
others do. The influence of interest groups upon decisions depends on a number of 
factors. These may include the size of group's membership, its monetary and other 
resources, its cohesiveness, the skill of its leadership, its social status, and the presence or 
absence of competing organizations. These factors are relevant because, as Mueller 
(1996) argues, politicians provide policies or legislation to win votes, and interest groups 
provide campaign funding as well as votes. The well-endowed groups have more to offer 
and consequently may demand more. Becker (1983) even goes on to say that "taxes, 
subsidies, regulations, and other political instruments are used to raise the welfare of 
more influential pressure [interest] groups" (P. 373). North (1994) expresses this by: 
"Institutions are not necessary or even usually created to be socially efficient; rather they, 
or at least the formal rules, are created to serve the interests of those with the bargaining 
power to create new rules." 
Olson (1982) has a comprehensive analysis of interest groups, focusing on those groups 
that seek re-distributive objectives. Business, trade, and professional associations and 
unions are primary examples of such groups. Olson argues that much of the activity of 
these groups is devoted to creating or preserving monopoly positions. Unions seek to 
force employers to hire only union members and to determine wages and other employee 
benefits by bargaining with the union. Business associations and unions both seek to 
protect their members from foreign competition by obtaining tariffs and quota on 
imports, and by obtaining regulations requiring that the government favor domestic 
producers in its purchases. The consequence is that, Olson concludes, "distributional 
coalitions slow down a society's capacity to adopt new technologies and to reallocate 
resources in response to changing conditions and thereby reduce the rate of economic 
growth" (p.64). 
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The harmfulness of the government's protectionist policy is acknowledged by other 
political economists. Dixit (1996) believes that the protectionism not only generates 
economic inefficiency but also the gaining interest groups will fiercely resist any changes 
that take away these gains in the future. The interest groups have particularly strong 
motives to form a coalition to lobby for the continuation of the policy, causing the policy 
to persist for a long time despite the large cost it inflicts on the rest of the economy. Dixit 
stresses that policies like tariff and quota protection, price supports, and subsidies 
actually encourage the resources to remain in their declining and less productive uses 
while inflicting higher prices on users of the products or higher burdens on the taxpayers. 
The Norwegian and British North Sea petroleum policy described in chapter 2 could be 
explained in conjunction with the same mechanism. At the beginning of the activity, 
unpredictability of the exploration phase and lack of domestic resources to take part in 
the activity (though not unreasonable given the associated risk) forced the two countries 
to rely on the resources provided by the international oil companies. With the first signs 
of the existence of petroleum in the region, however, the governments' attitudes changed 
and domestic goods and services became a source of significant concern for the two 
countries. From this stage, one could trace the force of interest groups (e.g. MVL and the 
Norwegian Iron and Metal Workers in Norway and the Module Contractors Association 
in the UK) behind the policies. A force that, as argued above, introduces inefficiency in 
the exploration and production process. 
3.4 Principal-Agent Relationship / Contract Theory 
The literature covering the economics of natural resources seems to lack discussion of the 
companies' optimization behavior when confronted with authorities' interference in the 
daily operation of the industry. If these sorts of interference generate inefficiency in the 
performance of the industry, it is essential to have an understanding of the nature of the 
inefficiency and the procedure applied by companies and the authorities to overcome the 
problem. As far as the North Sea petroleum industry, in particular, is concerned a 
theoretical approach to this problem has not been made. 
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To approach the problem one should be aware of the nature of the relationship between 
the various parties involved in the industry, and the problems arising from the interaction 
between these parties. While the latter issue has been discussed in the previous chapter, 
the former issue is to be touched upon in this section. 
The relationships between the governments of the North Sea and the operators are very 
similar to those between a principal and an agent. The idea of principal-agent theory is 
for the principal to delegate a particular task to a second party, the agent. This may be 
because the principal does not possess the type of skills necessary to conduct the task, or 
prefers to use his/her labour in other activities. The agent, in return, will be rewarded for 
the effort (physical, managerial, endowments etc.) s/he makes to conduct the activity. 
In the light of the need to provide incentives, the contracts governing these relationships 
are crucial. Scherer (1964) discusses two types of transfer from the principal to the agent 
in a procurement agreement. The first one is the firm fixed price (FFP) contract. In FFP 
the contractor (agent) undertakes to supply certain specific goods or services at a fixed 
agreed price' (transfer) to the buyer (principal). In FFP the price is not subject to 
adjustments reflecting actual cost experience. 
The second type is the cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF) contract. In CPFF the principal and the 
agent initially agree upon a fee, or profit, based on an estimate of total costs (which are 
stochastic in the model). The principal agrees to reimburse, normally within limits, all 
legally allowable costs incurred by the agent plus a fixed fee as the agent's profit. 
All the financial risk of deviations in actual cost from the negotiated cost estimate is 
assumed by the agent under a FFP contract, and by the principal under a CPFF contract. 
In this sense, Scherer regards the two contract types as polar alternatives. 
The classical theory of regulation largely ignores incentive issues between the regulator 
and the firm. It assumes that the regulator and the firm shared all information perfectly. 
The regulator is assumed to use rules within certain exogenously specified classes to 
97 
determine the firm's compensation, and predictions are derived regarding the firm's 
decisions. lo4 The economist's (classical) models, such as Sappington and Sibley (1986), 
are based on measurable variables and assume that firms maximize measurable profit 
rather than unmeasurable utility. lOS 
The weakness of the classical literature is that since all the impacts on the firm occur 
through cash flows and cash flows are assumed to be observable, it is always possible to 
create a regulatory policy that makes the firms completely indifferent between all 
decisions. In this case, the firm is weakly willing to choose the regulator's most desirable 
outcome. I06 To remove this difficulty, it is typically assumed that the regulatory 
reimbursement rule must be chosen from some exogenously specified class that excludes 
the option of making the firm completely indifferent between all decisions. Hence, we 
can see that in some models, the regulator reimburses the firm for capital at more than its 
true cost, and yet there is no asymmetry of information between the principal and the 
agent. I07 
Scherer identifies a third alternative, namely incentive contracts. In this scheme, 
variations in actual costs from the originally negotiated estimate are shared by the 
principal and the agent. Initially a cost target, a target profit, and a sharing formula (a) 
are negotiated. If, for instance, the actual costs prove to be higher than the target cost, the 
agent undertakes its agreed share (a) of the difference and hence its target profit will be 
reduced by that amount. From an analytical point of view, the FFP and CPFF are both 
special cases of the incentive contracts with a = 1 and a = 0, respectively. 
Using the same categorization as Scherer, McCall (1970) presents an economic analysis 
of the three kinds of procurement contract. McCall believes that the incentive contracts 
have serious drawbacks, as it is extremely difficult for the principal to distinguish 
between high and low-cost firms on the basis of the submitted bids or target costs. The 
104 Rogerson (1994) 
105 Berg and Tschirhart (1998) 
106 Rogerson (1994) 
107 See Crew, 1985 
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fact that efficient agents must share some of their profits (difference between target costs 
and actual costs) induces them to submit cost estimates higher than expected costs. On 
the other hand, inefficient (high cost) agents are permitted to share some of their losses 
with the principal and, consequently, submit cost estimates that are less than expected 
costs. 
If the principal chooses among firms on the basis of estimated costs, then it is possible 
that a relatively inefficient agent is selected. McCall describes this as the principal's 
"paradoxical" policy, as it may be in the best interests of the principal to make the 
contract with the agent with highest estimated costs. However, for this policy to be 
optimal, agents must believe that the contract will be awarded to the lowest-cost agent, 
otherwise all agents will change their behavior and report the highest possible cost. The 
principal, therefore, faces the problem of designing a mechanism to provide the agents 
with the incentive to tell the truth. 
Hurwicz (1972) and Postlewaite (1979) show that manipulability is common to any 
allocation scheme that achieves Pareto optimal, individually rational outcomes. In other 
words, the principal-agent relationship always involves the risk that the effort [i.e. the 
type of costs (high, or low), degree of involvement in the process, etc.] made by the agent 
does not match the a priori agreed level of effort between the two parties. Or the agent 
could gain from hiding/mis-reporting his/her private information. Thus, the principal 
should be equipped with certain tools to reduce a possible gap between the agreed level 
of effort and a realized one, or the true information and the reported one. 
The principal may use a monitoring tool to supervise the agent's activity and reveal 
information about the agent's behavior. Tirole (1986), Laffont and Tirole (1991), and 
Lofman and Lawarree (1993), while assuming the need for a third party to monitor the 
agent's behavior, develop the idea of collusion between the supervisor and the agent, 
which further complicates the principal-supervisor-agent hierarchy. A supervisor, in their 
opinion, is necessary for the same reasons the principal needs an agent. Besides being 
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costly to the principal, the supervisor has hislher own interests and these may be in 
conflict with those of the principal. 
The additional problem of a supervisor transforms the principal-agent problem into a 
problem with double moral hazard (hidden information) problem. Apart from inducing 
the agent to supply a high effort level, the principal needs also to set appropriate 
incentives to induce the supervisor to monitor the agent effectively.l08 The principal, 
therefore, has to create two types of incentive, one for the agent and one for the 
supervisor. 109 
The principal's other choice is to plan to persuade the agent to make the agreed effort and 
reveal the truth about the real effort made. In principal-agent literature this is called an 
incentive compatibility requirement. This may be achieved by estimating the agent's gain 
from mis-reporting the truth and offering a reward scheme so as to cover this gain. In 
other words, since the agent has private information concerning hislher actions, the 
scheme removes the agent's incentive to hide this information. In doing so, the principal 
is assumed to know his feasible objectives so he can ensure that the final outcome is 
feasible. 110 
The issue of "incentive compatibility" was first addressed by Hurwicz (1959), and soon 
followed by advocates of principal-agent theory. Incentive compatibility means that 
agents do indeed have an incentive to reveal the truth about themselves when they take 
account of the effect of their revelations upon the economic allocation. 1 11 
The importance of the issue of incentive compatibility in various aspects of an economy 
has been addressed and discussed by many game theorists: McCall (1970), Hurwicz 
(1973), Baron (1974), Green & Laffont (1977), Groves & Ledyard (1977), Myerson 
(1979), Dasgupta, Hammond & Maskin (1979), Milgrom (1979), Schoumaker (1979), 
108 Strausz,R. (1997) 
109 Khalil, F. (1991) 
IIODasgupta, Hammond and Maskin (1979) 
III Hammond (1979), Myersen (1979) provide general treatment of the problem. 
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Green (1979), Groves (1979), Hammond (1979 and 1987), Baron & Besanko (1987), 
MacLeod & Malcomson (1989), Laffont & Tirole (1994), Jeitschko, Mirman, and 
Salgueiro (1997) to name a few. As far as the current study is concerned Laffont and 
Tirole (1994) give the most comprehensive study of the issue because of the explicit 
focus placed on regulation. 
Laffont and Tirole emphasize how regulatory policies should be designed to cope with 
the problems created by information asymmetries, rather than how these are structured in 
practice. The basic models provide the agents with a menu of contracts whose differing 
power allows the regulator to identify the firm's type upon selection. The basic 
unobservable elements in this relationship are the agents' effort and efficiency which 
directly affect the firm's costs, but that induces an unobservable level of disutility for the 
firm. The key idea in Laffont and Tirole is that the principal does not know the minimum 
necessary transfer (in any form) to induce the agent to accept the contract because he 
does not know the agent's type, which is the whether the agent is experiencing high or 
low level of cost. 
In their model, the regulator has two conflicting goals: promote cost reduction and extract 
the firm's rent as the shadow cost of public funds, as we will shortly see, is assumed to be 
strictly positive. 112 Regulation is subject to adverse selection and moral hazard. The 
regulated firm has private information about its technology at the date of contracting 
(adverse selection) and its cost reducing effort is unobserved by the regulator (moral 
hazard). 
Let C = C(fJ, e, .... ) be the firm's costs, where fJ is the technological parameter and e is 
the effort or cost-reducing activity (Ce < 0 and Cee Z 0; effort reduces cost at a 
decreasing rate). In the basic model the cost function is defined as: 
C = fJ-e (9) 
112 This is because the money spent by the government is raised through various taxes and is costly to the 
society. 
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Let further lj/(e) denote the firm's managers' disutility of effort expressed in monetary 
terms, with lj/'(e) > 0 (effort is costly); lj/"(e) > 0 (the cost of effort is convex), and 
satisfies lj/(O) = 0, lime~oo lj/(e) = +00. 
It is first assumed that cost is observable and reimbursed to the firm by the regulator. In 
order to accept the contract, the firm must be compensated by a net transfer t in addition 
to the reimbursement of cost. In this case the firm's utility takes the form: 
U = t -lj/(e) (10) 
Normalizing the firm's reservation utility to zero, the firm's individual rationality 
constraint is: 
(11) 
The net surplus of consumers/taxpayers, when taking into account the shadow cost of 
public funds (A > 0), is 
S - (1 + A )(t + fJ - e) (12) 
The regulator's ex post social welfare, thus, takes the form: 
S - (1 + A )(t + fJ - e) + t - lj/( e) = S - (1 + A) [fJ - e + lj/( e )] - AU (13) 
As mentioned earlier, the crucial feature of this social welfare is that of the existence of a 
shadow cost of public funds implies that the regulator dislikes leaving a rent to the firm. 
Here the assumption is that the regulator is a Stackelberg leader, who makes a "take it or 
leave it" offer. Under complete information (i.e. knowing fJ and observing e), the 
regulator would solve: 
max {U,e} {S - (1 + A )[fJ - e + lj/(e)] - AU} 
subject to U ~ 0 
The solution to this problem is: 
lj/'(e) = 1 or e == e* 
(14) 
(15) 
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U = 0 or t = If/( e .. ) (16) 
That is, the marginal disutility of effort must be equal to marginal cost saving it induces. 
Further, the existence of a shadow cost of public funds implies that the firm receives no 
rent. 
Now, relaxing the assumption of complete information, the regulator observes realized 
cost but does not know the true value of fJ and does not monitor the level of effort. 
Laffont and Tirole discuss two scenarios. The first assumes that fJ can take one of the 
two values {fJ,fJ} with fJ > fJ and in the second scenario fJ can assume any value within 
the boundary. Since the results are similar, only the first scenario (the two-type case) is 
discussed here. 
A contract based on observable variables t and C specifies a transfer-cost pair for each 
type of firm, namely {t(fJ),C(fJ)} for type fJ and {t(fJ),C(fJ)} for type fJ· 
Hence, the optimal regulation under incomplete information is characterized by: 
I) 1f/'(fJ - C) = 1 or ~ = e* . This implies an efficient level of effort and a positive rent 
for type fJ. 
-- /L v -- -
II) 1f/'(/3 - C) = 1- ----<!>'(fJ - C) implying that e < e* . Thus fJ supplies less 
I+/L I-v 
than optimal effort and receives no rent. 
In the above equations, v is the probability of agent being of type fJ, (1- v) is the 
probability of the agent being of type fJ, and <!>( e) = If/( e) -If/( e - t..fJ) is fJ 's rent. These 
results illustrate the trade-off faced by the regulator under asymmetric information. The 
ability of the efficient type to mimic the inefficient type forces the regulator to give up a 
rent to the efficient type in order to have an active efficient type. To reduce the social 
costs of these (information) rents, allocations are distorted towards low-powered schemes 
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(the first best scenario is when the principal has complete information about the agent and 
makes the agent residual claimant ofhislher cost savings). 
In general, Laffont and Tirole's model offers the agents a menu of contracts. In this menu, 
the most efficient type chooses to face a fixed-price contract (FFP) and is therefore 
residual claimant for its cost savings. The other types are given incentive contracts that 
are intermediate between the fixed price contract and cost-plus contract. In other words, 
regardless of the regulator'S beliefs about the agents, the contract specifies that a low cost 
firm achieves the first best level of cost, and this target is unaffected by the revelation of 
information. 
The model of Laffont and Tirole assumes a deterministic relationship between the agent's 
effort and the signal the principal obtains. Jeitschko, Mirman, and Salgueiro (JMS 
hereafter), however, consider the same relationship in a stochastic environment, in which 
the principal does not necessarily become fully informed even if a separating equilibrium 
prevails. They present a dynamic (non-commitment) model in which the principal uses 
the knowledge gained in the first period to regulate the agent in the second period. 
JMS examine the question of optimal incentive schemes in noisy environments, in which 
signals are subject to random, unobservable shocks. A consequence of this scenario is 
that the principal need not be fully informed after observing the results of the agent's 
actions. Knowledge comes gradually and the principalleams from its experience with the 
agent's type and uses this knowledge in its next dealing with the agent. This affects the 
optimal reward structure, which depends on the degree of information transmission. 
Since the principal designs the contract, it determines the degree of information 
transmission. 
Further, the fact that signals are noisy increases the possibility of experimentation in 
designing the contract. That is, the principal can manipulate the information generating 
process to enhance the information inferred from the signal. 
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JMS show that the additional reward (informational rent) paid to high type 1 13 agents is 
smaller when production is stochastic. The agent's potential future payoff, and thus the 
amount of compensation, depends on how informative the signal is. That is, the agent's 
payoff depends on how much the principalleams. The principal can affect the amount of 
compensation to induce its favorable level of effort of the high type agent. This is 
because the principal determines the equilibrium distribution of output, which also 
enables the principal to design the first period contract in a way to obtain more 
information about the true state of the world. Since these two effects work in opposite 
direction, the high type will not produce the first best level of output in the first period. 
This, JMS believe, generate ratchet effect in the sense that in equilibrium, observation of 
high level of output in the first period increases the principal expectation and the target 
level of output in the second period. JMS's reward function consists of two parts: a base 
pay for any equilibrium output, and an additional bonus for high output levels. 
A difference between the North Sea and the model discussed by Laffont and Tirole and 
JMS is that the application of domestic goods and services, if less efficient than those of 
the foreign ones, has both negative and positive impact on the government's social 
welfare function. On one hand by virtue of its position as partner and/or collector of 
royalties, the government is financially involved in the industry and hence seeks the most 
efficient goods and services. On the other hand, the government's position as the 
caretaker of the offshore-related industries (possibly influenced by the factors described 
in section 3.3) enhances the weight placed on the application of domestic goods and 
services in solid welfare. 
Another difference between the two cases is that the agent's rent in Laffont and Tirole is 
costly and undesirable. In the North Sea, however, this rent is reflected in the company's 
profit from the activity of the field in question while the government itself has a share. 
Thus, reducing the operator's profit, by other means than its share of the consortium, 
results in government's losing profit. 
1 \3 Note that in this model (unlike Laffont and Tirole model), the high type is more efficient than the low 
type. Since they look at a production function model: y = (J.e , so (J <=> f3 
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One should bear in mind that Laffont and Tirole consider the case when the effort is a 
costly and undesirable element for the agent, while it increases principal's utility. Thus 
the agent is being compensated for making extra effort. The "effort" in the North Sea 
case, however, is defined in a different, and maybe opposite manner. The operator's 
(agent) effort may be defined as his willingness to apply "efficient" goods and services 
regardless of the country of origin. Thus, with the assumption of less efficient domestic 
goods and services, operator's effort is undesirable for the state. The latter is 
compensating the operator for not making the effort. Thus, while in Laffont and Tirole, 
the principal seeks the highest possible effort from the agent, in the North Sea case the 
principal (government) desires less effort from the agent. 
Further, the study of JMS considers the case when the principal has the opportunity of 
learning the agents' behavior, or their type. This is possible because the parameters are 
fixed intertemporally, which may not be the case in our case. In the North Sea case, one 
dimension of the agents' type is their (private) observation of the relative efficiency of the 
domestic goods and services. This will change over time, due to technological changes, 
and the government may not be able to use this information in its next contract with the 
operator. Thus, unlike the case studied by JMS, honoring the contract and the 
compensation scheme to the operator is necessary if the government is to keep its 
credi tabili ty. 
3.5 Empirical Work on the North Sea Petroleum Industry 
So far the literature concerning the various stages of the North Sea petroleum industry 
lead one to believe that the policies applied should have generated inefficiencies. The 
issue of efficiency seems more significant once one takes the magnitude of the 
investment in the industry into the consideration. This may lead us to investigate 
empirically the possible existence of inefficiency using conventional input-output 
methods, as described in the next chapter. This section briefly reviews the existing 
empirical work regarding the North Sea petroleum industry. 
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The literature on the North Sea petroleum industry is vast and covers many aspects of the 
industry. This includes theoretical aspects of exploration and exploitation of natural 
resources (Odell (1997), Basu (1993)) in addition to previously mentioned literature), the 
economic impacts of the industry on the economies of the UK and Norway (Bjornland 
(1998), Cumbers (1995), Harvie (1992), Motamen and Strange (1983, 1980), and the 
political economy of the region (Harvie (1994), Andersen (1992), Nelsen (1991), 
Liverman (1982), and Noreng (1980)), as well as the environmental issues (Stra (1993), 
Cairns (1992), Freestone (1992), Jenisch (1989), Saetevik (1988), Guruswamy (1984), 
watt (1976) and Mac Kay and Mac Kay (1975)) and issues relating to abandonment of 
fields after they cease production (Side (1997), and Whyatt (1991)). 
The empirical studies related to the North Sea petroleum industry, however, either deal 
with the issue of economic analysis of exploration and extraction of oil (Pesaran 1990), 
oil investment (Favero and Pesaran 1994), or issues related to petroleum tax and royalties 
in Norway and the UK, analyzing the impact of different regimes on the development of 
the North Sea fields as well as on the economies of the two countries. The latter issue is 
analyzed and discussed by Kemp and his co-authors in several articles. 114 
Despite the importance of the issue of efficiency in such a significant industry, no 
empirical study, to the best of my knowledge, has been conducted with respect to the 
issue of input/output efficiency of North Sea upstream activity (exploration, 
development, and production) petroleum industry. One explanation for the lack of such 
literature may be the lack of access to time-series input-output data. The data necessary 
for such a study should cover the magnitUde of production (preferably by type), and the 
development cost and production expenditure for each field throughout the lifetime of 
that field. Seemingly for competitive reasons, the oil companies are extremely reluctant 
to provide such data. Though it is fairly easy to obtain a part of the data (production level 
for instance), other parts, particularly concerning production (labour and other variable 
costs), are extremely difficult to gain access to. 
114 See Kemp (1990), Kemp and Mac Donald (1992a, 1992b, 1993, 1994), Kemp and Jones (l996a, 
1996b), Kemp, Rose and Stephen (1995), Kemp, Rose and Kellas (l988a, 1988b), Kemp and Stephen 
(1995), Kemp, and Kellas (1989), Kemp and Reading (1990). 
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While the upstream North Sea petroleum activity lacks a proper empirical study, Price 
and Weyman-Jones (1996) use the Malmquist indices to measure the productivity change 
in another energy sector, namely the UK's regional gas industry (transmission and 
distribution) before and after privatization. Using multiple inputs1l5 and outputs1l6 data, 
the authors show that the rate of productivity growth increased significantly after 
privatization. 
Using inputs and outputs to measure static (based on non-parametric DEA, and 
parametric SFA) and dynamic (based on non-parametric Malmquist indices) productivity 
has been widely used by researchers in the past two decades. The techniques have been 
applied in industries and businesses such as energy (Kittel sen 1999, Coelli 1996), 
software companies (Banker et al 1991), public sector (Boussofiane et al 1997), 
Hjalmarsson and Veiderpass 1992, Athanassopoulos 1999, Banker et al 1999), 
telecommunications (Banker et al 1998, and 1996), Airline industry (Banker and 
Johnston 1993), hospitals (Byrnes and Valdmanis 1989, Chilingerian and Sherman 1987, 
Fare et al 1990) and Banking (Ali and Chen 1999, Ali and Gstach 1999, Charnes et al 
1990, Mlima 1999) to name a few. 
The common feature of these studies is that they all use input-output data to measure the 
relative efficiency of the unit in question, with the same function, within the organization 
or industry under study. Fortunately, the author of this study has been able to gather a 
data set comprising of many necessary components to conduct a similar study. The data 
are not perfect, but so far as can be seen is the best available. The details of the data, 
along with a comprehensive study of the parametric and non-parametric approaches to 
the question of input efficiency are to be presented in the following chapters. 
115 Inputs including number of employee.s and l~ngth of the gas main~ transmission and distribution system 
116 Outputs including domestic gas sale, mdustrial gas sale, commercIal gas sale, number of customers 
served, and gas using appliances sold. 
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3.6 Summary and Concluding Remarks 
The chapter has had a brief discussion of the literature on oil exploration and production. 
It has attempted to illustrate the range of dynamic and static issues that economists have 
addressed on this topic area. It has reviewed the evolution of natural resource economics, 
from the time that the international oil companies were the mere decision-makers with 
regard to the exploration and production level. The latter, in tum, determined the global 
oil price, to the present time when each producing country has less significant effect on 
this commodity's price. Many economists believe that in the present situation cost-
minimization should be the main concern of the parties (oil companies and governments) 
involved in the petroleum industry. 
Governments' first involvement is the issue of auctioning the exploration and production 
licenses. The chapter has reviewed the various kinds of auctions. While the bonus-based 
auctions generally yield the same first-best outcome for the owner of the resources, the 
Norwegian and British government chose to apply a less efficient alternative, namely a 
discretionary auction system. Fraser and Kretzer show that the discretionary system does 
not provide the government with the best outcome. Given this and the fact that cost-
minimization should be the main concern of government, why might the governments 
choose to apply a second-best option? 
Political economists seek the answer in the environment where the government's policies 
are formed. Many of these economists believe that the governments are not necessarily 
seeking to maximize the so-called welfare function. In effect, the governments are 
influenced by various interest groups, and the policies are made to maximize the utility of 
these groups. In return, the governments receive contribution for the cost of their election 
campaign, and votes from these groups. Thus, a discretionary system is a powerful tool to 
control rules and regulation in favour of one or a number of interest groups. 
However, applying this system, the governments are faced by two immediate problems. 
The first one is diverging from the efficient equilibrium of a competitive market. The 
auctioning system applied by Norway and the UK put the choice of goods and services, 
109 
applied in the exploration, development, and production phases of each field, at the 
governments' discretion. If this policy was necessary, presumably these goods and 
services were inefficient, generating inefficiency in the industry as a whole. 
The second problem is the likely asymmetry of information between the government 
(principal) and the companies acting as operators of the daily activity of oil and gas fields 
(agents). The operator has access to all information involving a field's development and 
production including the source and efficiency of offshore-related industry. The review of 
the principal-agent literature has showed that this asymmetry of information generates 
another inefficiency in the industry. 
The increased use of domestic goods and services (discussed in Chapter 2), therefore, 
may have been due to government pressure (for political economy reasons) rather than 
profit maximizing decisions by operators. The analysis of policy in the previous chapter 
suggests periods of time when it might have been easier for government to implement 
such policies. The above arguments might be put to empirical tests had one sufficient 
data for the assignment. The literature about the evaluation of efficiency in a particular 
industry suggests two distinct approaches, namely non-parametric, mathematical 
approach and stochastic approach. The common element in both approaches is that the 
study requires data regarding the inputs and outputs of each field throughout its lifetime. 
Unfortunately the literature, to the best of my knowledge, lacks such study. The main 
reason, one could postulate, is the difficulty in obtaining the necessary data. 
Having been able to collect the required data, the remainder of this study is to evaluate 
the efficiency of the North Sea petroleum industry in both Norwegian and British sectors. 
However, before discussing the results, we will have a brief review of the two parametric 
and non-parametric approaches, followed by an overview of the data in hand. 
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Chapter Four: Methodology 
Introduction 
The previous chapter addressed the empirical work that has discussed and measured the 
efficiency of the organizations in question. It was mentioned that efficiency measurement 
involves two distinct approaches: parametric ( econometrics) and non-parametric 
(mathematical). These two approaches are the most common ones in measuring the 
relative efficiency of organizations. This chapter discusses and describes these 
techniques, to see how we can use them in the context of the present study. 
The first section discusses about what economists think of production, the role of inputs, 
and efficiency. The production function can be thought of as Y = f(xl'x 2 ,t,z,e); i.e. 
inputs (Xl and x2 ), (t) time, other (contextual) variables (z), and a random error term 
(e). These variables affect the way in which inputs are transformed into outputs. 
Inefficiency occurs when production is below the amount produced by applying these 
variables in the best (optimum) possible manner. 
To measure the (in)efficiency of a unit of production one needs to apply one of the above 
mentioned techniques. The description of these two techniques begins by first introducing 
the non-parametric approach, known as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). The next 
section involves a study of DEA in its static form, followed by a section explaining the 
development of the technique when one considers production procedure as a dynamic 
process, which involves the possibility of changes in available technology over time. 
The parametric approach of Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) is another approach to the 
question of (in)efficiency in a production unit. In addition to other characteristics (to be 
discussed shortly) the ability of the approach to consider the stochastic noise of a 
production process has made it a powerful tool in determining the efficiency level of 
units in question. The fourth part of this chapter explains this technique and its 
applications. 
III 
The chapter contains some examples to illustrate some of the concepts involved. The 
input and output used in the examples are arbitrary but the results of the study based on 
these random input/output are the actual results of DE A analysis. 
4.1 Production Possibility Frontier, Efficiency, and Productivity 
Coelli et al. (1998) define a production function, or production frontier, as a function 
showing the maximum output(s) attainable from a given vector of inputs. A production 
function, which involves two inputs for producing a single output can be represented by 
Y = f(x} , x2 ), where XI' x2 denote the two inputs applied in the production process. To 
illustrate the concept geometrically, consider a simple production process in which a 
single input (x) is used to produce a single output (Y), as shown in the Figure 4-1. 
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The set of all feasible input-output combination, OP in the figure, is called the feasible 
production set or production possibility frontier (PPF). In the other words, the PPF 
represents the maximum output attainable from each input level. Thus, both B and C are 
technically efficient since they lie on the PPF. All the points to the right-hand-side of OP, 
e.g. A, are not technically efficient. This is because they are either producing less output 
while using the same amount of input (comparing A and B), or using more input to 
produce the same amount of output (comparing A and C). 
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As defined above, both firm B and firm C are technically efficient since both lie on the 
PPF. Thus, firm A could mimic either firm B or firm C to become more efficient. 
However, though both firm B and firm C are efficient, the latter is said to be more 
productive than the former one. The productivity of a firm is defined as the ratio of the 
output to input (in a single input-output production). 
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The ray from the origin to each of the point (i.e. A, B, or C) has slope of Y / X , and thus, 
provides a measure of productivity of each point (each firm). If the firm operating at A 
were to move to technically efficient point B, the slope of the ray (DA) would become 
greater (DB), implying higher productivity at point B. However, Firm B itself, though 
technically efficient, could gain a higher productivity by moving to C, since the ray DC is 
tangent to the PPF indicating the maximum possible productivity. The point C is the 
point of optimal scale (Coelli et al. 1998). Operation at any other point on the production 
frontier results in lower productivity. Thus, a firm may be technically efficient but may 
still be able to improve its productivity. 
The production functions discussed so far do not include a time component. However, the 
production function can be represented by Y = f(X!, X 2,t), where t is the time 
component of the production function. The additional component, time, associates the 
production function with technological changes over time. When one considers 
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productivity comparisons through time, an additional source of productivity change, 
namely technical change, is possible. The advance in technology may push the PPF 
upward as shown in the Figure 4-3. 
y 
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The optimal level of efficiency and/or productivity (or measuring it) can not be reached 
unless one knows about the nature of PFF. The PFF, in turn, changes from one industry 
to the other and from time to time. Thus, when dealing with the efficiency/productivity 
issue, the major difficulty of economists is to have a close estimation of the prevailing 
production frontier for the industry in question. 
There are two distinct approaches to the construction of these frontiers and the 
measurement of efficiency relative to the constructed frontiers: the statistical approach 
(the econometric analysis), and the non-parametric (mathematical) approach. The two 
approaches use different techniques to envelop data more or less tightly. To that end, they 
make different accommodations for random noise and for flexibility in the structure of 
production technology. It is these two different accommodations that generate the 
strengths and weaknesses of the two approaches. Fried et al. (1993) differentiates the two 
approaches as: 
The econometric approach is parametric, and requires a pre-defined specification of 
functional form. The mathematical approach is non-parametric and does not assume a 
pre-determined functional form. 
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The econometric approach is stochastic, and distinguishes the effects of noise from 
the effects of inefficiency. The mathematical approach is non-stochastic, and lumps noise 
and inefficiency together and calls the combination inefficiency. In DEA, exogenous 
factors like a sudden shock in the global oil price, increase or decrease of demand for 
North Sea oil (due to, say, a decrease or increase in OPEC oil production), and 
governments' regulatory change with respect to various kind of inputs for the offshore 
industry will be regarded as reduction (or increase) in the efficiency of the firms. In SF A, 
however, the exogenous factors will be identified and separated from the endogenous 
factors effecting the efficiency of the firms. The following sections have a closer look at 
the two approaches. 
4.2 Non-Parametric Approach: Data Envelopment Analysis 
The mathematical programming approach to construct production frontiers and measure 
efficiency relative to these constructed frontiers, is called data envelopment analysis 
(DEA). The non-parametric approach of DEA is to calculate a discrete piecewise frontier 
determined by the set of Pareto-efficient decision-making units (DMUs). This results in 
an understanding about each DMU's stand in relation to the rest of the DMUs. "The focus 
of DEA is on the individual DMUs as represented by the n optimizations (one for each 
DMU) required in DEA analysis, in contrast to the focus on the averages and estimation 
of parameters that are associated with single-optimization statistical approaches". 
(Charles et al., 1994:5). 
A DEA analysis requires determination and specification of the inputs and outputs of the 
production process. This should be followed by a decision on the orientation of the study, 
which identifies whether the decision-makers have more say in determining the level 
andlor the type of inputs, or the level of output. For example if the firms or industry in 
question is to produce a certain fixed amount of goods (obliged by a contract for 
instance) then the efficiency of the firms should be based on the level of input applied 
(input-oriented study). Thus the orientation of the study depends on the aim of the study 
andlor the nature of the industry, or the activity in question. The results of an input-
oriented DEA analysis indicate the degree of (in)efficiency in the application of inputs, 
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holding the output fixed. The output-oriented DEA, on the other hand, indicates the 
relative efficiencies of the production process of each DMU. 
The principle of DEA lies in the assumption that if a given producer, A, is capable of 
using X(A) input to produce YeA) unit of output, then other producers should also be able 
to do the same if they were to operate efficiently. Similarly, if producer B is capable of 
using X(B) units of input for Y(B) unit of outputs, then other producers should also be 
capable of the same production schedule. Producers A, B and others can be combined to 
form a composite producer with composite inputs and composite outputs. Since this 
composite producer does not necessarily exist, it is typically called a virtual producer. 
The heart of the analysis lies in finding the best virtual producer for each real producer. If 
the virtual producer is better than the original producer by either making more output 
with the same input (in an output-oriented approach), or making the same output with 
less input (in an input-oriented approach) then the original producer is inefficient. 
In contrast to the parametric approaches, DEA does not require any assumption about the 
functional form of the production function in question. The only requirement in this 
approach is that each DMU lies on or below the frontier. Each DMU not on the frontier is 
scaled against a convex combination of the DMUs on the frontier facet closest to it. For 
each inefficient DMU, DEA identifies the sources and level of inefficiency for each of 
the inputs/outputs, depending on the orientation of the study. The level of inefficiency is 
determined by comparison to a single reference DMU or a convex combination of other 
referent DMUs located on the efficient frontier. 
DEA consists of a variety of models, each one suitable for different settings. The two 
most commonly applied models are as follows. 
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4.2.1 The CCR Ratio Model 
The model identifies the source, and estimates the amount, of inefficiencies, as well as 
yielding an objective evaluation of overall efficiency. 117 
The input-oriented CCR is formulated as follows: 
Minimize: Z 0 = e - & . f3 . S + - & . f3 . S-
Subject to: 
YA-S+ = Yo 
e Xo -X/l-S- = 0 
/l,S+,S- ~O 
(4-1) 
(4-2) 
Here IS a N x 1 vector of constants, Y and X are the output and input vectors, 
respectively, Ss are the slack variables, f3 is a (1 x N) row of 1 s, and e is a scalar the 
value of which will be the efficiency score of the ith DMU. 
The interpretation for the envelopment problem of CCR is "the selection of a point in the 
cone that allows maximal input reduction of X 0 " . 118 This point lies on a ray through the 
origin via the most northwestern DMU. 
In Figure 4-4, PI and P2 are the efficient (productive) units. The rest of the DMUs are 
being compared to either one of the efficient units (P 5 for instance which is being 
compare to PI) or being compared to a virtual unit, which is a linear combination of two 
efficient units (i.e. either of the inefficient units of P7, P 6, or P 4). 
117 Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes published the first paper introducing DEA (CCR model) in the European 
Journal of Operations Research in 1978. 
118 Charnes et al. (1984) 
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The model distinguishes between technical and scale efficiencies by estimating pure 
technical efficiency at the given scale of operation, and identifying whether increasing, 
decreasing, or constant returns to scale possibilities are present for further exploitation. 119 
Variable returns to scale are modeled by allowing fJ· A ~ 1. An input-oriented BCC 
model is structured as: 
Minimize: Zo = e - & . fJ . S + - & . fJ . S-
Subject to: 
YA-S+ =Yo 
e X -XA-S- =0 o 
fJ·A~l 
A,S+,S- ~o 
(4-3) 
(4-4) 
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Figure 4-5 «The Bee Model» INPUT 
The scalar e is the proportional reduction to all inputs of DMUs required to improve 
efficiency. This reduction simultaneously applies to all inputs and results in a radial 
movement toward the envelopment surface. The presence of & in the objective function 
allows the minimization over e without involving the slacks. However, the presence of 
slacks in the constraints serves the same purpose as other model. Thus, the optimization 
can be done in two stages. The first step is to achieve the maximum reduction of inputs 
via the optimal e, and the second is to move onto the efficient frontier via the slack 
variables. Thus, the following two statements are equivalent: 
1- A DMU is efficient if and only if 
( a) e'" = 1, and 
(b) all slacks are zero. 
2- A DMU is efficient if and only if Zo = 1. 
The non-zero slacks and the value of e* ~ 1 indicate the source and amount of any 
inefficiency. 
Like the CCR case, the inefficient units would be compared to either a real efficient unit 
(P6 for instance which is being compared to P3, in Figure 4-5) or being compared to a 
virtual unit, which is a linear combination of two efficient units (i.e. either of the 
inefficient units ofP7 and Ps). 
119 The model was first introduced by Banker, Charles, and Cooper in Management Science (1984) 
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The difference between the Bee and eeR models is that in the latter the convexity 
constraint of f3. A ~ 1 is omitted. In other words, while the eeR model assumes constant 
returns to scale technology for the industry, the Bee model allows for the presence of 
various returns to scale. The presence of the convexity constraint in the Bee model 
enlarges the DMUs' feasible region. The result is a higher number of reported "efficient" 
units in Bee than eeR. In effect, while the eeR model only identifies the productive 
units, the Bee model does not distinguish between efficient and productive units, that is 
being both on the frontier and being on the north-westerly ray from the origin. 
Example 1: The difference between the two mentioned models may be better explained 
by using a simplified example. The case of 10 units that use the same type of input for 
producing similar type of output is studied. The table 4-1 shows the DEA results using 
eeR and Bee models. Note that the results are the actual results of DEA on some 
arbitrary levels of input and outputs. 
Table 4-1: Example of BCC and CCR Efficiency Scores. 
CCR Model BCC Model BCC Model Returns 
DMU Efficiency Efficiency Scale Efficiency to scale 
0.889 1.000 0.889 irs 
2 0.267 0.600 0.444 irs 
3 1.000 1.000 1.000 
4 0.933 1.000 0.933 drs 
5 0.250 0.375 0.667 irs 
6 0.500 0.702 0.712 drs 
7 0.549 1.000 0.549 drs 
8 0.476 1.000 0.476 drs 
9 0.476 0.724 0.657 drs 
10 0.762 0.959 0.794 drs 
Assuming constant returns to scale, the eeR model identifies only one DMU as the 
efficient one, whereas the Bee model recognizes five DMUs as efficient. However, in 
the Bee model the number of productive firms (with scale efficiency of unity) is one. As 
discussed before, assuming variable returns to scale allows a unit to lack the optimal level 
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of productivity but still be efficient (the DMUs 1, 4, 7, and 8 are examples of this 
situation). 
The Figure 4-6 shows the geometrical positions of the DMUs in the above example. Let 
us consider the case of the firm D6. According to the CCR model, this DMU has an 
efficiency of 50%. This stems from the fact that this DMU uses 12 units of input to 
produce 9 units of output. The productivity of this DMU, which is what the CCR model 
calculates, is ~ or ~. The most efficient DMU, D3, uses 4 units of inputs to produce 6 12 4 
units of output, a productivity of 6 . In comparison, D6 has a productivity of 50% of D3 
4 
firm. The BCC model, however, uses the ratio of OD6 as the measurement of efficiency 
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of the D6. 
Besides BCe and CCR, there are other models of creating the production frontier within 
the framework of DEA. A brief discussion of these models will be represented in the 
appendix. 
The choice of BCC and CCR models for the current study stems from the fact that, unlike 
the other DEA models, BCC and CCR models are unit-independent in the sense that 
converting the unit of measurements does not affect the results. This is particularly 
important in the petroleum industry because various units are used to measure the oil or 
gas produced. These units include barrels a day, tonne, and tonne oil equivalent, to 
mention a few. These two models allow the analyst to freely choose anyone of these 
without worrying about what would have happened had s/he chosen other units. 
The reason for using both these models is the undecided issue of the nature of returns to 
scale of North Sea petroleum industry. On the one hand, one could argue that after almost 
four decades of activity in the North Sea, the oil companies have the experience required 
to adopt technologies that would guarantee a constant returns to scale production frontier. 
In the other hand, the intervention of governments in the daily activity of the oil fields, 
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especially with respect to the procurement process of the oil companies, may prevent the 
companies from applying the technology necessary for such returns to scale. 
However, one should be aware that the production frontiers formed by the two 
approaches of CRS and VRS have a basic difference when the input is expressed in term 
of costs. The VRS approach assumes that no production will be generated before some 
fixed cost incurs, while, as we can see in the Figure 4-4, the starting point of the 
production frontier with the CRS assumption is the origin, assuming no need for some 
fixed cost before the production start. In the context of the North Sea petroleum 
production, the VRS assumption seems to me a more valid case than the assumption 
made by the CRS approach, as the fields incur huge construction expenditure before it 
comes on stream. 
The current study adopts an input-oriented approach. The consideration behind this 
choice is that the study is to analyze the impacts of the governments' regulatory 
framework with respect to the oil companies' input-procurement policies. The 
requirement of companies' benevolence towards domestic offshore-related industries 
could affect the companies' policy with regard to injecting the most efficient inputs into 
their production processes. If that is the case, then one should be concerned about how 
the "imposed" inputs would affect the efficiency/productivity of the companies. 
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4.2.3 Significance of Each Variable in Question 
L 
The aim of DEA is to investigate the relative standing of each firm, or unit under study, 
in the whole population of firms or units in question. In, say, an input-oriented model the 
results would identify and measure and sources of inefficiency. In other words, it reveals 
how much the various inputs could have been reduced had the unit performed like one, or 
a combination, of efficient units. 
However, in any production process the significance of different variables is not 
necessarily the same. A certain variable may have a much higher impact on the efficiency 
scores of the units under question than any other variable does. Andersen and Petersen 
(1993) stress that" .. . units may be rated as efficient due to a single input or output, even 
though that input or output may be seen as relatively unimportant" (p. 1261). Thus, it 
may be important to investigate the significance of each different input when measuring 
the relative efficiency of the units in a certain industry. 
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Banker et al (1996 & 1999) suggest a simple method for identifying the significance of 
each variable. The authors suggest first evaluating the mean efficiency of all units by 
performing DEA on all variables. The second step is to evaluate the mean efficiency of 
units by performing DEA on all variables but the sth variable. Under the null hypothesis 
that the marginal impact of sth variable is zero, the significance of the variables under 
study can be identified. 
4.2.4 The Significance of Contextual Variables 
So far, the production function under study has been a function of inputs only. It has had 
the form Y = !(Xl 'X2 ' ..... X n ), whereXp X 2 , ..... X n denote the inputs applied. The 
producer in question has, presumably, control over the quantity, quality, and source of 
each of the inputs to produce a certain quantity of output. However, in certain 
circumstances the production process may involve factors, other than the conventional set 
of inputs, that the producer has less or no control over (in the form 
Y = !(Xl , X 2 , ..... X II , Zp Z2 , ..... , ZII) where Zs denote the uncontrollable factors). For 
instance, the production technology applied in an oil field may vary with the depth of 
petroleum reservoir and/or the depth of water. Platforms built on shallow waters may 
require lighter (and probably cheaper) facilities than those built on deeper waters. These 
kinds of factors will be referred to as contextual variables in this study. 
The DEA models, introduced above, per se, do not deal with this issue. However, 
economists have introduced some tools to measure the influence of the contextual 
variables on the inefficiency of the units in question. Banker et al (1993, 1996, and 1999) 
have developed a model to evaluate the significance of the contextual variables. The 
model is based on the relationship between output as a function of inputs and contextual 
variables. 
Banker et al. have an illustrative application based on Texas school districts data. They 
evaluate the efficiency of the schools when the output is considered to be the pass rate of 
students, which is the percentage of students passing the Texas Assessment of Academic 
Skills. The inputs are teachers per student, support staff per student, and administrative 
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staff per student. However, they hypothesize 5 socioeconomic (contextual) factors that 
could have had affect on the performance of the schools. The contextual factors for the 
study are standard tax value per student (T AXV AL), percentage of non-minority students 
(NMINORITY), percentage of students not economically disadvantaged (NDISADV), 
percentage of gifted and talented students (GIFTED), and average years of teachers 
tenure (TENURE). The efficiency of the schools under question is measured, using DEA, 
and thus the inefficiency e (llefficiency) is regressed against the contextual variables as 
follows: 
Loge = f30 + f3 l TAXVAL + f32NMINORITY + f33NDISADV 
+ f34GIFTED + f3sTENURE + V M - V + u 
where v is a two-sided noise term, bounded above at V M , and u is one-sided inefficiency 
term. Banker et ai assert that the OLS intercept is a consistent estimator of 
f30 + VM - E(v - u) . 
The regression analysis showed that 42% of the variance in Loge is explained by 
socioeconomic factors, 19% of the variance in Loge is attributed to noise, and 39% to 
residual inefficiency. 
4.3 Parametric Approach: Stochastic Frontier Analysis, SFA 
The estimated production function by DEA has a form of Y = !(Xp X 2 , ..... X n). We 
have seen that the technique used by Banker et ai. allows one to expand the evaluation to 
deal with production frontiers of the form Y = !(Xl , X 2 , ..... X n, Zp Z2 , ..... , Zn)' 
However, the non-parametric approach of DEA is a deterministic one, in the sense that 
the technique rules out (or does not recognize) the possibility of any stochastic noise. 
Any noise generated from data gathering process, and/or the shocks incurred in the 
industry (i.e. a war, which could trigger higher oil prices) is regarded as inefficiency by 
DEA. In short, the DEA technique comes short in dealing with production functions of 
the form Y = !(XpZpe) where e denotes noise. An alternative solution to DEA is 
known as Stochastic Frontier Analysis, SF A. 
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SF A is an econometric technique based on a specified stochastic production function and 
seeks to estimate the average production frontier. This technique assumes a parametric 
representation of technology along with a random disturbance term, assumed to be 
identically and independently distributed. 
The most common approach in the econometric literature is the single equation cross-
sectional model, represented by120 
(4-5) 
where P denotes the vector of parameters to be estimated, and i = 1, .......... ,1 is the index 
of producers, v; denotes the random disturbance term, which captures the effects of 
statistical noise, with iidN(O,(jl~). The inefficiency term is denoted by the independently 
distributed u;, which satisfies U; sO. Further, f(xpP) represents the deterministic 
production frontier, which is made stochastic by the inclusion of the error term. Thus, 
technical inefficiency is given by: 
Technical Efficiency (); = Y; = e Ui f(x;;p)el'i (4-6) 
In the initial period of performance assessment, the difficulty with decomposing the error 
term into separate estimates of noise and technical inefficiencies prevents the 
determination of accurate technical efficiency for each DMU. To overcome this problem, 
the one-sided-inefficiency-component functional form must be specified so that the 
conditional distribution (u; Iv; + u;) can be derived. The mean value of the conditional 
distribution is then inserted in (4-6) to obtain estimates of technical efficiencies. 
The calculation of the frontier is based on two major assumptions. The first assumption is 
that the non-positive error component, U;, is equal to zero. In this case the econometric 
problem simplifies to OLS estimation of the parameters of the specified production 
120 Fried et al. (1993) 
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function with no technical inefficiency. The obvious implication of this assumption is 
that there is no efficiency measurement problem. 121 
The second assumption is that the expected value (the average) of the random disturbance 
term, Vi' is equal to zero. In contrast to the first restriction, this is equivalent to 
estimating the deterministic production frontier with no noise. Thus the implication is 
that there is no decomposition problem. For this estimation three techniques, namely 
Corrected Least Squares (COLS), Modified Least Squares (MOLS), and Maximum 
Likelihood Estimation (MLE), can be used. 
The COLS technique does not require any specification of a priori functional form for the 
random disturbance term, Vi. It proceeds by estimating (4-5) by OLS and corrects the 
downward bias in the estimated OLS by shifting up the frontier until all corrected 
residuals are non-positive and at least one is zero. The corrected residuals are then 
inserted in (4-6) to calculate the technical efficiencies. 
The MOLS technique requires specification of a functional form for the non-positive 
efficiency component, U i • It is commonly assumed that this is a half-normal, 
exponentially distributed function, which requires estimation of one additional parameter, 
namely the variance of the normal distribution truncated above at zero. In this case, (4-5) 
is estimated by modifying the OLS intercept by subtracting the estimated mean of Up 
which is extracted from the moments of the OLS residuals. Expression (4-6) is then used 
to evaluate the technical efficiency. 
By assuming a non-positive disturbance term, Up MLE simultaneously estimates all the 
technology parameters of the distribution of U i • The frontier generated by this technique 
envelops all the DMUs, and the residuals are inserted into (4-6) to provide estimates of 
technical efficiency ( B), which satisfies the condition 0 < Bi S 1. 
121 Fried et al. (1993) 
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In this study, the Maximum Likelihood Estimate approach will be adapted to estimate: 
Log (output) = Po + PI log (fixed cost) + 132 log (variable cost) + (V - U) 
A more discussion of the applied methodology will be presented in 6.2 and 7.2. 
4.4 Advantages and Drawbacks of the Two Techniques 
The parametric and non-parametric approaches use different techniques to envelop data 
in different ways. They make different accommodations for random noise and for 
flexibility in the structure of production technology. It is these two different 
accommodations that generate the strengths and weaknesses of the two approaches. 
DEA approach: 
Focuses on individual DMU in contrast to the population average analyzed by 
econometric approach. Considering the fact that the fields in the North Sea are 
developed under different regulatory regimes, knowing the efficiency of each field is 
a vital step towards determining the effects of these regimes on the performance of 
each field. 
Produces a single aggregate measure of efficiency for each DMU in terms of its 
utilization of input factors to produce desired outputs. 
Places no restriction on the functional form of the production (cost) relationships. 
Considering that the fields in question are developed by different companies in 
different technological environment, it does not seem realistic to analyze all the fields 
with one predetermined production function. 
Focuses on the revealed best-practice frontier, rather than on central-tendency 
properties of the stochastic frontier. This is especially helpful since it may reveal 
which field(s), under which regulatory regimes, has a better performance, relative to 
the other fields. 
Directly compares each DMU against a peer or combination of peers. 
Provides information about the source of inefficiency. 
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Stochastic Approach: 
Can specify, and deal with, noise such as measurement error, whereas the extreme-
point-technique of DEA can not deal with even symmetrical noise with zero mean. 
This is a helpful tool since DEA does not take into consideration the misjudgments in 
setting up the data, and does not take into account other factors (oil price shock, for 
instance) as affecting the performance of the fields. 
Is able to test statistical hypotheses. Since the study is to compare the (average) 
relative efficiency 
Distinguishes random factors from efficiency variations. DEA contributes all the 
variations from the best practices as inefficiency. However, some of these variations 
might have been caused by factors that were not under operator's control (i.e. random 
shocks). In this case, the least the analyst could do is to compare the efficiency results 
given by the two approaches to see whether these uncontrollable factors (if any) have 
had significant effect on the results. 
4.5 Efficiency Change Over Time 
So far, the process of evaluating the production frontier, and consequently the efficiency 
of units of production, by Data Envelopment Analysis has been considered under the 
assumption of static technology. However, the production technology of almost all 
industries is subject to modification based on state-of-the-art in the industry in question. 
Hence, the production function assumes another component, time, as its characteristics 
change in response to production technologies. Thus, the production function takes the 
more challenging form of Y = f(X I'X2' ..... X n'ZI'Z2' ..... 'Zn,e,t), where t denotes the 
element of time (technology). 
Though the DEA models do not take the component of time into consideration while 
measuring the efficiency of production units, they can still be used as a medium to 
measure the comparative changes in efficiency after a new technology is introduced. 
Alternatively, DEA can be used to break down the efficiency changes into, among others, 
efficiency changes that new technology brings about and the efficiency changes stem 
from better performance of the firm, irrespective of the technology change. Before 
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discussing the index-number-based techniques that allow this differentiation, a number of 
definitions must be made. 
Isoquant: An isoquant depicts all combinations of inputs (Xl' X 2 ) that could be used to 
produce a particular quantity of output (say Y = 1'0). Each level of output has an 
associated isoquant. In the simplest form, an isoquant is algebraically derived from 
Y = I(Xp X 2) by making X 2 the subject of the equation and setting Y to a fixed value, 
such as Yo. 
Index Numbers: An index number is defined as a real number that measures changes in 
a set of related variables (Coelli et aI, 1998). Conceptually, index numbers may be used 
for comparisons over time, or space or both. Index numbers are used to measure price 
and quantity changes over time, as well as to measure differences in the levels across 
firms, industries, regions or countries. Price index numbers may refer to consumer prices, 
input and output prices, etc. whereas quantity numbers may be measuring changes in 
quantities of output produced or input used by a firm over time, or across firms. For 
instance, the index v.~/, given by 
(4-12) 
measures the change in the value of the basket of quantities of N commodities from 
period s to t. 
Total Factor Productivity Index: The Total Factor Productivity (TFP) Index is defined 
as a measurement of change in total output relative to change in the usage of all inputs. 
Caves et al. (1982) show how TFP can be derived, using the Malmquist Index (to be 
discussed shortly). The TFP index for two time periods or enterprises, s and t is defined 
r; I r~ 
as TFP~, = ---
, X/IX,I' 
(4-13) 
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4.5.1 Output Oriented Productivity Index 
Decomposition of a Simple TFP Index 
Fare et al. (1994) decompose an output-oriented TFP, introduced by Caves et al. Suppose 
that the production technologies in two periods are represented by functions II' (X) and 
f, (X). If the firms were technically efficient in these two periods, then the observed 
output levels would be the same as those implied by the production function. Otherwise 
the outputs for both t and s will be 
(4-14) 
where 0 ~ AI :::; 1. A value of AI less than unity implies that the firm is inefficient in that 
period. Substituting (4-14) in the TFP (4-13): 
TFP
vl 
= ~x f,(XI)/ XI . 
. As IJXs)/ X.I, 
(4-15) 
1- If the level of input usage in the two periods is the same, i.e. XI = X. I. = X· , then the 
latter equation provides the following decomposition of 
TFP. =~xf,(X*). 
,II A.
I
, II'(X*) (4-16) 
The first ratio, AI measures the technical efficiency; and the second ratio, f, (X*) 
A,I' I·(X*) , 
measures technical change, as it measures the output level implied by the technology in 
the two periods at the same input level, X*. 
2- If the level of inputs are different, we can write Xl = d" (in the case of a single 
input). Assuming that the production function is homogeneous of degree E(t) at XI III 
period t , the TFP equation can be written as: 
TFP =~xf,(ds)/d\ =~XK&(I)-lXf,(XS>. 
.1'1 As I" (Xs) / Xs As f (XS> (4-17) 
The decomposition is completed by defining the scale change, K&(l)-l, which itself 
consists of two components. K represents the scale of the operation, and E(t) represents 
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the return to scale parameter. If we assume constant returns to scale, then the scale effect 
becomes unity. 
4.5.2 Input Oriented Productivity Index 
Decomposition of a Simple TFP Index 
Since, as mentioned earlier, this study applies input-oriented DEA to measure efficiency 
of North Sea petroleum industry, it might be appropriate to study the input oriented 
productivity index as well. The input-oriented equivalent of Fare et al.'s decomposition 
takes similar steps to those above. Suppose that the inverse production functions (the 
input required to produce a certain level of output) in these two periods are represented 
by functions g~ (Y) and gt (X). If the firms were technically efficient in these two 
periods, then the observed input levels would be the same as those implied by the inverse 
production function. Otherwise the inputs for both t and s would be 
(4-18) 
where At ~ 1. A value of At greater than unity implies that the firm is inefficient in that 
period. Substituting the latter in (4-17) yields. 
TFP =Asxg·JY~)/Ys. 
.1'1 AI g I (r; ) / r; (4-19) 
1- If the level of output produced in the two periods is the same, i.e. r; = Y\ = y* , then 
the latter equation provides the following decomposition of 
(4-20) 
A g(Y*) 
The first ratio, _5 measures technical efficiency; the second ratio, .\ measures 
AI gt(Y*) , 
technical change, as it measures the input level implied by the technology in the two 
periods at the same output level, Y* . 
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2 - If the level of outputs are different, we can write Y:5 = K~ (in case of a single output). 
Assuming that the inverse production function is homogeneous of degree B(t) at, Y:5' 
in period t , the TFP equation can be written as 
T'F'P - As gsCK~)/ K~ _ As 8(1)-1 gs(~) II - X - XK X . 
. AI gl(~)/~ AI gl(~) (4-21) 
The decomposition is completed by defining the scale change, K 8 (1)-I, which itself 
consists of two components. K represents the scale of the operation, and B(t) represents 
the returns to scale parameter. If we assume constant return to scale, then the scale 
effect becomes unity. 
4.5.3 Input Distance Function 
Distance functions (input and output) allow one to describe a multi-input, multi-output 
production technology without the need to specify a behavioral objective (such as cost-
minimization or profit maximization). An input distance function characterizes the 
production function technology by looking at a minimal proportional contraction of the 
input vector, given an output vector. 
The input distance function, which involves the scaling of the input vector, is defined on 
the input set, L(Y) , as 
d;(X,Y) = max{p: (X / p) E L(Y)} , (4-21) 
where the input set L(Y) represents the set of all input vectors, X, which can produce the 
output vector, Y, i.e. 
L(Y) = {X: X can Produce Y}. 
The distance function has the following properties: 
The input distance function is non-decreasing in X and increasing in Y; 
It is linearly homogeneous in X; 
If X belongs to the input set ofY then d;(X,Y) ~ 1; and 
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Distance is equal to unity if X belongs to the frontier of the input set (the isoquant of 
Y). 
X 2A ---- -------
A 
o~--------~--------------------
Figure 4-7 XIA Xl 
Value of the distance function for the point A, which defines the production point where 
the firm uses X 1A of input 1 and X 2A of input 2, to produce the output vector Y, is equal 
to the ratio p= OAI OB. 
The introduction of the distance function helps one to understand the concept and 
application of Malmquist productivity indices, as follows. 
4.5.4 Malmquist Productivity Indices, an Input-Oriented Approach 
Introduced by Caves et al. (1982), the Malmquist (TFP) index measures the TFP between 
two data points by calculating the ratio of the distances of each data point relative to a 
common technology (Coelli and Rao, 1999). The input-oriented Malmquist compares the 
input requirements for producing output level, 1';, produced within period t technology, 
with the input that would have been required if the production technology was the same 
as that in period s. This means that XI is essentially being compared with what would 
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have been required under technology s. The Period- s -based input-oriented Malmquist 
productivity index (MPI) is formally defined as 
.I'(y V X X)- dt(~,XJ 
m; ,\" 1 t , x' t - s ( ) 
d i ~.,Xs (4-22) 
where i refers to the unit in question. 
Similarly, the period- t productivity index can be defined as 
(4-23) 
Hence the geometric average of the two input-oriented MPI is 
1 
m;(r\., ~ ,Xx'Xt ) = (m; (~., ~ ,Xx ,X/)x m/ (~,r; ,Xx'X/ ))2 
1 
m.(Y Y X x)=(d/(r;,Xt )x d:(r;'X/)J2. 
1.1" t' x' t d:\'(Y X) d~(Y X) , 
I .1" SIS' S 
(4-24) 
Alternatively the MPI can be expressed as 
(4-25) 
If the firm has a higher productivity level in period- t, the m;" (in 4-22) will be greater 
than 1. When the local returns to scale parameters are equal to 1, then the input-oriented 
MPI is identical to the usual TFP index. 
In order to compute MPI, one should essentially assume that each firm is technically 
efficient. Adding the assumption of constant returns to scale technology, it is possible to 
interpret the MPI as a measure of pure technical change, as it addresses efficiency 
change with no involvement of scale and/or technical change. However, if any of the 
assumptions do not hold, then the MPI is a compound measure of productivity change 
that can be attributable to various other factors, such as changes in technical efficiency, 
allocative efficiency (where price data is available), or scale efficiency. 
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As we will discuss it in 4.6, equations 4-22 and 4-23 could have another application 
within the context of North Sea petroleum industry. As mentioned above, Malmquist 
index approach enables one to compare the efficiency of the fields in question before and 
after critical periods of time, e.g. 1985. The necessary condition for this analysis is that 
the fields should be active both before and after 1985. In other words, one cannot use 
Malmquist to measure the efficiency change of a set of fields whose development started 
before 1984 (inclusive) with other set of fields whose development started after 1985 
(inclusive). If this is the case, equations 4-22 and 4-23 may be applied to have a closer 
look at the efficiency of the two sets. These two equations allow the analyst to compare 
the former fields with the frontier generated by the latter (and vise versa) to measure the 
efficiency of the pre-1984 fields relative to the best practices of the post-1985 fields (and 
vise versa). A more detailed account of this procedure will be given in section 4-6. 
4.5.5 Decomposition of Malmquist Productivity Indices 
Fare et al. (1994) calculate the Malmquist index directly based on the fact that the 
distance function, on which the Malmquist index is based, can be calculated by exploiting 
its relationship to the technical efficiency measures developed by Farrell (1957). This led 
to their decomposition of productivity into changes in technology (innovation effect) and 
changes in efficiency (catching up effect). 
The Malmquist TFP index was defined by (4-25) as: 
The part outside the bracket is the ratio of the DMU's relative efficiency in time t (with 
respect to the t-period's efficiency) and its relative efficiency in time s (with respect to the 
s-period's efficiency). Other factors equal, this ratio reveals how the relative efficiency of 
the unit under question has changed over the two periods. In Malmquist literature this is 
called the "catching up effect". Thus 
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Efficiency Change = d: (Y, ,XI) (Catching-up effect); 
d j (~,Xs) ( 4-26) 
The remaining part of equation (4-25) addresses the change in the efficiency over time 
due to technological changes. 
1 
( d:~(Y,X) d~(Y X )J2 Technical Change = 'I (I I) X 'I ( s' s) (technology effect). d; Y, ,XI d; ~.,Xs ( 4-27) 
The decomposition is illustrated in the following diagram when the technology is 
assumed to be constant returns to scale, involving a single input and a single output. The 
firm produces at the points D and E in periods sand t, respectively. In each period the 
firm is operating below the technology for that period. Hence there is technical 
inefficiency in both periods. Referring to Figure 4-8, these can be expressed as: 
Efficiency Change = Xc / XI ; 
Xa/ Xs 
1 
Technical Change = b I X a s . (X /X X /X J2 
XC/XI Xb/Xs 
The decomposition can be extended by decomposing the technical efficiency change into 
scale efficiency and pure technical efficiency components. 
Scale Efficiency of each period = CRS Efficiency; 
VRS 
Scale Efficiency Change = scale Efficiency in period t / Scale Efficiency in period s. 
This shows how much the scale of operation has changed over the two periods. 
Pure Efficiency Change = TFP Change /(Tech. Change x Scale Efficiency Change); 
or 
Pure Efficiency Change = Efficiency Change / Scale Efficiency Change. 
As mentioned earlier, the pure efficiency change is the change in the efficiency of the 
unit in question over the two periods with the assumption of no technical and scale 
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change during the period in question. In the other words, pure efficiency change could be 
interpreted as the change in the performance of that part of, say, a field's activity that is 
directly controllable by its operator, as scale efficiency change could be due to the 
geological characteristics of the field, and technical change might be an exogenous factor 
to the operator's decision-making process. 
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Example 2: To illustrate the way Malmquist functions, let expand the Example 1 by 
adding a second period for the DMUs in question's activity. The DMUs still use one input 
to produce an output. 
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Table 4-2: Example of a Malmquist Index Approach, Distance Results 
Period 1 CRS Efficiency of CRS Efficiency of VRS Efficiency of 
Period 1 Relative to the Period 1 Relative to the Period 1 Relative to the 
Same Period's Frontier Next Period's Frontier Same Period's Frontier 
dt(Xs'~') d: (X.1,rf) 
DMU 
1 0.889 0.667 1.000 
2 0.267 0.200 0.600 
3 1.000 0.750 1.000 
4 0.933 0.700 1.000 
5 0.250 0.188 0.375 
6 0.500 0.375 0.702 
7 0.549 0.412 1.000 
8 0.476 0.357 1.000 
9 0.476 0.357 0.724 
10 0.762 0.571 0.959 
Mean 0.610 0.458 0.836 
Table 4-2: Example of a Malmquist Results (continued) 
Period 2 CRS Efficiency of CRS Efficiency of VRS Efficiency of 
Period 2 Relative to the Period 2 Relative to the Period 2 Relative to the 
Period 1 Frontier Same Period's Frontier Same Period's Frontier 
dt (X" ~) d:(X,,~) 
DMU 
1 1.333 1.pOO 1.000 
2 0.333 0.250 0.333 
3 1.167 0.875 1.000 
4 1.067 0.800 1.000 
5 0.476 0.357 0.381 
6 0.611 0.458 0.823 
7 0.593 0.444 1.000 
8 0.526 0.395 0.862 
9 0.556 0.417 0.688 
10 0.857 0.643 0.946 
Mean 0.752 0.564 0.803 
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Table 4-3: Example of a Malmquist Index Approach, Efficiency Decomposition 
1 2 3 4 5 
DMU Efficiency Tech. Pure Efr. Scale Efficiency Total Factor 
Change Change Change Change Product. Change 
d:eX"y,) ( d: (X"Y,) X CRS Eff. (P2) I 
dteXs,YJ 
VRS Eff. (P2) 
d: expy,) TFP --------------------
1 ------------ CRS Eff. (P1) I 1x2 
di;(X"Y,) r 2x4 VRS Eff. (P1) 
d; eX.I,r5) P2=Period 2 
P1=Period 1 
1 U~§ 1.333 1.000 1.125 1.500 
2 0.937 1.333 0.556 1.687 1.250 
3 0.875 1.333 1.000 0.875 1.167 
4 0.857 1.333 1.000 0.857 1.143 
5 1.429 1.333 1.016 1.406 1.905 
6 0.917 1.333 1.172 0.782 1.222 
7 0.810 1.333 1.000 0.810 1.079 
8 0.829 1.333 0.862 0.962 1.105 
9 0.875 1.333 0.949 0.922 1.167 
10 0.844 1.333 0.987 0.855 1.125 
mean 0.935 1.333 0.939 0.996 1.247 
Let us focus on one of the DMUs, say DMU 1. 
. d'ey"X,) From e 4-26) we have EfficIency Change = I where sand t denote the first and 
dteYI'X s ) 
second period, respectively. Thus, dI2eX2'Y2) =1.000, and d11eXI'r;) = 0.889 give an 
efficiency change of 1.000 = 1.125. [See the shaded boxes in the tables.] 
0.889 
DMU1 has a eCRS) efficiency of 0.889 in the first period. As DEA indicates, the 0.889 is 
the efficiency of this unit relative to the best practicees) of the first period. In the second 
period, however, the firm has become more efficient relative to the other units in the 
second period by having a relative efficiency of 1.000. Thus the firm has an efficiency 
change of 1.125 over the two periods. 
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1 
Technical change IS gIven by (4-27) as (d/ (r:, XI) X d j ' (r:~, XJ)2 Thus, Setting 
d:(~,XJ d:(y~,XJ 
d11(Y2,X2)=1.33, d12(Y2'X2)= 1.000, d11(r;,X j )=0.889, and d12(r;,Xl) =0.667, the 
1 
hn· I h . (1.333 0.889J2 tec Ica c ange IS x = 1.333. 
1.000 0.669 
Total factor productivity, which is Efficiency Change x Technical Change. Thus, 
TPF=1.125 x 1.333 == 1.500. 
Scale efficiency change is the ratio between the scale efficiency of the second period and 
the scale efficiency of the first period. The scale efficiency of each period, in turn, is the 
ratio of efficiency under the assumption of constant returns to scale, and the efficiency 
under the assumption of variable returns to scale. Thus, the scale efficiency change of 
DMU1 · . b· 1.000/1.000::: 1 125 IS gIven y. _.. 
0.899/1.000 
Finally, the pure efficiency change is TFP/(Scale Efficiency x Technical Change), which 
IS 1.500 == 1.000; 
1.333 x 1.125 
Or, using Pure Efficiency Change = Efficiency Change 1 Scale Efficiency Change: 
1.125 == 1.000 
1.125 
4.5.6 The Estimation Method 
Following Fare et al (1994), the required distances can be calculated by using DEA-like 
linear programs. For the ith firm, four distance functions must be calculated to measure 
the TFP change between the two periods. This requires the solving of four linear 
programming problems. The required programs, assuming constant returns to scale, are: 
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Distance of the ith firm in period t from the period-t frontier 
[d~ C1'; ,XI) ]-1 = max¢,A ¢ 
subject to: 
-¢Yit + 1';A ~ ° 
XiI - XIA ~ 0, 
A ~ ° 
Distance of the ith firm in period s from the period-s frontier: 
[d(:' CYv' X,I') ]-1 = max¢,A ¢ 
s.t. 
- ¢Y;s + Y\,A ~ ° 
Xis - X,I,A ~ 0, 
A~O 
Distance of the ith firm in period s from the period-t frontier: 
[ I ]-1 doCY\"X,\) = max¢,A ¢ 
s.t. 
- ¢Y;,I' + 1'; A ~ ° 
XiS -XIA ~ 0, 
A~O 
Distance of the ith firm in period t from the period-s frontier: 
s.t. 
- ¢Y;I + YI·A ~ ° 
Xit -XsA ~ 0, 
A~O 
Note that in the last program, ¢ assumes a value of less than unity if technological 
progress has occurred over the two periods. The above programs must be repeated for 
each firm over each two periods of time. 
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4.6 Efficiency Over Space 
We have seen how DEA could be used to measure the static efficiency of the units in 
question. What the different DEA models have in common is the principle of measuring 
the efficiency of each unit in question relative to the best practices, rather than comparing 
each unit with all the units under study. 
The Malmquist technique, on the other hand, is used to measure the change in 
efficiencies of DMUs in different periods of time. To decompose the total factor 
productivity, the DMUs in various time periods must be identical, otherwise investigating 
the unit's performance over time is meaningless. A problem may arise when one is to 
study the relative efficiency of two groups ofDMUs over two periods of time and/or over 
two different regions of activity. 
Suppose we have (as we shall in chapter 5) two groups of oil fields. The first group came 
on stream before 1984, while the second group started production after 1985. A change in 
regulation was implemented in 1985, and thus the analyst is interested in investigating the 
affects of the change in the fields whose production started after the change took place. 
Using DEA, the analyst would combine all the fields in question and measure the relative 
efficiency of the fields. Then the fields, along with their efficiency scores, could be 
placed in two different groups according to whether they came on stream before and after 
1985. The average efficiency of each group could be compared to see whether the 
regulatory change had affected the fields' performance. The difficulty in the interpretation 
of the results might arise when all reported efficient fields belong to one category, either 
pre-1984 or post-1985 period. This is because in this case all the fields being compared to 
the most efficient fields, belonging to one group. Only an indirect comparison (via the 
best practices) is being made among the units of the two groups. 
To verify the results of DEA on all fields (both groups), one could measure the distance 
between each and every units in one group to the frontier made by the other group, 
namely diG! (X G2' YG2) . The (geometric) average of the distances is the mean distance of 
one group from the best practices of the second group. 
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4.7 Summary and Concluding Remarks 
A production process, in its simplest form, consists of applying one or a number of inputs 
to produce one or a number of outputs. However, producers of identical goods may have 
different policies with regard to the quantity, quality, and source of their inputs for 
producing one unit of each output. Thus, there is an interest among economists to identify 
the best possible combination of inputs for producing a given output. This gives them the 
opportunity to identify a production process that gives the highest level of output holding 
the input fixed, or the lowest amount of input for a given quantity of production. The best 
production process is often labeled as the most efficient one. 
Data Envelopment Analyses is one of the techniques to measure the efficiency of the 
production units in question. The non-parametric approach of DEA identifies the best 
(most efficient/productive) units and then compares the rest of the units with the most 
efficient/productive ones. 
The basic problem with DEA is that the technique disregards the possibility of 
malfunctioning in the data gathering process (noise) and/or the likely shocks incurred in 
the industry. DEA regards all negative (positive) shocks as inefficiency (efficiency). 
To distinguish between noise and efficiency one could alternatively apply a stochastic 
technique (Stochastic Frontier Analyses, SF A). Separating efficiency and stochastic 
noise, SF A uses econometric techniques to identify an average production frontier, and to 
measure the efficiency of the units in question accordingly. However, unlike DEA, SF A 
requires a priori specification of a production function. 
Both SF A and DEA are based on input-output analysis. The efficiency measurement is 
based on the ratio of output (or combination of outputs) and input (or a combination of 
inputs). However, a production process may well be affected by some other factors 
though these factors are not considered as inputs. Though DEA and SF A can not directly 
take these factors into account, Banker et al.'s procedure allows one to use the results 
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from DEA or SFA to evaluate the role and significance of these (contextual) variables on 
the inefficiency of the units in question. 
DEA can also be used to measure the efficiency of units in question over the time. 
Technological changes allow the firms to have a better output-input ratio. They could 
allow for either applying less input for a fixed level of production, or more output than 
before from a the same input applied. The Malmquist index approach applies DEA-like 
approach to measure these changes. The technique also allows the analyst to decompose 
the total factor productivity measurement into various components of efficiency change 
(catch-up effect), technology change, pure-efficiency change, and scale efficiency 
change. 
The functions described above are suitable for exammmg the hypothesis set out in 
chapters 2 and 3. The governments' regulatory regime over the years of North Sea 
petroleum activity may have led the oil companies distance themselves from efficient 
input choice in order to be eligible for future production licenses. If imposed on the 
companies, the domestic goods and services would, presumably, generate inefficiency. In 
order to test this hypothesis one should have a benchmark point of time when the 
governments relaxed this requirement. In the UK, this happened in 1985 when the 
government, under pressure from the European Commission, dropped the requirement to 
"buy British". In Norway, however, the change was not seen as drastic as in the UK. The 
change, which happened to be in the same year, occurred with respect to the role of 
Statoil as the government's watch-dog within the industry. Nevertheless, 1985 could be 
set as a turning point in both countries' regulatory regimes, and the above methods might 
be used to compare the companies' performance before and after 1985. 
However, application of the input-output techniques mentioned above requires a data set 
comprising of detailed data on each field's input and output throughout the years of 
production. In addition, one should be equipped with additional information with regard 
to factors that are not regarded as input or output, but could have affected the production 
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process of oil and gas fields (i.e. contextual variables). The next chapter presents and 
discusses the data collected by the author for this purpose. 
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Chapter Five: Data 
Introduction 
We have seen in Chapter 4 that measuring productivity and efficiency of an industry 
requires data on the quantity or magnitude of inputs and outputs of production. To control 
the impacts of factors that might affect efficiency measurement, the analyst should also 
be equipped with relevant data concerning (contextual) factors. Despite the significance 
of the North Sea petroleum industry both on domestic and intemationallevels, there is a 
surprising lack of empirical analysis of its efficiency. The vast literature of practically all 
aspects of this industry except the issue of input-output efficiency measurement may stem 
from the fact that gathering the relevant data has proved a difficult task. 
The data presented in this chapter could be divided in two groups. The first group 
consists of some technical and technological data for each North Sea field, i.e. the 
number of platforms, length of pipelines, etc. and annual production of each field. The 
North Sea Field Development (OPL Publication) is the source used in this study. 
The second group comprises of data with regard to annual construction and production 
cost on a field by field basis. These data, especially the production cost, are considered of 
high confidentiality by both the oil companies and the authorities. This is mirrored in the 
terms made by the Aberdeenshire Council and the Norwegian Oil directorate to provide 
the author with the data about the annual costs of the North Sea fields, on the condition of 
strict confidentiality. The data regarding the annual production on a field by field basis, is 
provided by Wood Mackenzie Consultants. 
Although the data could be enriched by more detailed and/or additional data122, the 
present data set, to the best of my knowledge, is the best currently available. 
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5.1 Production-Based Categorization 
Almost all North Sea fields to have started production before the end of 1999 are under 
consideration in the current study (exemptions will be discussed shortly). This includes 
fields that ceased production before 1999. The fields are classified into three categories. 
1- Oil and gas producing fields: this includes all the fields that produce both oil and gas. 
However, it is possible for each field in this category to begin (cease) production of one 
product before the other. This category covers 37 Norwegian and 66 British fields. 
2- Oil producing fields: this category consists of those fields that only produce oil. There 
are 66 British and 6 Norwegian fields are in this category. 
3- Gas producing fields: this category covers the fields with gas as their only product. 
While there are 52 British fields, there is only one Norwegian field in this category. 
It should be noted that when studying the Norwegian fields alone, DEA could not be 
applied to the second and third categories. The consideration behind excluding both 
category from the study is the low number of fields in this category. When the number of 
DMU s is a below a certain level, each DMU can be on the frontier. As a matter of fact 
the results of DEA for this category show 5 fields on the frontier with the 6th one very 
close to them. Charnes et al. (1989) have proposed a rule of thumb that recommends that 
the minimum number of DMUs be greater than three times the sum of the inputs and 
outputs. While the first category satisfies the role, the second, and trivially the third, 
categories fail to do so. These two categories, however, will be studied, together with the 
first category, when considering all Norwegian fields. 
5.2 Output 
The oil (including NGL) production of the fields active in the NCS varies from as little as 
an annual average of 0.01 standard cubic meters (Sm3) to as much as 26.19 Sm3. On 
average, the Norwegian fields have produced 4.2 Sm3 (var: 38.3), equivalent to 72,000 
barrels a day of oil and NGL combined. This entitles Norway to claim an average 
production of over 3.2 million barrels of oil during the petroleum activity of the 
122 For instance the share of domestic goods and services applied in each phase of a field's activity. 
However, to the best of my knowledge, such a detailed data does not exist. 
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Norwegian Continental Shelf. The three major fields, namely Statfjord, Gullfaks, and 
Oseberg, have produced an average of more than 408,000 barrels of oil per day. 
The average gas production of the NCS has had a range of between 0.02 and 19.9 billion 
Sm3, with an average annual production of 1.65 billion Sm3 (var.: 10.93), or 1.65 Sm3 oil 
equivalent per field. This makes an average annual production of more than 66 billion 
Sm3 being produced in NCS. The field Troll (East) is the major gas producer of the NCS 
with an average annual production of 19.9 billion Sm3, with Sleipner (East) as the second 
major gas producer with an annual production of more than 6.3 billion Sm3. 
With regard to the United Kingdom Continental Shelf, oil production has annually 
averaged 1.58 (var.: 5.26) and 2.24 (var.: 6.98) million Sm3 from oil and Oil and gas 
fields, respectively. In aggregate, the British fields have had an annual average of 1.91 
(var.: 6.17) million Sm3, equivalent to just below 33,000 barrels of oil and NGL per day. 
By an annual average of 16.6 million Sm3, or more than 286,000 barrels a day, the field 
Forties is the leading oil & NGL producer in the United Kingdom Continental Shelf. 
The fields active in the UKCS have produced an annual average of 1.08 (var.: 2.34) 
billion Sm3 of natural gas. The production range varies from as little as 0.01 billion Sm3 
to 9.50 billion Sm3. The leading producer is Leman, followed by the gas field 
Indefatigable, with an average annual production of just over 7 billion Sm3. 
While the average oil production of the Norwegian Continental Shelf is significantly 
(99% level of significance) higher than that of the United Kingdom Continental Shelf, the 
difference between the average gas production of the two shelves is not significant. 
5.3 Input 
5.3.1 Fixed Costs 
The infrastructure of each field consists of three major elements: rigs, platform, and 
pipeline. Though categorical data for these three variables for the majority of the 
Norwegian fields are available, lack of this separation for some Norwegian fields and the 
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entire British fields makes the study of these three elements as an aggregate financial cost 
inevitable. Throughout the study the sum of rigs, platform, and pipeline costs will be 
denoted by total development and/or construction cost. 
The Norwegian Continental Shelf has absorbed more than £66 billion123 in the 
construction and development phases of its 46 fields throughout the lifetime of its 
petroleum activity. Thus, on average the annual construction and development of fields 
counts for over £4 billion. In average, each field has consumed an annual £94 (var.: 9345) 
million to provide the companies with the opportunity to extract petroleum from beneath 
the Norwegian sector of the North Sea. 
The investment made in the construction phase of the United Kingdom Continental 
Shelfs fields counts for a total of £122 billion. Of this, £32 billion is spent on 67 oil 
fields, £17.4 billion on 51 gas fields, and £72.6 billion on the 66 remaining oil & gas124 
fields. The data shows that an annual average of £8.5 billion in aggregate, which is just 
over £46 million (var.: 3363) per field per year, has been spent to construct the fields 
until the end of 1999. The average British field has an annual construction cost 
significantly lower than that of the average Norwegian fields at 99% level of significance. 
This may be due to the fact that the Norwegian fields are larger than the British ones. 
The construction phase of the fields takes place before production start, and can continue 
during the production phase of each field. The infrastructure of a field is meant to serve 
the production process throughout the lifetime of the field. Thus, the cost incurred in this 
phase should be divided between the years of production of the field in question. 
Appendix one explains, and illustrates by the help of an example, how the construction 
and development costs have been spread over the years of production. 
123 All the figures in this chapter are constant 1995 prices. 
124 Oil & Gas fields is referred to those fields producing both oil and gas. 
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5.3.2 Variable Costs 
Turning to operation and production costs, two issues need consideration. The first is that 
the operation costs of each field consist, mostly, of the taxes and tariffs owed in 
accordance to the relevant countries' regulations. These costs change with the level of 
production (and in the same direction, and roughly, in proportion). Thus, taking these 
costs in the study would lead to undesirable false information about the fields' efficiency 
scores. 
The second issue concerns the labour cost for each field. With regard to Norway, the 
labour cost of the pre-1990s period is available only combined with other production 
costs. With regard to the UK, the labour data are separately available only in the physical 
number of workers in some field, rather than their monetary cost. Thus, for both 
countries, the variable cost used in this study consists of labour cost and other production 
costs, combined. This combination will be called "production cost" in the remaining parts 
of this study. 
The Norwegian fields have borne just under £32 billion of production cost over the 
period of their petroleum production activity. This leaves the 44 Norwegian fields (two 
other fields are unmanned and operated with remote-control production system) with an 
average £58 million (var.: 4970) of annual production cost. 
The United Kingdom, on the other hand, has spent more than £66 billion in the 
production phase of its fields ever since the production start in its continental shelf. This 
gives the British fields an annual average of close to £31 million (var.: 1481). There is no 
significant difference between the average (per field, per year) production costs of the 
Norwegian and British fields. This could be due to the large variation of cost in the 
Norwegian case. 
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Table 5-1: Average Fixed and Variable cost in the UKCS and NCS 
THE UNITED KIGDOM N 0 R W A Y 
Oil Fields Gas Fields Oil & Gas Fields Oil Fields Gas Fields Oil & Gas Fields 
Fixed Cost 477.617 342.566 1104.344 1088.193 298.780 1611.786 
Var. Cost 286.605 167.345 593.839 140.128 48.110 793.801 
5.4 Contextual variables 
As discussed earlier, efficiency of the North Sea fields might be affected by parameters 
uncontrollable by operators. Because of this possibility, and to investigate the degree of 
influence of these parameters, it is important to have access to data on these factors. The 
following give a brief account of the data available. 
5.4.1 Partners 
The data set includes the companies and their share of each and every consortium within 
United Kingdom and Norwegian Continental Shelves. The lowest number of partners in a 
consortium is one (which is the operator) and the highest number of partners belongs to 
Statfjord East, in the NCS, with 15 partners. Table 5-2 and Figure 5-1 illustrate the 
partners across of the two shelves. 
Table 5-2: Distribution of Partners in the UKCS and NCS 
No. of Partners Nes: Oil & Gas ues: Oil & Gas ues:oil ues: Gas 
1 - 2 1 (2.7%) 22 (33.3%) 18 (26.9%) 22 (43.2%) 
3 - 4 6 (16.2%) 16 (24.2%) 22 (32.8%) 21 (41.2%) 
5 - 6 11 (29.7%) 19 (28.8%) 22 (32.8%) 4 (7.8%) 
7 - 8 4 (10.8%) 8 (12.2%) 4 (6.0%) 4 (7.8%) 
9 - 10 12 (32.4%) 1 (1.5%) 0 0 
11 - 12 1 (2.7%) 0 1 (1.5%) 0 
Over 13 2 (5.5%) 0 0 0 
Source: The North Sea Field Development Guide 
Oilfield Publication Limited, Herefordshire, England, 1999. 
There doesn't seem to be an apparent pattern in the distribution of partners across various 
types of fields. However, when comparing the Norwegian fields with those of the UK, it 
seems that the Norwegian fields have higher average number of partners in each 
consortium. This may stem from the fact that the Norwegian fields have higher average 
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fixed and variable cost, and/or the Norwegian regulation (from the mid-1980s) that 
require the companies to apply for the fields individually rather than the UK case, where 
the companies can apply as pre-arranged joint partners. 
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In contacts with some oil companies125, it has been suggested that water depth may have 
impact on any efficiency analysis, because of its influence on the type of infrastructure 
applied in the construction phase of each field. Presumably, the higher water depth 
requires a more solid base, which may increase the construction cost. The latter, in tum, 
may affect the efficiency of the field in question. To investigate the possibility of such 
impact, the analyst should be equipped with the relevant data. 
Complete data regarding the depth of water (or average water depth in the case of fields 
sitting on a slope) for every field of the two continental shelves is available. The 
difference between the average water depth of the oil & gas fields of NCS and those of 
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the oil fields and oil & gas fields of the UKCS is not significant (at 95% level of 
significance). The average water depth of Norwegian oil & gas fields is 136 meters, while 
the corresponding figures for the United Kingdom Continental Shelf are: oil & gas fields 
109 meters, oil fields 129 meters, and gas fields 32 meters. The latter fields are located in 
the shallow Southern part of the North Sea, known as the Southern gas basin. Table 5-3 
shows the distribution of the fields on the two continental shelves with respect to water 
depth. 
Table 5-3: Distribution of Water Depth in the UKCS and NCS 
Water Depth NCS: UKCS: UKCS: Water Depth UKCS: Gas 
(Meter) Oil & Gas Oil & Gas Oil (Meter) 
0- 50 0 8 2 10 - 20 4 
50 - 100 15 21 20 21 - 30 24 
101 - 150 11 34 34 31 - 40 18 
151 - 200 5 3 9 41 - 50 3 
201 - 250 0 0 Over 50 2 
251 - 300 0 0 
Over 300 4 0 3 
Source: The North Sea Field Development Guide 
Oilfield Publication Limited, Herefordshire, England, 1999. 
5.4.3 Reservoir Depth 
During discussion with several oil companies it also became apparent that reservoir depth 
may influence production (variable) cost, and consequently, the efficiency of a given 
field. This is because a deeper reservoir may require additional technology to bring 
petroleum to the surface. 
The average reservoir depth of the UKCS oil fields is 2818 meters, while the oil & gas 
fields of the same shelf have an average depth of 3060 meters. The average reservoir 
depths of these two groups do not have a significant difference. However, the UKCS oil 
& gas fields are, on average, significantly (at 95% level of significance) deeper than the 
Norwegian oil & gas fields, which have an average reservoir depth of2762 meters. The 
125 Including BP-Amoco, Fina, and Statoil. 
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average reservoir depth of the gas fields in the UKCS is about 2600 meters, which is 
significantly lower than that of the oil and oil & gas fields in the same shelf, as well as 
the oil & gas fields of the NCS. Table 5-4 shows the spread of reservoir depth in the 
Norwegian and the United Kingdom continental shelves. 
Table 5-4: Distribution of Reservoir Depth in the UKCS and NCS 
Reservoir NCS; UKCS; UKCS; UKCS: 
Depth (m) Oil & Gas Oil Oil & Gas Gas 
Under 1500 2 3 0 4 
1501-2000 5 5 3 2 
2001-2500 5 14 11 8 
2501-3000 12 14 15 21 
3001-3500 9 12 23 3 
3501-4000 3 9 7 4 
4001-4500 0 2 4 1 
Over 4500 1 0 
Source: The North Sea Field Development Guide 
Oilfield Publication Limited, Herefordshire, England, 1999. 
It should be noticed that the data set lacks the reservoir depth of 7 oil fields and 2 oil & 
gas fields and 8 gas fields of the UKCS. This shortage should not have major impact on 
measuring the influence of contextual variables as the number of fields in the UKCS (184 
fields) seems high enough for such study. 
5.5 Development / Production Start Dates 
One of the most important pieces of data to analyze the effect of governments' contractual 
policy on the performance of the fields is the dates when construction/production start. 
This is because policy changes such as those discussed in Chapter 2 may have significant 
impacts on the construction and production costs of North Sea operation and, hence, on 
the performance of the companies concerned. (Such costs account for almost all of a 
field's total cost). It is therefore important to know what policies were in place during a 
field's lifetime. 
In the case of Norwegian oil & gas fields, 20 fields began their construction phase after 
1985. The development of the remaining 17 fields began before 1985. However, four 
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fields of the latter category did not begin production before 1985. The first development 
in Norway started in 1970 (Ekofisk oil & gas field), and the field came on stream in late 
1971. The most recent field included in our study is Tordis East. The development of this 
field began in 1995 and the field started production before the end of 1997. The earliest 
oil field began its construction phase in 1986. The most recent oil fields came on stream 
in 1998. 
On the other side of the North Sea, the United Kingdom fields are divided in three 
categories in this study. In the oil-producing category, consisting of 67 fields, five fields 
began development before 1974, while production in all these fields began after 1975. 
Within the same category, the construction of 12 fields began between 1975-1984, while 
the production of four of these fields began after 1985. The remaining 50 fields began 
both construction and production after 1985. 
In the case of oil & gas producing fields, the construction of six fields began before 1974, 
while only two of these fields began production before 1974. Ten fields began 
development between 1975 and 1984, from which eight fields came on stream in the 
same era. The construction and production phases of the remaining 50 fields occurred in 
the post-1985 period. 
With respect to the gas fields in the United Kingdom Continental Shelf, four fields began 
development and production before 1975. Construction phases of another five fields 
started between 1975 and 1984, from which four fields came on stream after 1985. Since 
the focus of this study is on the possible impacts of government's policies on the 
efficiency of the fields, and since the most challenging period for the companies' 
performance was during the period of 1975 to 1984, the lack of enough fields developed 
and brought on stream in that era makes the elimination of this category from the current 
study inevitable. 
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Finally, it is worth mentioning that eight oil fields, one gas field, and two oil & gas fields 
of the UKCS have been decommissioned, while none of the fields within the Norwegian 
Continental Shelf has ceased production by the end of 1999. 
5.6 Summary 
The study is based on a unique collection of data on inputs, outputs, and contextual 
variables across all the fields in the UKCS and NCS, covering the full period of 
operation. The inputs are grouped in two categories of development/construction and 
production costs. The outputs of the fields are categorized in three groups of oil, gas, and 
oil & gas. The fields are divided in three groups according to the type of their production 
(output). The latter categorization, however, generates the problem of small samples in 
some groups. For instance, the UK gas fields are mostly developed after 1985, which 
makes the comparison of pre and post 1985 difficult. 
The data mentioned above allow the remammg chapters of this study to use the 
parametric (Stochastic Frontier Analysis) and non-parametric (Data Envelopment 
Analysis) approaches discussed in Chapter 5 to investigate the performance of the various 
fields in the two continental shelves. 
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Chapter Six: Efficiency Assessment in the NCS 
Introduction 
In Chapter 2 we looked at several aspects of British and Norwegian offshore petroleum 
policy and the various requirements set before the international oil companies before they 
could participate in the North Sea petroleum industry. The core requirement, as far as this 
study is concerned, was the companies' commitment to give a fair chance to the domestic 
offshore-related industries to participate in the activity. In practice, this meant that the oil 
companies should prove their benevolence towards the economy of the country in 
question by increasing their purchases from domestic suppliers. A company's violation 
could (and in some occasions would) result to its exclusion from license-awarding 
rounds. We have also seen in Chapter 3 that economic theories suggest that this 
requirement, along with the discretionary licensing method of the governments could 
generate inefficiency in the performance of the industry. In this and the next two chapters 
we turn to empirical analysis of production in the North Sea to examine this view. 
The efficiency of the fields developed and brought on stream in the Norwegian 
Continental Shelf is the focus of the current chapter. Using both Data Envelopment 
Analysis and Stochastic Frontier Analysis, particular attention will be paid to the question 
of efficiency across fields and over time, with a key interest in efficiency before and after 
1985. As explained in Chapter 2, 1985 marks a change in the Norwegian policy with 
regard to Statoil as their monitoring tool over the international oil companies' 
procurement policy. If the government's insistence on the use of domestic goods and 
services initially created inefficiency in North Sea production, the absence of Statoil, one 
might suspect, would have widened the companies' room for maneuver and, thus, 
increased the efficiency of their operation after 1985. 126 However, since the government's 
support for domestic offshore-suppliers remained intact even after 1985, the industry 
could not have gained in efficiency if the government was able to use alternative scrutiny 
126 This of course assumes that domestic goods and services were not the most efficient options during 
1974 and 1985. If this were so the policy constraints would not have been binding on the firms and there 
would be no efficiency gain after 1985. 
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means for Statoil. Thus, the efficiency change, if any, over the two period of pre-1984 
and post-1985 (exclusive) might indicate the Norwegian monitoring change over the 
companies' procurement policy rather than radical policy changes. 
The chapter is structured as follows. The empirical analysis begins with measuring the 
relative efficiency of the oil & gas fields using DEA. The results indicate the relative 
efficiency of the fields in each category according to whether the development and 
production start time is before or after 1985 (as will be discussed shortly some of fields 
started the construction phase in the former period while the production of those fields 
started in the latter period). The analysis will then (in a separate study) include the six oil 
fields and one gas field to examine the effect of these fields in the former results. 
The same analysis will be carried on in the next part of this chapter, using the stochastic 
method of SF A. As we have seen in Chapter 4, the non-parametric approach of DEA 
does not distinguish between efficiency and stochastic noise, while this separation is 
being made in SF A. The SF A results allow us to consider the efficiency issue of the 
North Sea activity from a parametric point of view to see if the (average) relative 
efficiency of the two periods differs from one method to the other. 
The chapter continues with taking the effect of the contextual variables into 
consideration. As discussed in Chapter Four, there may be parameters (i.e. the number of 
partners in each consortium and depth of water and reservoir) that effect the level of 
production/cost of each field in the construction and/or production phases. If these 
parameters had an effect, one could not hold high cost andlor low production responsible 
for the low efficiency of the fields in question. The contextual parameters might 
effectively put the operator in a situation where higher cost than normal is inevitable. The 
method used by Banker et al. (see Chapter 4) indicates the degree of responsibility of 
each contextual variable in the inefficiency of the fields. 
The comparisons over time, made in the early part of this chapter, however, do not take 
into accolmt the possibility of technology advancement over the two periods of pre-1984 
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and post-1985, thus, the results may be misleading. In order to control for such variations 
in technology, the chapter will continue by comparing the fields over two periods using 
Malmquist indices. As discussed earlier, this method provides a decomposition of the 
efficiency change, which removes ambiguities with regard to the elements responsible for 
the possible changes. 
Before we begin with the empirical results, some points need clarification. As mentioned 
earlier, the crucial time of policy change (1985) is the benchmark for analyzing the fields' 
performance. Thus, the fields are categorized into three groups. The first group (N-l) 
contains those fields whose both development (construction) and production phases 
started before 1984, inclusive. This group consists of 13 oil & gas fields. The second 
group (N-2), consisting of four oil & gas fields, contains the fields whose construction 
phase began prior to the policy change, but came on stream after 1985. The reason for 
this separation is that the fixed (construction) costs of these fields were mostly incurred in 
the pre-1984 period but the variable (production) costs were incurred in the post-1985 
era. Thus, one can not associate any (in)efficiency to any particular period with certainty. 
The third group (N-3) consists of the fields whose both construction and production 
phases began after 1985. This group consists of 20 oil & gas fields, six oil fields and one 
gas field. 
Further categorization is to be made with respect to group 1. The 13 fields in this group 
have produced in both pre-1984 and post-1985 (inclusive) periods. Thus, it is possible to 
compare each field's activity over the two periods. For this reason, this group is 
decomposed into two groups, namely group N-1Il and group N-1I2. The group N-111 
counts for the part of these 13 fields' activity before 1984, while group N -112 covers the 
part of activity incurred in the post-1985 era. 
The second point to be noted is with regard to the relatively small number of fields in 
each group. As far as the DEA method is concerned, the small number of observations 
should not effect the results, provided that the number of observation is greater than twice 
the sum of inputs and outputs (see Chames et al. 1989). However, the average production 
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frontier estimated by SF A may suffer from the low number of observation. Bearing in 
mind that this shortcoming arises from the low number of Norwegian fields, rather than 
the unavailability of data per se, the combination of DEA and SF A method used in this 
study may contribute to increase the effects of SF A's robustness. 
The problem of sample size discussed above brings us to the last point to note. In order to 
infer conclusions from the DEA and SF A results, one should be confident about the 
significance of the results. For instance when comparing the average efficiency of two 
periods in question the difference between the averages must be statistically tested. To 
conduct the tests, the number of observations (sample size) and normality of the sample 
distribution must be taken into account, as the statistical tests are more reliable when the 
sample size is large and normally distributed. The issue of normality can be tested, using 
the statistic proposed by Jarque and Bera (1980). If the normality of the distribution is 
established, then the Student t-test can be conducted to test the significance of difference 
between two mean values. The efficiency scores of this study have been tested using the 
Jarque and Bera method throughout this study. Whenever the t-test is conducted it 
implies that the test has approved the normality of the distribution in question. 
The problem of small sample size may give biased results against the significance 
between the tested difference. 127 However, since the input and output of each field, which 
is applied to measure the efficiency, are the sum of a number of years (more than 30 
years in some cases), these variables could be regarded as samples of a larger set. In this 
case, the central limit theorem can be used to assure that the sample mean is 
representative of the population mean, with normal distribution 128 and thus can be tested 
by statistical tests, i.e. Student t-test. 
The problem of sample size could also be overcome by usmg the non-parametric 
Kolmogorov-Smimov test, which is particularly suitable for small-size samples. Though 
the test will be used in this study, one should be careful about the conservative tendency 
127 Pollitt, 1994 
128 See Green (2000:116) 
161 
and the application of this test. 129 The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test examines the probability 
of two-samples being taken from one distribution. 13o As far as the current study is 
concerned we are interested in the change in the efficiency of the fields over the periods 
of policy changes. While the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test provides us with other 
specifications of the samples in question (i.e. the difference between the variance, mean, 
etc.) our attention is focused on the average efficiency changes. Aside from the problem 
of small samples in using the Student t-test in this study, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
provides the analyst with a less useful tool than the Student t-test to compare the 
efficiency changes over various periods. 
6.1 Data Envelopment Analysis 
The CCR and BCC models discussed in 4-2-1 and 4-2-2 are used to measure the relative 
efficiency of Norwegian fields, assuming constant returns to scale (CRS) and variable 
returns to scale (VRS), respectively. The DEA method is applied to measure the relative 
efficiency of Norwegian fields in three exercises. In the first step, the efficiency of 37 oil 
& gas fields will be examined. In the second step seven remaining Norwegian fields, 
which produce either oil or gas (but not both) will be included. In the third part the 
activity of each year of each field will be considered as a separate unit (DMU). With this, 
431 units are generated, which allow the analysis of efficiency of each production year, 
and consequently the comparative study of the two periods ofpre-1984 and post-1985. 
In all following analysis the Program DEAP is used to calculate the efficiency scores. 
6.1.1 Oil & Gas Fields 
The CCR and BCC models discussed in Chapter Four (equations 4-1 to 4-4) are used for 
two inputs (fixed and variable costs) and two outputs (oil & NGL and gas). The results 
are presented in Table 6-1. Note that the first 13 fields form group N-1, the next 4 fields 
belongs to group N-2, and the remaining 20 belong to the group N-3. 
129 Kittelsen and Magnussen, 1999. 
130 Daniel (1990) 
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The results show a higher average efficiency for the fields in the group N-3 (post-1985) 
relative to the N-l group (pre-1984). Assuming constant returns to scale production 
technology, the difference between the two groups is statistically significant (95%). 
However, under the assumption of variable returns to scale, the level of significance 
drops to just below 92%. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, however, rejects the possibility 
of the N-l and N-3 groups belong to the same distribution at 780/0 (CRS-DEA), and 760/0 
(VRS-DEA) levels of significance. 
The N-2 groups, whose construction began before 1984, but whose production did not 
begin until after 1985, seem to have average efficiency closer to the N-l group than to 
that of the N-3 group. This might be due to the fact that the construction phase of these 
fields took place during the period of heavy regulation. However, the differences between 
the mean efficiency of N-2 group with other two groups, under both CRS and VRS 
assumption, are not statistically significant. The significance might have been rejected 
due to the small number of fields in the N-2 groups. 
With VRS, a total of 10 fields appear on the frontier as the best practice fields. While half 
of these fields belong to the N-3 groups, four come from the N-2 group while the last one 
(field 17) belongs to the N -2 group. It is worth noticing that three of the fields in N -1 and 
N-2 groups gained their rank as efficient fields arguably because of the level of their 
production, which happens to be the largest fields in the Norwegian Continental Shelf. 
With CRS, on the other hand, only 25% of the best practices belong to the N-l group and 
the rest come from the N-3 group. This may emphasis the reason of the appearance of 
these fields on the frontier with the VRS assumption. This is because the CRS 
assumption is less sensitive to the scale of production than the VRS is. 
Figures 6-1 and 6-2 illustrate the distribution of Norwegian oil & gas fields according to 
their efficiency and the groups they belong to. 
The VRS efficiency measurement pinpoints 50% of the post-1985 fields with efficiency 
of better than 700/0. The figure for the pre-1984 fields is just above 38%. The post-1985 
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fields have 350/0 with efficiency above 900/0 while 30% of the pre-1984 fields enjoy that 
level of efficiency. 
The CRS efficiency measurement has more conclusive results in favor of the post-1985 
(N-3) fields. As mentioned earlier, this might be due to the fact that the CRS approach 
does not necessarily takes very small and very large fields as the efficient ones, as the 
VRS does. According to the results, while less than 8% of the pre-1984 fields enjoy 
efficiency of above 70%, the figure for the post-1985 fields is 25%. According to the 
same results, more than 92% of the pre-1984 fields have efficiency of less than 50%. This 
is to say that only one pre-1984 field has an efficiency score of above 50%, while 45% 
(nine fields) of the post-1985 fields enjoy efficiency of above 50%. 
The common feature of almost all the fields is their apparent lack of constant returns to 
scale production technology. In total, less than 11 % of the fields enjoy constant returns to 
scale production technology, the post-1985 fields having relatively more (15%, 3 out of 
20 fields), while only one pre-1984 field, 7.7%, enjoys this situation. Despite more than 
three decades of offshore experience, it seems that the companies active in the NCS have 
not been able to bring the costs in line with their production level. The situation is 
slightly better in the post-1985 period. 
In general, the DEA analysis of the oil & gas fields indicates higher efficiency in the 
post-1985 fields compared to the time when Statoil was in charge of safeguarding the 
domestic offshore suppliers' presence in North Sea activity. 
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Table 6-1: Results of DEA for Norwegian Oil & Gas Fields 
Field CRS VRS Scale r.t.s .. Field CRS VRS Scale r.ts .. 
1 0.362 1.000 0.362 drs 20 0.227 0.476 0.477 drs 
2 1.000 1.000 1.000 21 0.193 0.379 0.508 drs 
3 0.404 1.000 0.404 drs 22 0.485 0.780 0.622 drs 
4 0.234 0.243 0.964 drs 23 0.101 0.536 0.189 irs 
5 0.349 0.525 0.665 drs 24 1.000 1.000 1.000 
6 0.062 0.085 0.728 drs 25 0.310 0.674 0.459 drs 
7 0.207 0.235 0.884 drs 26 0.371 0.557 0.667 drs 
8 0.324 0.509 0.637 drs 27 0.245 0.572 0.428 drs 
9 0.375 1.000 0.375 drs 28 0.670 0.864 0.776 drs 
10 0.100 0.188 0.534 drs 29 0.329 0.330 0.996 drs 
11 0.402 0.758 0.530 drs 30 0.592 0.980 0.604 drs 
12 0.395 0.407 0.971 drs 31 0.592 0.983 0.602 drs 
13 0.487 0.495 0.983 irs 32 0.608 1.000 0.608 drs 
14 0.284 0.313 0.908 drs 33 0.258 0.649 0.398 drs 
15 0.271 0.584 0.463 drs 34 0.316 0.470 0.672 drs 
16 0.247 0.550 0.449 drs 35 0.300 0.426 0.704 drs 
17 0.461 1.000 0.461 drs 36 1.000 1.000 1.000 
18 0.928 1.000 0.928 drs 37 1.000 1.000 1.000 
19 0.841 0.864 0.974 drs 
Average 0.441 0.660 0.674 
N-1 0.362 0.573 0.695 
(0.052) (0.118) (0.060) 
N-2 0.316 0.612 0.570 
(0.010) (0.082) (0.051) 
N-3 0.518 0.727 0.681 
(0.090) (0.060) (0.057) 
The numbers in brackets are variance. 
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6.1.2 All Norwegian Fields 
The seven other Norwegian fields (producing either oil or gas, but not both) could also be 
added to the study. Because of the additional fields, the pre-1984 fields now form group 
N-All-1, the fields whose development started before 1984 but came on stream after 1985 
are called N-AIl-2, and the remaining fields whose development and production started 
after 1985 are the N-AIl-3 Fields. 
The inclusion, however, requires a reduction in the number of outputs in the above study. 
In other words, since the seven fields are either producing oil or gas, if the two input -
two output analysis is continued, one of the outputs for the new fields will be zero and 
this significantly reduces the reported efficiency scores of these fields. The alternative 
procedure is to convert all the outputs into oil equivalent and carry on with a two input -
one output study. The problem with the new procedure, however, is that the efficiency 
score for some of the fields may be less than what they gained with two-input/two-output 
analysis. This is because, in a multiple output system, units may be awarded a high 
efficiency score if one of the outputs is high enough, even if the other outputs are low (of 
course if the other outputs were high, the efficiency score would be much higher). 
Whereas with an aggregate output the units will be judged merely on one (composite) 
output. 
The same methods as earlier have been used for the 44 Norwegian fields. The results are 
presented in Table 6-2. According to the results, the N-All-3 (post-1985) fields enjoy 
higher average efficiency under both constant and variable returns to scale assumption at 
98% and 97% level of significance, respectively. As expected, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test reduces the level of significance for the two groups belonging to the same 
distribution to 86% (CRS-DEA) and 78% (VRS-DEA). 
The average efficiency of N-AIl-2 group fields lies between the other two groups, under 
both CRS and VRS. Statistically, however, the null hypothesis of equality of the average 
efficiency of this group with those of the other groups can not be rejected at 95% level of 
significance. 
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Though none of the included seven fields (from which six produce only oil and one only 
gas), lie on the frontier, the results show lower efficiency score for most of the former 37 
fields, compared with the previous analysis. The inclusion of non-efficient units into the 
study should not alter the efficiency measure of other units, as the units are evaluated 
against best practices, or a virtual combination of best practices. Thus, the reduction in 
the efficiency scores should be attributed to the change from two-output to one-output 
analysis. 
The DEA results in both 37-field and 44-field cases do not rule out the possibility of 
more efficient performance of the fields developed and brought on stream after 1985. 
Table 6-2: Results of DEA for All Norwegian Fields 
Field CRS VRS Scale r.t.s .. Field CRS VRS Scale r.t.S. 
0.279 0.668 0.417 drs 23 0.092 0.536 0.172 irs 
2 0.555 1.000 0.555 drs 24 0.525 0.774 0.679 drs 
3 0.174 0.379 0.459 drs 25 0.297 0.642 0.463 drs 
4 0.127 0.232 0.546 drs 26 0.203 0.521 0.389 drs 
5 0.259 0.522 0.497 drs 27 0.239 0.515 0.463 drs 
6 0.048 0.084 0.574 drs 28 0.521 0.801 0.651 drs 
7 0.114 0.225 0.506 drs 29 0.181 0.260 0.695 drs 
8 0.237 0.500 0.474 drs 30 0.572 0.965 0.593 drs 
9 0.375 1.000 0.375 drs 31 0.581 0.979 0.594 drs 
10 0.095 0.181 0.524 drs 32 0.588 1.000 0.588 drs 
11 0.358 0.742 0.483 drs 33 0.255 0.567 0.449 drs 
12 0.155 0.253 0.612 drs 34 0.281 0.454 0.619 drs 
13 0.209 0.429 0.488 drs 35 0.214 0.414 0.518 drs 
14 0.127 0.308 0.411 drs 36 0.442 1.000 0.442 drs 
15 0.265 0.566 0.468 drs 37 1.000 1.000 1.000 
16 0.245 0.539 0.455 drs 38 0.402 0.753 0.534 drs 
17 0.454 1.000 0.454 drs 39 0.208 0.446 0.466 drs 
18 0.508 0.841 0.603 drs 40 0.278 0.680 0.409 drs 
19 0.333 0.624 0.533 drs 41 0.327 0.568 0.576 drs 
20 0.225 0.471 0.478 drs 42 0.433 0.848 0.510 drs 
21 0.184 0.378 0.487 drs 43 0.141 0.237 0.594 drs 
22 0.433 0.776 0.559 drs 44 0.201 0.317 0.634 drs 
Average 0.312 0.591 0.523 
(0.033) (0.070) (0.014) 
N-AII-1 0.230 0.478 0.501 
(0.019) (0.090) (0.004) 
N-AII-2 0.273 0.603 0.447 
(0.018) (0.083) (0.001) 
N-AII-3 0.358 0.643 0.544 
(0.038) (0.056) (0.020) 
The numbers in brackets are variance. 
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6.1.3 The Significance of Fixed and Variable Costs 
The Data Envelopment Analysis measures the relative efficiency of the units in question 
using the input and output data of the units in question. The units could be ranked 
according to the efficiency score, but the results do not say much about the importance of 
each input or output in measuring the efficiency. That is, in an input oriented analysis, for 
instance, the role of each input in producing a particular efficiency score for the units in 
question is not obvious. 
In case of the North Sea offshore industry the role of each input variable could be of 
significant importance. This is because many of the fields were subject to various state 
policies with regard to the procurement of goods and services. For instance, the fields 
whose development started before 1985 ran through two distinct periods. The 
construction of the fields began when there was heavy government control over the 
procurement process of the oil companies. Hence most of the development cost (referred 
to as fixed-cost in this study) was incurred in that era. Whereas in the operation phase, the 
fields were subject to both less and heavy state intervention policies. The production cost 
of these fields was incurred pre-1984 and post-1985, inclusive. 
The importance of each variable can be investigated simply by comparing the efficiencies 
of the units in question in the presence and absence of that particular variable. Banker et 
al. (1996, 1999) assure that the significant difference between the two sets is the 
significance of the variable in question. 
The results of the study on Norwegian fields are given in Table 6-3. On aggregate, the 
results indicate insignificant effect of the fixed cost on the efficiency of the Norwegian 
fields, regardless of the choice of returns to scale. Decomposing the study into pre-1984 
and post-1985 fields, however, indicates the significance of the fixed costs on the 
performance of the post-1985 fields (at the 95% level of significance) and insignificance 
of them on the study on the pre-1984 fields. The variable costs, on the other hand, playa 
significant role in the study at (at least) 98% level of significance with both constant and 
variable returns to scale, for pre-1984, post-1985, and aggregate fields. 
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The importance of the variable cost, and not the fixed costs, on the study of the pre-1984 
fields seems to reemphasis the effect of the regulatory changes of 1985. The cost of 
infrastructure (fixed cost) of these fields was incurred pre-1985, but the same 
infrastructure was used post-1985. What was changed by the regulatory change was the 
operator's relative freedom in choosing the supplier of the goods and services applied in 
the operation phase of the fields' activity. Hence we witness the significance of variable 
costs and not the fixed costs. 
For the post-1985 fields, however, the operators have relative freedom in choosing goods 
and services used in both development and production phases. This seems to be reflected 
in the significance of both types of cost to the study of these fields' performance. 
Table 6-3: Relative Significant of Fixed and Variable Costs: 
All Norwegian Fields 
Efficiency With 
Both Variables 
Field CRS VRS 
Efficiency With 
Fixed Costs 
CRS VRS 
Efficiency With 
Vraiable Costs 
CRS VRS 
Efficiency With 
Both Variables 
Field CRS VRS 
0.279 0.668 0.279 0.668 0.045 0.249 23 0.092 0.536 
2 0.555 1.000 
3 0.174 0.379 
4 0.127 0.232 
5 0.259 0.522 
6 0.048 0.084 
7 0.114 0.225 
8 0.237 0.500 
9 0.375 1.000 
10 0.095 0.181 
11 0.358 0.742 
12 0.155 0.253 
13 0.209 0.429 
14 0.127 0.308 
15 0.265 0.566 
16 0.245 0.539 
17 0.454 1.000 
18 0.508 0.841 
19 0.333 0.624 
20 0.225 0.471 
21 0.184 0.378 
22 0.433 0.776 
0.555 1.000 
0.174 0.365 
0.127 0.211 
0.259 0.464 
0.048 0.075 
0.114 0.201 
0.237 0.496 
0.375 1.000 
0.095 0.161 
0.358 0.728 
0.128 0.214 
0.209 0.373 
0.119 0.222 
0.265 0.528 
0.245 0.539 
0.454 1.000 
0.157 0.269 
0.309 0.543 
0.225 0.409 
0.184 0.329 
0.433 0.698 
0.038 0.089 24 
0.112 0.350 25 
0.034 0.055 26 
0.065 0.142 27 
0.029 0.044 28 
0.033 0.063 29 
0.059 0.182 30 
0.121 1.000 31 
0.060 0.098 32 
0.072 0.206 33 
0.155 0.253 34 
0.129 0.265 35 
0.127 0.308 36 
0.129 0.345 37 
0.130 0.458 38 
0.284 1.000 39 
0.508 0.841 40 
0.333 0.591 41 
0.106 0.251 42 
0.098 0.208 43 
0.196 0.307 44 
0.525 0.774 
0.297 0.642 
0.203 0.521 
0.239 0.515 
0.521 0.801 
0.181 0.260 
0.572 0.965 
0.581 0.979 
0.588 1.000 
0.255 0.567 
0.281 0.454 
0.214 0.414 
0.442 1.000 
1.000 1.000 
0.402 0.753 
0.208 0.446 
0.278 0.680 
0.327 0.568 
0.433 0.848 
0.141 0.237 
0.201 0.317 
Efficiency With 
Fixed Costs 
CRS VRS 
0.036 0.207 
0.461 0.695 
0.297 0.608 
0.203 0.401 
0.239 0.430 
0.276 0.436 
0.060 0.088 
0.357 0.621 
0.325 0.564 
0.499 0.874 
0.255 0.466 
0.172 0.286 
0.214 0.365 
0.442 0.872 
1.000 1.000 
0.402 0.667 
0.208 0.386 
0.196 0.368 
0.327 0.516 
0.433 0.755 
0.141 0.216 
0.117 0.189 
Efficiency With 
Vraiable Costs 
CRS VRS 
0.092 0.536 
0.525 0.773 
0.169 0.486 
0.201 0.521 
0.211 0.490 
0.521 0.801 
0.181 0.260 
0.572 0.965 
0.581 0.979 
0.588 1.000 
0.238 0.567 
0.281 0.454 
0.206 0.341 
0.387 1.000 
1.000 1.000 
0.354 0.570 
0.165 0.400 
0.278 0.680 
0.118 0.181 
0.177 0.299 
0.052 0.077 
0.201 0.317 
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6.1.4 Efficiency Measurement on Annual Basis 
During the years of activity, each field registers annual production, as well as cost. While 
the sum of the productions and the sum of costs over years were used in the above DEA 
studies, this part will regard each year of each field's production as a DMU in the DEA 
study. Thus, a 20-year old field, for instance, (that is, a field whose production started in 
1980) generates 20 DMUs for this part of the study. With this procedure, one is able to: 
1- study each year's efficiency and 2- crosscheck the comparative efficiency results from 
the above study for the two periods in question, namely pre-1984 and post-1985. Further, 
with this procedure, we do not encounter the problem of low sample. 
The annual activity of Norwegian fields generates 431 DMUs when defined as above. 
Note that for some geological reasons beyond the oil companies' control, the production 
of oil (gas) of some of oil & gas fields may start some years after the production of gas 
(oil). In this case, separating oil and gas as two distinct productions may result in low 
efficiency scores for those years of single-output activity. Further, since six oil fields and 
one gas field are also included in the study, the separation of oil & gas results in 
unjustifiably low efficiency for these fields. For these reasons, the outputs of all fields are 
integrated into a single "oil-equivalent" output. 
The annual efficiency trends of Norwegian fields are shown in Figures 6-3 and 6-4. It is 
worth noticing that the high efficiency of the years 1978 and 1979 is due to the high 
efficiency of a single field. Since the number of fields active in these two years were very 
few, the high efficiency of this field has had a major effect on these two years' efficiency. 
As the years went on, the number of fields in production increased and the effect of a 
single field on the average efficiency became smaller. 
Perhaps the most interesting feature of the study of annual performance of the shelf is the 
negative correlation between the efficiency results and the share of domestic goods and 
services from the procurement made in the construction phase of fields' activity. The 
statistical test attributes 77% (VRS-DEA), and 86% (CRS-DEA) negative correlation 
between the efficiency of the NCS between 1978 and 1996, and the share of Norwegian 
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goods and services in that period. l3 ] Figures 6-5 and 6-6 illustrate this graphically. Note 
that in the figures, the inefficiency measures are depicted against the share of domestic 
goods and services and these have been enlarged ten times in order to have a better view 
of the movement of the two factors. The high correlation between the two indicates the 
possibility of the impacts of low efficient domestic goods and services on the 
performance of the fields. 
Though 1985 is the year of policy change and hence the efficiency of the two periods 
before and after 1985 are the main focus of this study, one should note that the fields' 
whose construction started after 1985 did not come on stream before 1989. Further, even 
if the changing policy of Norwegian government has had significant effect on the 
efficiency of the fields, one can not expect this happen over night. This is because the 
construction phase of the fields whose development started before the policy change was 
already finished and the new policy could not have major effect on the construction cost. 
Thus, the immediate effect of the policy change should be sought in the change in the 
production (variable) cost. In this regard, two points should be borne in mind. First, the 
production technologies of the pre-1985 fields were decided upon before the policy 
change, and even if major changes in the technology was feasible, this also could not 
have happened overnight (thought the time-frame will be shorter than fixed costs). 
Second, the policy change in Norway did not, by any means, aim to distract the oil 
companies from applying domestic goods and services. The absence of Statoil as the 
monitoring body from the consortiums' Board of Directors did not mean that the oil 
companies could, or would, shed all the Norwegian manpower on the platform. For these 
reasons, one could not expect higher efficiency immediately after the policy change in 
1985. 
The results of the study over the years of production could also be used to measure the 
average efficiency of each field. These averages, in tum, could be categorized with 
respect to the period of their development and production start (groups N-1 to N-3), to 
IJ I The data concerning the share of Norwegian goods and services for before 1978 in incomplete, and for 
after 1997 do not exist. Regulations do not require the oil companies to provide the authorities with the 
relevant data as post 1995. 
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measure the average efficiency of each group. The results are presented in Table 6-4. 
Consistent with the results from tables 6-1 and 6-2, the results establish higher efficiency 
for the N-3 group than the other two groups, under assumptions of both constant and 
variable returns to scale. The null hypothesis of equality between the average efficiency 
of the N-1 and N-3 groups is rejected at 99% level of significance. Assuming constant 
return to scale, the N-3 field is significantly (99% level of significance) more efficient 
than N-2. The level of significance reduces to 93%, however, when the assumption 
changes to variable returns to scale. Under the latter assumption, the N-2 group is 
significantly more efficient than N-1 group (99% level), while under the constant return 
to scale this reduces to 93% level of significance. 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test also verifies the lower efficiency of pre-1984 fields (N-1 
group) at 96% (CRS) and 98% (VRS) relative to the N-2 group, and at 99% (both DEA 
approaches) relative to the N-3 group. 
N-1 
N-2 
N-3 
0.191 (0.0074) 
0.231 (0.0040) 
0.329 (0.0040) 
The numbers in brackets are variance. 
VRS Efficiency 
0.256 (0.0124) 
0.359 (0.0187) 
0.428 (0.0043) 
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6.2 Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
To compare the results obtained from DEA, the program Frontier 4.1 was used to 
estimate the efficiency of the Norwegian fields based on stochastic analysis. The program 
is based on Battese and Coelli (1992). The model can be expressed as: 
Log (output) = flo + fl1 log (fixed cost) + fl2log (variable cost) + (V - U) 
V IS are random variables, which are assumed to be iid N (0, a,7), and independent of the 
U = (Ui * e-17U-T »). U's, in turn, are non-negative random variables, which are assumed 
to account for technical inefficiency in production and are assumed to be iid as 
truncations at zero of the N(f.1,a[~) distribution. 1] is a parameter to be estimated. 
The program utilizes the parameterization of Battese and Corra (1977) who replace 
a,~ and a ,; with a 2 = a; + a,; and r = a; /(a,7 + a ,;). The parameter r must lie between 
° and 1 and thus this range can be searched to provide a good starting value for use in an 
iterative maximization process. 
The first step of the Frontier 4.1 involves obtaining ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimates of the model. The estimated fli are unbiased (with the exception of flo). The 
ratio of the estimated coefficients to their corresponding standard errors (the t-ratio) 
indicates the significance of the coefficients (Coelli 1996). 
The second step involves evaluating the log-likelihood function for a number of values of 
r between zero and one. The final result of r being between zero and one indicates that a 
suitable value for an iterative optimization process is obtained (Babalola, 1999) 
6.2.1 Oil & Gas Fields 
The results of the stochastic frontier analysis for 37 Norwegian oil & gas fields are shown 
in Tables 6-5, and support the findings of DEA. The results indicate the significance of 
both fixed and variable costs (at 95%) and that r has a suitable value (0.85) for an 
iterative process. 
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According to these results, the post-1985 fields enjoy higher average efficiency than the 
pre-1984 fields. The null hypothesis of equality between the two periods' average 
efficiency is rejected at 95% level of significance. The Kolmogorov-Smimov test, 
however, does not reject the null hypothesis that the efficiency measurements come from 
the same distribution. 
With regard to the N-2 group, the equality between the mean efficiency and that of the 
two other groups was not rejected. 
The comparative study of SF A results and those of DEA shows high correction between 
the two approaches, particularly when comparing SF A with VRS-DEA. The results 
indicate the correlation between SF A and CRS-DEA as 56%, and between SFA and 
VRS-DEA as slightly less than 76%. The comparative results of SF A and two DEA 
approaches are shown in Figures 6-7 and 6-8. 
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Table 6-5: Results of SFA for Norwegian Oil & Gas Fields 
Field Efficiency Field Efficiency Field Efficiency 
1 0.878 13 0.778 26 0.848 
2 0.861 14 0.711 27 0.851 
3 0.815 15 0.860 28 0.850 
4 0.559 16 0.904 29 0.528 
5 0.771 17 0.955 30 0.913 
6 0.422 18 0.795 31 0.905 
7 0.579 19 0.883 32 0.937 
8 0.816 20 0.798 33 0.870 
9 0.943 21 0.740 34 0.750 
10 0.561 22 0.857 35 0.776 
11 0.872 23 0.355 36 0.941 
12 0.663 24 0.900 37 0.947 
25 0.895 
Ar. Average 0.792 (0.023) 
Average N-1 0.732 (0.025) 
Average N-2 0.858 (0.011) 
Average N-3 0.817 (0.021) 
The numbers in brackets are variance. 
Summary Statistics for 37 Norwegian Oil & Gas Fields 
Coefficient Standard t-ratio Significance 
Error at 95% 
Constant -0.576 0.225 -2.557 
Fixed Cost 0.525 0.199 2.640 yes 
Variable Cost 0.328 0.143 2.286 yes 
r 0.850 
(j2 0.080 
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6.2.2 All Norwegian Fields 
The similar results (shown in Table 6-6) to the study of 37 fields are given by SFA when 
the other 7 fields are included in the study. According to the results both fixed and 
variable costs play significant role in measuring the efficiency of the fields in question. 
The value of 0.85 for r indicates that the iterative process started suitably. 
Once again SF A recognizes the superiority of post-1985 fields' average efficiency over 
that of the pre-1984 fields, which is statistically significant at over 94% level of 
significance. Further, the N-All-2 group, whose development started before 1984 but 
came on stream after 1985, is significantly (at 93%) more efficient than the pre-1984 
group. The difference between the N-All-2 and N-All-3 groups, however, is not 
significant. 
The high correlation between the two approaches continues to hold, at 70% with CRS-
DEA and 79% with VRS-DEA. The comparative efficiencies of SF A with DEA 
measurements are shown in Figures 6-9 and 6-10. 
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Table 6-6: Results of SFA for All Norwegian Fields 
Field Efficiency Field Efficiency Field Efficiency Field Efficiency 
0.858 12 0.658 23 0.371 34 0.739 
2 0.845 13 0.764 24 0.890 35 0.764 
3 0.796 14 0.700 25 0.880 36 0.933 
4 0.561 15 0.843 26 0.831 37 0.941 
5 0.757 16 0.888 27 0.834 38 0.876 
6 0.432 17 0.949 28 0.837 39 0.805 
7 0.578 18 0.781 29 0.534 40 0.833 
8 0.797 19 0.869 30 0.902 41 0.761 
9 0.934 20 0.782 31 0.894 42 0.869 
10 0.563 21 0.728 32 0.929 43 0.577 
11 0.855 22 0.844 33 0.854 44 0.648 
Arithmetic Average 0.779 (0.019) 
Average N-AII-1 0.723 (0.022) 
Average N-AII-2 0.845 (0.011) 
Average N-AII-3 0.767 (0.017) 
The numbers in brackets are variance. 
Summary Statistics for 44 Norwegian Fields 
Coefficient Standard t-ratio Significance 
Error at 95% 
Constant -0.597 0.189 -3.154 
Fixed Cost 0.546 0.167 3.266 yes 
Variable Cost 0.314 0.124 2.527 yes 
r 0.850 
(j2 0.072 
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6.3 The Significance of Contextual Variables 
We have seen in 4.2.4 that parametric regression analysis enables the analyst to use DEA 
and SF A efficiency results to determine the impact of some other important variables, 
which have been absent in the efficiency analysis. These variables (often referred to as 
contextual variables) include the elements that could not be included in the efficiency 
measurement analysis (because they were neither input, nor output) but might, in 
practice, have affected the efficiency of the unit in question. 
As far as the issue of offshore petroleum industry is concerned, these variables should 
include the water depth and reservoir depth of each field, as these are said (see Chapter 4) 
to impose additional cost on construction and production phases. With respect to the 
contractual framework of the Norwegian (and British, for that matter) offshore industry, 
the number of partners may also playa vital role in the efficiency of the field in question. 
This is because the operator of each field has a dual responsibility towards the 
government and other partners in the consortium. On one hand, disregarding the 
government's requirement to apply domestic goods and services may cost the operator its 
share in future consortia. On the other hand, if the domestic goods and services generate 
heavy inefficiency, the operator may be confronted with other partners' objection to its 
decisions. Recalling from Chapter 2 that according to Norwegian petroleum regulation, 
operator's decision could be vetoed by the partners if the latter unanimously voted for an 
alternative procurement plan. Thus, one could assume that the larger the number of 
partners in a consortium, the lower the possibility of reaching unanimity for alternative 
proposal. This is because larger numbers of partners is usually associated with lower 
shares for each partner in the consortium. The lower share, in tum, reduces partners' 
sensitivity to higher cost, as their share of the difference between the optimal cost and the 
incurred cost is lower. For this consideration it was decided to include the number of 
partners in the analysis of the effect of contextual variables. 
In addition, a dummy variable for the post-1985 fields has been included to investigate 
the effect, if any, of the government's changing policy on the efficiency of fields in 
question. 
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It is worth mentioning that the program Frontier 4,1 is able to evaluate the significance of 
these variables simultaneous with measuring the efficiency of the fields in question. 
However, since the data lack the information with regard to some of the fields' reservoir 
and water depth (see 5.4.2 and 5.4.3) the study is unable to take advantage of this 
possibility. 
To investigate the impacts of the contextual variables mentioned above on the efficiency 
of the Norwegian fields, the efficiency measures given by CRS-DEA, VRS-DEA, and 
SF A methods have been used as the dependent variables in Banker et aI's procedure 
given by: 
In(e) = h(Z;P) + VM - (v - u) 
where e is the inefficiency (inverse of efficiency) given by the three methods mentioned 
above, Z is the vector of contextual variables. Note that Banker et al. show the OLS 
intercept is a consistent estimator of Po + VM - E(v - u). 
Z3 are "number of partners", "water-depth", and "reservoir depth", respectively, DS5 is the 
dummy variable for post-1985 fields, and &=VM -E(v-u). The results of the 
regressions are given in Tables 6-7 to 6-9. 
The Banker et al. procedure attributes between roughly 19% (based on CRS and VRS-
DEA), and 24% (based on SFA) of the inefficiency to the three contextual variables. In 
other words between 76% and 81 % of inefficiency in the Norwegian offshore petroleum 
industry is caused by failing to bring the cost in line with efficient production. 
The common feature of the results of is that none of the contextual variables (on its own) 
plays significant role in the inefficiency of the fields. As a matter of fact, the results 
indicate that while the reservoir depth plays a positive (but insignificant) role in the 
inefficiency of the fields, the other two variables, namely number of partners and water-
depth play an opposite role in that regard. In other words, the more partners in a 
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consortium and/or the deeper the depth of water is, the higher the efficiency is resulted. 
One may assume that high and low number of partners in consortia may produce two 
opposite problems leading to the same results. While the high number of partners may 
create the problem of free-riding, the low number of partners may put the operator in the 
position of caring about its own interest without being responsible to many partners. 
Since both cases, one would expect, generate low efficiency, another study was 
conducted using partner-square to offset this effect. The result showed higher 
significance for partners, but still not at 95% level. 
As far as the water-depth is concerned, the results are in contrast with what is commonly 
believed in the industry. Deep waters require more tolerant equipment and more 
sophisticated technology, which usually impose further cost on the consortium. However, 
if this knowledge is shared by both parties, namely government and oil companies, the 
former is aware that not relaxing some of the restrictions on the companies (i.e. use of 
domestic goods and services) when the field in question lies on deep waters, may make 
the partners reconsider their investment policy on that field, or even withdraw from the 
consortium if the outcome is not promising. In this case, the water-depth may come to 
rescue the oil companies for some saving on their cost, due to softer regulations from the 
government's side. 
An additional test was performed to measure the correlation between water depth and 
reservoir depth to check the possibility of multicollinearity between these two variables. 
The test shows a negative correlation of 47% between the two. Thus, it seems that the 
two parameters do not cause the multicollinearity problem. 
The early assumption that the higher number of partners in a consortium reduces the 
efficiency of the operationships is also contradicted by the results, according to which the 
higher the number of partners is, the more efficiently are the fields conducted. This may 
imply that when the number of partners is higher, the operator is monitored by higher 
number of oil companies, and thus, is more careful about its procurement behavior. 
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The results are compatible with our early assumption with respect to reservoir-depth. 
According to the findings, the reservoir-depth plays a positive (but still insignificant) role 
in the inefficiency of the fields. 
As far as the performance of the fields over the two periods of pre-1984 and post-1985 
(inclusive) is concerned, the dummy variable, indicating the post-1985 fields, has a 
negative coefficient (significant at 90% for both DEA approaches). 
Table 6-7: The impact of Contextual Variables: All Norwegian Fields, Based on 
Inefficiency evaluated by CRS-DEA 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio Probability 
Constant 2.7527 3.8530 0.71444 0.479 
Partners -0.20707 0.18606 -1.1129 0.273 
Water Depth -0.19976 0.20723 -0.96395 0.341 
Reservoir Depth 0.023994 0.42100 0.05699 0.955 
Dummy Post-85 -0.38199 0.22281 -1.7144 0.094 
R-Squared 0.194 
Table 6-8: The impact of Contextual Variables: All Norwegian Fields, Based on 
Inefficiency evaluated by VRS-DEA 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio Probability 
Constant 1.3415 3.5658 0.37622 0.709 
Partners -0.18135 0.17220 -1.0532 0.299 
Water Depth -0.15518 0.19178 -0.80913 0.423 
Reservoir Depth 0.082594 0.38962 0.21198 0.833 
Dummy Post-85 -0.36663 0.20621 -1.7780 0.083 
R-Squared 0.186 
Table 6-9: The impact of Contextual Variables: All Norwegian Fields, Based on 
Inefficiency evaluated by SFA 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio Probability 
Constant -1.1425 1.2999 -0.87890 0.385 
Partners -0.071764 0.062773 -1.1432 0.260 
Water Depth -0.60920 0.069914 -0.87137 0.389 
Reservoir Depth 0.24035 0.14204 1.6921 0.099 
Dummy Post-85 -0.078824 0.075172 -1.0486 0.301 
R-Squared 0.241 
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6.4 Dynamic Efficiency Measurement: Malmquist Index Approach 
The DEA and SF A approach to the question of efficiency is a static approach in the sense 
that if the study is being run over time (that is if DMUs belong to different periods of 
time) the relative efficiency scores do not take into account the possibility of 
technological advancement over the two periods. This applies to the efficiency issue in 
the Norwegian offshore petroleum industry. Though the majority of the results indicates 
higher efficiency in the post-1985 era, they do not, however, determine whether the 
higher efficiency is due to more efficient post-1985 performance, or because in that 
period more advanced technology was available. 
This problem leads us to the application of the Malmquist Index described in Chapter 4. 
The aim is to decompose the efficiency change over the two periods into the real 
efficiency change and that part of the change that was due to technical advancement. As 
seen in Chapter 4, the Malmquist Index approach also provides the analyst with the scale 
efficiency change, and pure efficiency change, which is the efficiency change assuming 
constant return to scale and no technical efficiency change. 
Note that the above decomposition is possible only when identical DMUs (here, fields) 
are being compared over different periods of time. This means that since only fields in 
the group N-l were active in both periods, the Malmquist approach is only applicable to 
these fields. The other two groups, Namely N-2 and N-3, came on stream only after 1985. 
Thus the Malmquist Index approach can not decompose the efficiency elements for these 
two groups. 
6.4.1 Pre-1984 Fields' Efficiency Decomposition 
The 13 Norwegian fields whose development and production started before 1984 are 
being analyzed in this part. The fact that these fields were involved in both pre-1984 and 
post-1985 periods enables the analyst to compare the relative performance of these fields 
in both periods. 
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The Malmquist Index approach, based on 4-5-4 and 4-5-5, estimates the total factor 
productivity change of the fields in the group N -1 over the two periods. The TFP changes 
are further decomposed into efficiency change, technology change, pure efficiency 
change, and scale efficiency change. The results are represented in Table 6-10. 
The results {column [1]} indicate higher efficiency for five fields after the change in the 
government's policy towards the scrutiny responsibility of Statoil, whereas the efficiency 
of six fields was reduced in the post-1985 period. One of the reasons for the latter case 
could be the fact that the fields under study in group N-1 were developed in the pre-1984 
period, and the construction cost associated with these fields incurred in that period and is 
affected by Statoil's supervisory role. Thus one of the elements of the efficiency analysis 
in this study, namely the construction (fixed) costs, in both periods are reflecting the 
government's policy before 1984. If one assumed that Statoil's responsibility for 
safeguarding domestic offshore suppliers' presence in the North Sea activity would 
generate inefficiency, one would conclude that the procedure of breaking-down the 
construction costs over the years of production is biased against the post-1985 part of the 
group N -1 's activity. This bias would result in lowering the actual efficiency of the post-
1985 activity of the fields whose development and production started before 1985. 
The post-1985 period enjoys more efficient technology {column [2]} than the part of 
group N-l activity that took place in the pre-1984 period. The scale efficiency, however, 
suffers a reduction in the post-1985 period {column [4]}. The change illustrates the 
diminishing rate of production in the post-1985 period, which could be attributed to two 
geological factors. First, in the early years of production, the production procedure takes 
place by simple drilling which causes relatively low cost. As the production continues, 
the fields enter the phase where the oil is in its more solid form. In order to extract the oil, 
it should first be liquidated (by injecting hot water and/or steam into the ground) and then 
pumped to the surface. In addition, in the latter stage, the under-ground pressure for 
successful pumping should also be maintained by injecting natural gas into the well. 
Thus, as the production proceeds, the magnitude of extracted petroleum is (usually) lower 
and the cost of production is higher than before. Second, the fields whose development 
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started after 1985 are, in average, much smaller than the fields whose development began 
before 1984. Thus, the scale efficiency of the fields are lower in the post-1985 era. 
This introduces another factor indicating better performance of the post-1985 activity of 
N -1 fields. The pure efficiency change, {column [3]} determines the level of efficiency 
change assuming there is no scale efficiency and technological change. Thus, had there 
not been any technical and scale efficiency change, the efficiency of post-1985 period 
would have been higher than the pre-1984 period by about 10%. 
Table 6-10: Malmquist Decomposition for Pre-1984 Norwegian (N-1) Fields 
Post-1985 Change Compare to Pre-1984 Performance 
[1 ] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Efficiency Technical Pure Efficiency Scale Efficiency Totl. Factor 
Field Change Change Change Change Prod. Change 
1.629 0.823 1.000 1.629 1.340 
2 1.000 0.556 1.000 1.000 0.556 
3 0.644 1.047 1.000 0.644 0.674 
4 0.857 0.946 1.889 0.454 0.811 
5 0.353 1.042 0.752 0.470 0.368 
6 0.385 1.388 2.095 0.184 0.534 
7 0.576 0.950 0.941 0.612 0.547 
8 1.293 1.073 0.976 1.325 1.387 
9 1.033 1.779 1.000 1.033 1.838 
10 0.389 1.446 0.899 0.432 0.562 
11 1.816 1.232 1.051 1.729 2.237 
12 1.000 0.678 1.000 1.000 0.678 
13 2.377 1.031 1.276 1.863 2.452 
Geometric 
Average 0.868 1.031 1.096 0.792 0.894 
6.4.2 Distance Between the two Pre-1984 and Post-1985 Periods 
As mentioned in the previous section, the DEA and SF A approaches are unable to 
address the cause of differences in efficiencies. Though the Malmquist Index approach 
solves this problem, it has the basic requirement that DMUs in question must be identical 
and run through various periods. The decomposition of the efficiency differences 
between the two groups N-1 and N-3, therefore, is not possible since they do not satisfy 
the requirement mentioned above. 
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The results of both DEA and SF A suggested the superiority of the post-1985's average 
efficiency over the pre-1984 one. These results could also be checked by using the distant 
function procedure described in Chapter 4 (4.5.3). This method would determine the 
distance between the fields in one period and the frontier formed by the other group. In 
other words, measuring the distance between the post-1985 period from the frontier 
formed by the pre-1984 fields measures the distance of each and every one field from the 
post-1985 group with the best practices (but not with off-frontier fields). Though this 
approach does not measure the actual difference between the two periods' efficiency, it 
may emphasize the results of DE A and SFA. 
The distance function approach is used to measure the distance between the Norwegian 
post-1985 oil & gas fields with those of the pre-1984 ones and vice versa. The results 
(shown in Table 6-11) indicate the higher efficiency level for post-1985 fields in both 
cases. As far as the distance between the pre-1984 fields with the frontier made by the 
post-1985 fields is concerned, only one field stands above that frontier (field m.2). 
However, when the distance between the post-1985 fields and the frontier formed by 
post-1985 is measured, only one field is slightly under that frontier (slightly less efficient 
than the most efficient fields in the pre-1984 period). This indicates the higher efficiency 
of post-1985 fields relative to pre-1985 ones. 
Despite the inability of the DEA, SFA, and Distance function approaches to address the 
source of changes, the result of the scale and technical efficiency change in the 
Malmquist analysis with regard to the two-timing activity of the N -1 group could be, to a 
certain extent, generalized for the other groups. As mentioned in 7.4.1, the reduction in 
scale efficiency arises from two geological factors that are outside the ability of 
companies to control. The second factor, namely the smaller size of fields in the post-
1985 period (which causes lower scale efficiency for the post-1985 period), and the fact 
that the Malmquist results does not show any significant technological change over the 
two periods, but 30/0, could be applied to the post-1985 developed fields. If the fields are 
smaller (lower scale efficiency) and technology has not had significant effect on the 
performance of the fields (otherwise the N-1 fields could use it after 1985), there is less 
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reason to believe that the efficiency superiority of the post-1985 fields (group N-3) is 
resulted from other factors than the improvement in companies' performance. 
Table 6-11: Efficiency of Each Group Relative to 
the Best Practices of the Other Group 
Efficiency of pre-84 Efficiency of Post-85 
Field relative to Post-85 Field relative to Pre-84 
Frontier Frontier 
1 0.293 1 3.119 
2 1.505 2 2.010 
3 0.475 3 1.274 
4 0.264 4 1.113 
5 0.720 5 2.257 
6 0.097 6 0.966 
7 0.295 7 3.408 
8 0.285 8 1.939 
9 0.187 9 1.485 
10 0.163 10 2.390 
11 0.192 11 4.907 
12 0.688 12 1.119 
13 0.170 13 6.250 
14 6.549 
15 6.696 
16 2.627 
17 2.911 
18 1.848 
19 2.574 
20 11.128 
Ar. Average 0.410 3.329 
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6.5 Concluding Remarks 
The results of static efficiency analysis from DEA and SF A do not contradict the 
assumption of the higher efficiency of Norwegian fields in the aftermath of Statoil's 
changing position. Except for minor exceptions, the difference between the efficiency of 
the pre-1984 and post-1985 seems significant. The exceptions occur when the Jarque and 
Bera test does not establish normality in the fields' efficiency score distribution. Thus, the 
problem seems to have a statistical nature related to either the type of distribution or 
small size of the sample in question, or both. 
The inability of the static parametric and non-parametric tests to distinguish between the 
causes of efficiency disparity (whether it is because of companies' better performance 
after 1985 or simply because of more efficient technology in that period) led us to the 
application of Malmquist Index approach. To make the distinction between different 
components responsible for a likely change between efficiency of the periods, 13 oil & 
gas fields, whose development and production began before 1984, were chosen for the 
study. The fact that these fields were active in both the pre-1984 and post-1985 era made 
them appropriate for a Malmquist analysis. The results show that the post-1985 part of 
these fields' activity suffers from less efficiency compare to the pre-1984 period. The 
reduction, however, stems from the fact that the fields have lower scale efficiency in the 
post-1985 period. Had the fields enjoyed the same scale of operation in the post-1985 
period, the average efficiency of this period would have exceeded that of the pre-1984 
fields by about 10%. This is despite the fact that the post-1985 part of these fields' 
activity suffers from the investment made in the development phase prior to Statoil's 
reduced power within the consortia. This biases the study against the activity of these 
fields occurred post-1985. 
The basic assumption of the Malmquist approach, which requires the units in question to 
be identical over the periods under study, prevents the analyst from applying the 
approach when comparing the fields whose development and production began after 
1985 and those who began both these phases before 1984. Therefore, to check the results 
of DEA and SF A the distance function method was applied to measure the average 
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distance of each group with the best practices of the other one. Consistent with the 
previous findings, the results suggest higher efficiency in the post-1985 era. 
The construction and production costs used as inputs in the above studies are said to be 
two of the various elements affecting the performance of a field in question. The offshore 
industry believes that the depth of water and depth of reservoir play significant role in the 
level of costs, and thus are major factors in determining the efficiency level of the field. 
These two elements, along with the number of partners in each consortium and a dummy 
variable for the post-1985 fields, were included as contextual variables to test the above 
claim using Banker et al.'s approach. The results attribute between 22% and 260/0 of the 
inefficiency of the fields to these contextual variables. 
The above results do not rule out the positive effects of Norway's changing policy on the 
performance of the fields in the Norwegian Continental Shelf. This includes the effect on 
both existing fields at the time, and the fields whose production started after 1985. 
Statoil's shift, from being the government's scrutiny instrument to having a more 
entrepreneurial role, seems to have provided the international oil companies with the 
opportunity of adjusting their procurement policy. Before the change in 1985, the oil 
companies' government-determined procurement policy was monitored by Statoil, whose 
presence in the consortium's decision-making board and its vast vested power, influenced 
the international oil companies' procurement decisions. Though the change in the 
government's policy did not remove the "buy-Norwegian" requirement, and the oil 
companies procurement was to be monitored by the Oil Directorate, Statoil's absence as 
the monitoring instrument seems to have reduced the impact of the government's other 
scrutiny tools. This could be because Statoil had the advantage of being an oil company 
familiar with all aspects of operation. Statoil had the technical knowledge and expertise 
to respond to the oil companies' counter arguments, and the power to impose its decision 
when necessary. Bearing in mind that the flow of expertise within the industry was more 
from governmental position to oil-companies than vice versa (Nelsen 1991), it could be 
assumed that the oil companies could more easily persuade the officials of Oil 
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Directorate than they could with Statoil. Statoil was a member of the team (perhaps 
unwanted) who was controlling the others from inside. The change in 1985, as the results 
of this study suggest, lowered the pressure on the international oil companies. 
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Chapter Seven: Efficiency Analysis in the UKCS 
Introduction 
The changing policy in Norway as we have seen in Chapter 6, brought about higher 
efficiency for the fields whose production began after 1985. Further, the pure efficiency 
of the fields whose construction and production began under Statoil's influence was also 
increased once Statoil's role changed. Considering the changes in UK policy highlighted 
in Chapter 2, might one expect efficiency improvements in the UK in the post-1985 
period. 
Like the Norwegian case discussed in Chapter 6, the efficiency of the fields developed 
and brought on stream in the United Kingdom Continental Shelf in different periods of 
regulation is the focus of the current chapter. The approaches that are applied in this 
regard are similar to those used in the previous chapter. However, while in the Norwegian 
case, 1985 marked the timing of the policy changes, in the United Kingdom these 
changes occurred in two periods of 1975 and 1985. Recall from Chapter 2 that, prior to 
1975, British policy towards the application of domestic goods and services was a verbal 
understanding between the government and the oil companies involved. The 
"understanding" did not bring about serious commitments for the oil companies 132 and 
the use of domestic goods and services was not typically the result of government's 
pressure. However, in 1975 the government made it clear that the companies' negligence 
in contributing to the British economy, by applying insufficient domestic goods and 
services, would jeopardize their chance of winning production licenses. The requirement, 
however, was abolished in 1985 when the European Committee expressed its concern 
about the legitimacy of the regulation. Thus, the study on the issue of efficiency of the 
British fields focuses on both 1975 and 1985 as benchmarks. While 1975 marks the 
beginning of government's direct intervention in the procurement policy of the oil 
companies, 1985 marks the end of this era. 
\J2 See Nelsen 1991. 
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The structure of this chapter is quite similar to Chapter 6. The analysis begins by 
applying DEA to measure the efficiency of the oil fields and oil & gas fields of the 
United Kingdom Continental Shelf. Though the same approach to the gas fields does not 
lead the analyst to any conclusion (as only one gas field was developed and brought on 
stream during the period of severe government intervention of 1975-84), these fields are 
included in the study when the relative efficiency of all British fields is being measured. 
All the fields in the UKCS are studied when the activity of each year of production for 
each field is used as a DMU for DEA. As mentioned before, with this, the analyst is able 
not only to measure the relative average efficiency of each field under study, but also to 
measure the average efficiency of each year of production since the beginning of 
petroleum activity in the shelf. 
In the next section, the results of DEA are then cross-checked by applying SF A. As in the 
Norwegian case, the efficiency scores are categorized according to the timing of 
development and production start (to be described shortly) to examine the relative 
efficiency of each group. 
The efficiency measurements given by DEA and SF A will be used in the next section to 
evaluate the contribution of the contextual variables to the inefficiency formed in the 
UKCS. Using regression analysis with the same consideration as before, the number of 
partners, depth of water, and depth of reservoir will be examined. In addition the dummy 
variable, reflecting the periods of no/less government intervention (before 1974 and after 
1985) will be included in the study. 
The study continues by using the Malmquist Index approach to decompose the total 
factor productivity change into the various components of efficiency change, technical 
change, scale efficiency change, and pure efficiency change. This not only addresses the 
real efficiency changes after the policy change, but also gives some clue about the 
technical situation before and after 1985. The final part of the study summarizes the 
results of the chapter. 
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Before presenting the results, the categorization of the fields in the UKCS should be 
clarified. These fields are separated into five groups as follows. 
• Group 1 consists of those fields whose development and production started before 
197 4 (inclusive). 
• Group 2 is formed by the fields whose development started before 1974, but did not 
come on stream until after 1975, inclusive. 
• Group 3 refers to the fields whose construction and production started during the 
period of government intervention (1975-1984, inclusive). 
• Group 4 indicate the fields whose development started between 1975 and 1984, but 
whose production started after 1985. 
• Group 5 accommodates the fields whose development and production started after 
1985, inclusive. 
Though the above categorization is used throughout this chapter, referring to fields 
merely based on the above categorization may generate confusion when different kinds of 
fields (by type of production) are under study. As mentioned above, this chapter studies 
oil fields, oil & gas fields, and the total fields in the UKCS. For this reason when the oil 
fields are under study the groups will be referred to by adding "oil" at the beginning of 
the group's number. Similarly, the oil & gas fields will be denoted by "o&g", while the 
aggregate fields are marked by UK. For instance, oil-2 refers to the oil fields whose 
development started before 1974 and production started after 1975, 0&g-4 refers to the 
oil & gas fields whose development started between 1975 and 1985, but came on stream 
after 1985. Finally, UK-3, for instance, denotes all the fields whose development and 
production started between 1975 and 1984, inclusive. The number of fields in each group 
and according to their production type is shown in Table 7-1. 
Table 7-1: Categorization of the Fields in the UKCS 
Group-l Group-2 Group-3 Group-4 Group-S Sum 
Oil Fields 0 5 8 4 50 67 
Oil & Gas Fields 2 4 8 2 50 66 
Total (Gas Fields included) 5 10 17 10 142 184 
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7.1 Data Envelopment Analysis Approach 
As in the previous chapter, the CCR and BCC models discussed in 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 are 
used to measure the relative efficiency of British fields, assuming constant returns to 
scale (CRS) and variable returns to scale (VRS), respectively. The DEA method is used 
here to measure the relative efficiency of the fields in four situations. In the first, the 
efficiency of 67 oil fields will be examined. In the second study the same analysis will be 
carried out, this time for 66 fields producing both oil & gas. In the third part the 
performance of all 184 UKCS fields will be studied to check the results of the previous 
two studies. 
The final part of this section examines the activity of each field in each year. Each year in 
this study will be considered as a unit (DMU). With this, 1432 units are generated, which 
allow the analysis of efficiency of each production year, and consequently the 
comparative study of the different periods in question. 
Program DEAP is used, throughout this section, to calculate the efficiency scores. 
7.1.1 Oil Fields 
The CCR and BCC models discussed in Chapter 4 (equations 4-1 to 4-4) are used for two 
inputs (fixed and variable costs) and one output. The results are presented in Table 7-2. 
Note that the fields l-S belong to group Oil-2, fields 6 to 13 (inclusive) belong to Oil-3, 
fields 14 to17 belong to Oil-3, and the rest belong to group Oil-S (see the introduction to 
this chapter for description of the groups). 
Recall that the three groups Oil-2, Oil-3, and Oil-4 have all experienced same period of 
government protectionism (197S-84). The production phase of group Oil-2, and the 
construction phase of group Oil-4 started in the time of heavy government intervention, 
while the group Oil-3 started both phases in that period. Thus the only group unaffected 
(or less affected) by the policy is the group Oil-So Having this difference in mind, the 
results of DEA (both CRS and VRS assumptions), not rejected by Student t-test, single 
out the Oil-S group as significantly more efficient than the groups Oil-3 and Oil-4 (at 
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990/0 and 98% level of significance, respectively). The equality of the averages for Oil-5 
group and Oil-2 group, however, cannot be rejected at 950/0 level of significance (with 
VRS assumption, the equality is rejected at 90% level). 
The Kolmogorov-Smimov test also rejects the possibility of the Oil-5 group having the 
same distribution as the Oil-3 and Oil-4 groups at 99% and 96% level of significance, 
respectively, for both DEA approaches. However, comparing with Oil-2 group, the 
hypothesis that the efficiency scores of the two groups come from a single distribution is 
not rejected at 95% level. The same is also true for other combinations of groups (Oil-3 
vs Oil-2 and Oil-4, and Oil-2 vs. Oil-4). The results, therefore, do not role out the 
possibility of a positive effect of the government's changing policy in 1985 on the 
performance of the fields developed and brought on stream after that time. 
Despite its numerical advantage, the average efficiency of the Oil-2 group, on the other 
hand, is not significantly larger than the groups Oil-3 and Oil-4. The numerical advantage 
of the Oil-2 group is despite the fact that these fields are considerably older than the other 
fields and, thus, date from a more costly phase (see Chapter 6). This should, normally, 
result in low efficiency score for these fields. The reason for this relatively high 
efficiency score may stem from the fact that the construction phase of these fields started 
in the pre-1974 era, when the government's interference in the companies' procurement 
policy was at its minimum. Considering the significance of the construction phase (i.e. 
the huge costs incurred in this phase), a relatively high efficient procurement policy in 
this phase could result in a high efficiency save. 
With respect to the scale of production, 52% of the fields exhibit decreasing returns to 
scale and 43% are in the increasing returns to scale position. 93% of the fields in the 
latter position belong to group Oil-5, which was predictable since these are new fields in 
the early stages of their production. All fields with constant returns to scale belong to the 
latter group. 
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Table 7-2: Results of DEA for the UK Oil Fields 
Field CRS 
0.310 
2 0.794 
3 0.266 
4 0.410 
5 0.214 
6 0.484 
7 0.193 
8 0.207 
9 0.276 
10 0.325 
11 0.230 
12 0.137 
13 0.405 
14 0.296 
15 0.238 
16 0.423 
17 0.182 
18 0.459 
19 0.635 
20 0.614 
21 0.654 
22 0.101 
23 0.232 
24 0.449 
25 0.582 
26 0.252 
27 0.080 
28 0.366 
29 0.494 
30 0.367 
31 0.717 
32 0.420 
33 0.590 
Average 
Average Oil-2 
Average Oil-3 
Average Oil-4 
Average Oil-5 
VRS 
0.376 
1.000 
0.301 
0.511 
0.275 
0.673 
0.255 
0.275 
0.310 
0.548 
0.403 
0.139 
0.575 
0.389 
0.334 
0.522 
0.206 
0.599 
0.816 
0.720 
0.961 
0.139 
0.287 
0.464 
0.779 
0.259 
0.552 
0.446 
0.550 
0.668 
0.805 
0.439 
0.651 
Scale 
0.826 
0.794 
0.884 
0.801 
0.777 
0.718 
0.756 
0.754 
0.893 
0.593 
0.571 
0.982 
0.705 
0.760 
0.712 
0.810 
0.887 
0.767 
0.778 
0.853 
0.680 
0.723 
0.809 
0.969 
0.746 
0.974 
0.145 
0.821 
0.899 
0.549 
0.890 
0.957 
0.906 
eRS 
r.tS. 
drs 
drs 
drs 
drs 
drs 
drs 
drs 
drs 
drs 
drs 
drs 
irs 
drs 
drs 
drs 
drs 
irs 
drs 
drs 
drs 
drs 
irs 
drs 
irs 
drs 
irs 
irs 
irs 
drs 
drs 
drs 
irs 
drs 
0.493 (0.0627) 
0.399 (0.0540) 
0.282 (0.0136) 
0.285 (0.0107) 
0.552 (0.0621) 
The numbers in brackets are variance. 
Field CRS 
34 0.545 
35 0.475 
36 0.698 
37 0.846 
38 1.000 
39 0.669 
40 0.234 
41 0.854 
42 0.545 
43 0.726 
44 0.507 
45 0.765 
46 0.508 
47 0.547 
48 1.000 
49 1.000 
50 0.908 
51 0.811 
52 0.652 
53 0.313 
54 0.571 
55 0.113 
56 0.095 
57 0.463 
58 0.366 
59 0.426 
60 0.674 
61 0.291 
62 0.837 
63 0.803 
64 0.155 
65 0.857 
66 0.804 
67 0.546 
VRS 
VRS 
0.595 
0.487 
0.716 
1.000 
1.000 
0.905 
1.000 
0.868 
0.853 
0.748 
0.736 
0.958 
0.579 
0.587 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
0.953 
0.666 
1.000 
0.636 
0.161 
0.101 
0.869 
0.370 
0.428 
0.682 
0.399 
1.000 
0.804 
0.468 
0.931 
0.832 
0.654 
0.615 (0.0715) 
0.493 (0.0889) 
0.397 (0.0343) 
0.363 (0.0171) 
0.682 (0.0640) 
Scale 
0.915 
0.975 
0.976 
0.846 
1.000 
0.739 
0.234 
0.984 
0.639 
0.971 
0.688 
0.799 
0.877 
0.931 
1.000 
1.000 
0.908 
0.851 
0.979 
0.313 
0.898 
0.701 
0.937 
0.532 
0.989 
0.995 
0.989 
0.729 
0.837 
0.999 
0.330 
0.921 
0.967 
0.835 
Scale 
r.tS. 
irs 
irs 
drs 
drs 
drs 
irs 
irs 
drs 
irs 
drs 
drs 
drs 
irs 
drs 
drs 
irs 
irs 
irs 
irs 
irs 
irs 
irs 
irs 
irs 
irs 
irs 
drs 
irs 
irs 
irs 
irs 
0.806 (0.0344) 
0.816 (0.0017) 
0.747 (0.0191) 
0.792 (0.0056) 
0.815 (0.0425) 
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Assuming constant returns to scale, a number of three fields form the efficient frontier. 
All these fields belong to group Oil-So Changing the assumption to variable returns to 
scale increases the efficient fields to nine, with eight of them belonging to group Oil-So 
The remaining field comes from the group Oil-2, whose construction phase began in the 
pre-1974 era. 
Assuming constant returns to scale, 60% of the fields in the group Oil-S and 20% of the 
fields in the group Oil-2 enjoy efficiency of better than SO%. None of the other groups 
has a field with higher than SO% efficiency. 28% of the fields in group Oil-S have 
efficiency of greater than 70%. 
With the assumption of variable returns to scale, however, the situation is slightly 
different. 400/0 of the fields in the Oil-2, 37.S% in the Oil-3, and 2S% in the Oil-4 have 
efficiency of better than SO%. This is while 74% of the fields in the Oil-S enjoy the same 
situation. With 70% efficiency as the benchmark, however, SO% of the fields in group 
Oil-S and 200/0 in group Oil-2 enjoy at least that level of efficiency. Once again, no other 
group has a field with higher than 70% efficiency. 
The results of DEA support the basic hypothesis of the higher efficiency in the periods of 
less government intervention in the procurement policy of the oil companies. However, 
as in the Norwegian case, whether this higher efficiency stems from the companies' more 
efficient performance is to be tested in later stages. 
7-1-2 Oil & Gas Fields 
The DEA results for 66 oil & gas fields are presented in Table 7-3. The first 2 fields 
belong to the O&G-l group, the next 4 fields form the O&G-2 group, fields 7-14 belong 
to the O&G-3 group, and the O&G-4 group consists of fields IS and 16. The rest of the 
fields (17 to 66) form the O&G-S group. 
Assuming constant returns to scale production, the periods of less government 
intervention (groups O&G-l and O&G-S) are significantly (both at 99% level of 
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significance) more efficient than the O&G-3, the period of the "buy British" requirement. 
The differences between the average efficiency of the former groups (O&G-l and O&G-
5) with the groups O&G-2 and O&G-4 are not significant. Note that the latter two groups 
have roots in periods of both type of government intervention. 
The surprising result is the numerical advantage of the first group, namely O&G-l, over 
the other groups. This group is significantly more efficient than group O&G-2 (at 96% 
level of significance), and more efficient than groups O&G-4 and O&G-5, both at 91 % 
level of significance. This is despite the fact that these fields are the two 133 of oldest 
fields in the UKCS and are supposed to be among the most costly fields (as explained in 
Chapter 6). Recall that these fields were developed prior to the beginning of state's 
intervention in the UKCS activity, these fields owe their efficiency, as we will see 
shortly, to the low construction costs and high efficiency in that period. 
The assumption of variable returns to scale slightly alters the results. Though the O&G-l 
group is still more efficient than the O&G-3 group, the level of significance drops to 
about 95%. The latter group is still significantly (990/0) less efficient than the O&G-5 
group. The O&G-5 group is now more efficient than O&G-2 and O&G-4 groups at 93% 
level of significance, while the average efficiency of O&G-l group is no longer 
significantly higher than O&G-2 and O&G-4. The reason for this is higher efficiency of 
these two latter groups under the variable returns to scale assumption, while the 
efficiency of the O&G-l fields remained the same compared to the CRS assumption. 
According to the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, neither of the O&G-l and O&G-5 groups 
has the same distribution as the O&G-3 group (under both CRS and VRS assumptions). 
Further, the test rejects the null hypothesis of O&G-2 and O&G-3 belonging to the same 
distribution at 900/0 level of significance under both DEA assumptions. 
13J One should be careful about the result as the number of fields (2) is relatively small to draw a 
comprehensive conclusion. 
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The results of the British oil & gas fields also support the hypothesis of higher efficiency 
in the periods of less state intervention. Under both CRS and VRS, during 1975 and 
1984, the efficiency of the fields are the least compare to the other periods. One could 
argue the possibility of technological improvement after 1985 and attribute the higher 
efficiency to that factor. Though the argument could be valid, one should notice that with 
the same argument the technological improvement after 1975 should have also have 
yielded the fields in 0&0-3 groups a higher efficiency than the 0&0-1 group, or even 
0&0-2 group for that matter, which was not the case. 
With regard to the scale of production the oil & gas fields have a slightly better situation 
than the oil fields. While 38.9% and 48.5% of the fields experience decreasing and 
increasing returns to scale, respectively, 13.6% of the fields have constant return to scale 
production technology. 77.8% of these fields belong to the 0&0-5 group whose 
production and development started after 1985. Despite more than three decades of 
petroleum activity the majority of the fields still fail to adjust the scale of production to 
the optimal level. However, one might argue that this phenomenon was due to the fact 
that the extraction cost increases as the fields age. 
With the assumption of constant returns to scale, seven fields are efficient. All seven 
fields started the development and production phases in the periods of less government 
intervention, with the 0&0-5 group accommodating six of these fields. Further, 47 fields 
enjoy efficiency of higher than 50%, about 91.5% of which belong to the groups 0&0-1 
and 0&0-5 periods. The period of 1975-84 has only two fields in this category. A 
number of 24 fields has efficiency of higher than 70% with the 0&0-1 and 0&0-5 
counting for 22 of them. 
Changing the assumption to variable returns to scale increases the number of efficient 
fields to 14. The latter two groups have 12 fields in this category. 55 and 39 fields are 
reported to have efficiency of higher than 50% and 70%, respectively. The 0&0-1 and 
0&0-5 groups, in aggregate, account for 87% and 82% of these, respectively. The fields 
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belonging to the period of state intervention, O&G-3, has two fields in each group, 
counting for 3.6% and 5.1 % of total, respectively. 
The general tendency of the results for oil & gas fields is quite similar to the results of oil 
fields in supporting the hypothesis of better efficiency when the state had no, or little, 
intervention in the procurement decision of the oil companies. In the next step of the 
analysis, the gas fields will be included in the study. Table 7-3 shows the results for the 
UK oil & gas fields. 
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Table 7-3: Results of DEA for the UK Oil & Gas Fields 
Field CRS 
1 1.000 
2 0.728 
3 0.472 
4 0.760 
5 0.479 
6 0.490 
7 0.359 
8 0.433 
9 0.374 
10 0.661 
11 0.231 
12 0.386 
13 0.240 
14 0.717 
15 0.621 
16 0.339 
17 0.682 
18 0.593 
19 0.517 
20 0.859 
21 0.499 
22 0.753 
23 0.506 
24 0.536 
25 0.724 
26 1.000 
27 0.849 
28 0.675 
29 0.437 
30 0.721 
31 0.357 
32 0.357 
VRS 
1.000 
0.729 
0.772 
1.000 
1.000 
0.830 
0.472 
0.443 
0.455 
0.856 
0.232 
0.464 
0.258 
0.942 
0.734 
0.347 
0.970 
0.598 
0.523 
0.864 
0.514 
0.918 
0.523 
0.544 
0.824 
1.000 
0.873 
0.717 
0.529 
0.764 
0.403 
0.370 
33 0.367 0.374 
Average 
Average O&G-1 
Average O&G-2 
Average O&G-3 
Average O&G-4 
Average O&G-5 
Scale 
1.000 
0.999 
0.611 
0.760 
0.479 
0.590 
0.761 
0.978 
0.822 
0.772 
0.999 
0.832 
0.930 
0.760 
0.847 
0.977 
0.703 
0.991 
0.989 
0.993 
0.971 
0.820 
0.969 
0.986 
0.879 
1.000 
0.973 
0.941 
0.825 
0.944 
0.885 
0.966 
r.t.S. 
irs 
drs 
drs 
drs 
drs 
drs 
drs 
drs 
drs 
drs 
drs 
drs 
drs 
drs 
drs 
drs 
irs 
irs 
irs 
drs 
drs 
irs 
drs 
irs 
drs 
irs 
irs 
irs 
irs 
0.981 irs 
CRS 
0.631 (0.0449) 
0.864 (0.0370) 
0.550 (0.0196) 
0.425 (0.0316) 
0.480 (0.0398) 
0.667 (0.0404) 
The numbers in brackets are variance. 
Field CRS 
34 0.637 
35 0.533 
36 0.469 
37 0.828 
38 1.000 
39 0.744 
40 0.876 
41 0.508 
42 1.000 
43 0.600 
44 1.000 
45 0.670 
46 1.000 
47 0.565 
48 0.692 
49 0.687 
50 0.813 
51 1.000 
52 0.586 
53 0.795 
54 0.693 
55 0.146 
56 0.656 
57 0.752 
58 0.988 
59 0.736 
60 0.512 
61 0.450 
62 0.524 
63 0.597 
64 0.548 
65 0.460 
66 0.856 
VRS 
0.732 (0.0481) 
0.865 (0.0367) 
0.901 (0.0138) 
0.515 (0.0654) 
0.541 (0.0749) 
0.755 (0.0386) 
VRS 
0.714 
0.535 
0.495 
0.828 
1.000 
0.813 
0.963 
0.528 
1.000 
0.633 
1.000 
0.680 
1.000 
0.573 
0.703 
0.688 
0.876 
1.000 
0.610 
0.857 
0.707 
1.000 
1.000 
0.848 
1.000 
0.913 
0.537 
0.685 
0.753 
0.810 
0.693 
1.000 
1.000 
Scale 
0.892 
0.996 
0.947 
1.000 
1.000 
0.916 
0.910 
0.962 
1.000 
0.948 
1.000 
0.985 
1.000 
0.986 
0.984 
0.999 
0.927 
1.000 
0.961 
0.928 
0.980 
0.146 
0.656 
0.887 
0.988 
0.805 
0.954 
0.658 
0.695 
0.738 
0.791 
0.460 
r.t.S. 
irs 
irs 
drs 
irs 
drs 
irs 
drs 
irs 
irs 
irs 
irs 
drs 
drs 
irs 
irs 
irs 
irs 
drs 
irs 
irs 
irs 
irs 
irs 
irs 
irs 
irs 
0.856 irs 
Scale 
0.877 (0.0258) 
1.000 (0.0000) 
0.610 (0.0134) 
0.857 (0.0097) 
0.912 (0.0085) 
0.895 (0.0250) 
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7 -1-3 All Fields in the UKCS 
A total of 184 fields, active and decommissioned, are studied in this part. Irrespective of 
the kind of output, the first five fields in Table 7-4 belong to UK-I, next 10 fields belong 
to UK-2, fields 16 to 32 belong to UK-3, fields 33 to 42 belong to UK-4, and the rest of 
the fields (142 fields) belong to UK-So 
The study on all fields in the UKCS clearly demonstrates the efficiency supremacy of the 
fields whose development and production started in the period of the state's low 
intervention policy, namely UK-1 and UK-S groups. In this regard, the pre-1974 period 
witnessed the lowest possible intervention from the government's side. The results show 
that the fields belonging to this group have a significant advantage over the other groups. 
The significance is proved to be at 99% level irrespective of the assumption about returns 
to scale. 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test also give the same results with regard to the different 
distribution of the UK-1 compared to the groups ofUK-2, UK-3, and UK-4. The level of 
significance varies between 97% and 99% depending on the returns to scale assumption 
used by DEA. 
The other period of reduced intervention was after the government dropped the 
requirement for "buy British" (post-198S). Relative to pre-1974, this period, however, 
witnessed more intervention as the companies were still required to expose their 
procurement documents, though they were not, officially, threatened with exclusion from 
licensing rounds if they failed to apply domestic goods and services. The results of the 
study rank the average efficiency of this group above those ofUK-2, UK-3, and UK-4, all 
of them involved in the period of intervention. The significance of the superiority is 
approved at 990/0 level, with either of the returns to scale assumption (also approved by 
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test). The only exception is with regard to comparing the 
average efficiencies of UK-2 and UK-S under the assumption of variable return to scale. 
In this case the significance of difference between the two average efficiency drops to 
92%. 
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The comparison of the average efficiencies of the other three groups, namely UK-2, UK-
3, and UK-4, does not reject the hypothesis of equality between them at 95% level of 
significance. 
The distribution of fields' efficiency is shown in Table 7-5. 
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Table 7-4: Results of DEA for All Fields in the UK 
Field CRS 
0.700 
2 1.000 
3 0.949 
4 0.970 
5 0.697 
6 0.214 
7 0.562 
8 0.185 
9 0.285 
10 0.154 
11 0.344 
12 0.340 
13 0.490 
14 0.333 
15 0.309 
16 0.363 
17 0.146 
18 0.155 
19 0.191 
20 0.266 
21 0.192 
22 0.097 
23 0.341 
24 0.671 
25 0.232 
26 0.285 
27 0.236 
28 0.434 
29 0.153 
30 0.270 
31 0.153 
32 0.476 
33 0.224 
34 0.211 
35 0.303 
36 0.125 
37 0.399 
38 0.315 
39 0.132 
40 0.366 
VRS 
0.852 
1.000 
0.966 
1.000 
0.699 
0.222 
1.000 
0.193 
0.286 
0.177 
0.421 
0.374 
0.508 
1.000 
0.352 
0.379 
0.148 
0.157 
0.191 
0.294 
0.213 
0.098 
0.346 
0.928 
0.254 
0.286 
0.249 
0.462 
0.154 
0.280 
0.156 
0.484 
0.227 
0.216 
0.334 
0.148 
0.440 
0.332 
0.133 
0.380 
Scale 
0.821 
1.000 
0.982 
0.970 
0.998 
0.962 
0.562 
0.960 
0.997 
0.871 
0.818 
0.911 
0.964 
0.333 
0.879 
0.958 
0.987 
0.987 
0.997 
0.905 
0.904 
0.986 
0.988 
0.723 
0.916 
0.996 
0.950 
0.938 
0.995 
0.966 
0.981 
0.982 
0.987 
0.980 
0.907 
0.843 
0.906 
0.949 
0.998 
0.964 
r.ts .. 
drs 
drs 
drs 
drs 
drs 
drs 
drs 
drs 
drs 
drs 
drs 
drs 
drs 
drs 
drs 
drs 
drs 
irs 
drs 
drs 
irs 
irs 
drs 
drs 
drs 
drs 
drs 
drs 
drs 
drs 
drs 
drs 
drs 
drs 
irs 
drs 
drs 
drs 
Field CRS 
41 0.461 
42 0.222 
43 0.347 
44 0.452 
45 0.424 
46 0.479 
47 0.090 
48 0.199 
49 0.310 
50 0.451 
51 0.174 
52 0.080 
53 0.304 
54 0.337 
55 0.316 
56 0.495 
57 0.293 
58 0.441 
59 0.384 
60 0.328 
61 0.494 
62 0.631 
63 0.691 
64 0.496 
65 0.203 
66 0.632 
67 0.462 
68 0.503 
69 0.432 
70 0.561 
71 0.370 
72 0.377 
73 1.000 
74 0.992 
75 0.694 
76 0.651 
77 0.485 
78 0.216 
79 0.394 
80 0.081 
VRS 
0.530 
0.225 
0.352 
0.508 
0.424 
0.581 
0.096 
0.201 
0.327 
0.459 
0.185 
0.383 
0.321 
0.339 
0.328 
0.495 
0.327 
0.460 
0.471 
0.342 
0.496 
0.635 
0.697 
0.571 
0.613 
0.641 
0.469 
0.545 
0.443 
0.575 
0.372 
0.435 
1.000 
1.000 
0.698 
0.657 
0.493 
0.767 
0.449 
0.102 
Scale 
0.871 
0.984 
0.987 
0.890 
1.000 
0.824 
0.933 
0.989 
0.948 
0.984 
0.940 
0.210 
0.948 
0.994 
0.964 
1.000 
0.896 
0.959 
0.816 
0.960 
0.996 
0.992 
0.992 
0.868 
0.330 
0.986 
0.985 
0.923 
0.975 
0.977 
0.996 
0.866 
1.000 
0.992 
0.995 
0.991 
0.984 
0.282 
0.877 
0.794 
r.ts .. 
drs 
drs 
drs 
drs 
Drs 
Irs 
Drs 
Irs 
drs 
Irs 
Irs 
Irs 
Irs 
drs 
Irs 
Irs 
Irs 
Irs 
Irs 
drs 
Irs 
Drs 
Irs 
Irs 
drs 
Irs 
drs 
drs 
drs 
Irs 
irs 
drs 
drs 
irs 
irs 
irs 
irs 
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Table 7-4: Results of DEA for All Fields in the UK (continued) 
Field eRS 
81 0.080 
82 0.422 
83 0.275 
84 0.314 
85 0.571 
86 0.257 
87 0.578 
88 0.613 
89 0.130 
90 0.592 
91 0.689 
92 0.377 
93 0.458 
94 0.218 
95 0.600 
96 0.546 
97 0.589 
98 0.441 
99 0.435 
100 0.393 
101 0.581 
102 0.416 
103 0.702 
104 0.251 
105 0.367 
106 0.580 
107 0.367 
108 0.940 
109 0.511 
110 0.480 
111 0.664 
112 0.505 
113 0.443 
114 0.761 
115 0.516 
116 0.528 
117 0.588 
118 0.689 
119 0.978 
120 0.374 
VRS 
0.083 
0.584 
0.279 
0.318 
0.577 
0.272 
0.773 
0.618 
0.277 
0.675 
0.788 
0.493 
0.551 
0.218 
0.688 
0.550 
0.602 
0.446 
0.443 
0.411 
0.588 
0.423 
0.733 
0.256 
0.382 
0.582 
0.374 
1.000 
0.514 
0.594 
0.750 
0.512 
0.474 
0.773 
0.518 
0.551 
0.597 
0.711 
0.988 
0.442 
Scale 
0.966 
0.722 
0.988 
0.990 
0.988 
0.944 
0.747 
0.992 
0.470 
0.877 
0.875 
0.764 
0.831 
0.999 
0.872 
0.993 
0.979 
0.989 
0.981 
0.957 
0.988 
0.985 
0.959 
0.980 
0.961 
0.996 
0.979 
0.940 
0.994 
0.809 
0.885 
0.988 
0.933 
0.984 
0.997 
0.958 
0.985 
0.970 
0.991 
0.846 
r.ts .. 
irs 
irs 
irs 
irs 
irs 
irs 
irs 
irs 
irs 
irs 
irs 
irs 
drs 
drs 
drs 
irs 
drs 
irs 
irs 
irs 
drs 
drs 
irs 
irs 
irs 
irs 
drs 
Irs 
Irs 
Irs 
drs 
Irs 
drs 
Irs 
irs 
irs 
irs 
irs 
irs 
Field eRS 
121 0.474 
122 0.305 
123 0.177 
124 0.597 
125 0.312 
126 0.901 
127 0.554 
128 0.417 
129 0.957 
130 0.519 
131 0.758 
132 0.270 
133 0.670 
134 0.533 
135 0.609 
136 0.405 
137 0.336 
138 0.555 
139 0.443 
140 0.519 
141 0.439 
142 0.378 
143 0.500 
144 0.659 
145 0.607 
146 0.449 
147 0.299 
148 0.489 
149 0.258 
150 0.309 
151 0.249 
152 0.543 
153 0.363 
154 0.380 
155 0.595 
156 1.000 
157 0.710 
158 0.651 
159 0.323 
160 0.747 
VRS 
0.511 
0.412 
0.188 
0.600 
0.962 
1.000 
0.600 
1.000 
0.974 
0.907 
0.943 
0.956 
0.823 
0.663 
0.750 
0.405 
0.336 
0.572 
0.444 
0.604 
0.439 
0.393 
0.519 
0.659 
0.629 
0.452 
0.307 
0.507 
0.291 
0.314 
0.249 
0.556 
0.363 
0.391 
0.603 
1.000 
0.727 
0.675 
0.330 
0.762 
Scale 
0.928 
0.739 
0.940 
0.997 
0.324 
0.901 
0.922 
0.417 
0.982 
0.572 
0.804 
0.282 
0.814 
0.805 
0.812 
0.998 
0.999 
0.970 
0.997 
0.859 
1.000 
0.961 
0.962 
1.000 
0.965 
0.993 
0.975 
0.966 
0.888 
0.983 
0.998 
0.977 
1.000 
0.971 
0.986 
1.000 
0.976 
0.966 
0.980 
0.980 
r.ts.. 
irs 
irs 
irs 
drs 
irs 
irs 
irs 
irs 
irs 
irs 
irs 
irs 
irs 
irs 
drs 
irs 
drs 
irs 
drs 
drs 
drs 
drs 
drs 
irs 
drs 
irs 
drs 
drs 
irs 
drs 
drs 
irs 
drs 
drs 
drs 
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Table 7-4: Results of DEA for All Fields in the UK (continued) 
Field CRS VRS Scale r.t.s.. Field CRS VRS Scale r.t.s.. 
161 0.565 0.605 0.935 drs 173 0.083 1.000 0.083 irs 
162 1.000 1.000 1.000 174 0.424 0.597 0.710 irs 
163 0.480 0.488 0.984 irs 175 0.611 0.641 0.954 drs 
164 0.636 0.668 0.952 drs 176 0.713 0.774 0.922 irs 
165 0.460 0.474 0.969 irs 177 0.486 0.514 0.945 irs 
166 0.566 0.578 0.980 irs 178 0.403 0.409 0.986 irs 
167 0.448 0.462 0.971 drs 179 0.378 0.445 0.848 irs 
168 0.673 0.710 0.948 drs 180 0.290 0.399 0.727 irs 
169 1.000 1.000 1.000 181 0.421 0.435 0.967 irs 
170 0.512 0.522 0.981 drs 182 0.374 0.396 0.945 irs 
171 0.561 0.608 0.923 irs 183 0.304 0.908 0.334 irs 
172 0.483 0.484 0.999 184 0.718 0.807 0.890 irs 
CRS VRS Scale 
Average 0.456 (0.0457) 0.519(0.0572) 0.903 (0.0269) 
Average UK-1 0.863 (0.0229) 0.903 (0.0167) 0.954 (0.0056) 
Average UK-2 0.322 (0.0163) 0.453 (0.0937) 0.826 (0.0455) 
Average UK-3 0.274 (0.0215) 0.299 (0.0383) 0.951 (0.0044) 
Average UK-4 0.276 (0.0125) 0.297 (0.0166) 0.939 (0.0029) 
Average UK-5 0.485 (0.0401) 0.552 (0.0463) 0.899 (0.0303) 
The numbers in brackets are variance. 
Table 7-5: The distribution of fields according to the efficiency and group 
CRS 0.000-0.099 0.100-0.199 0.200-0.299 0.300-0.399 0.400-0.499 0.500-0.599 0.600-0.699 0.700-0.799 0.800-0.899 0.900-1.000 
UK-1 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 20.00% 20.00% 0.00% 60.00% 
UK-2 0.00% 20.00% 20.00% 40.00% 10.00% 10.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
UK-3 5.88% 35.29% 29.41% 11.76% 11.76% 0.00% 5.88% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
UK-4 0.00% 20.00% 30.00% 40.00% 10.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
UK-5 3.52% 2.82% 8.45% 19.01% 23.24% 19.01% 12.68% 4.93% 0.00% 6.34% 
VRS 0.000-0.099 0.100-0.199 0.200-0.299 0.300-0.399 0.400-0.499 0.500-0.599 0.600-0.699 0.700-0.799 0.800-0.899 0.900-1.000 
UK-1 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 20.00% 0.00% 20.00% 60.00% 
UK-2 0.00% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% 10.00% 10.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 20.00% 
UK-3 5.88% 29.41% 35.29% 11.76% 11.76% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 5.88% 
UK-4 0.00% 20.00% 30.00% 30.00% 10.00% 10.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
UK-5 1.41% 2.11% 5.63% 14.79% 21.13% 18.31% 15.49% 8.45% 1.41% 11.27% 
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7-1-4 Efficiency Measurement on Annual Basis 
The annual activity of the fields in the United Kingdom Continental Shelf generates 1432 
DMUs. For the same technical and geological reasons as the Norwegian case (see 6-1-3) 
the DEA approach is now based on one composite output (aggregate production in oil 
equivalent) and two inputs (fixed and variable costs). 
The results support the findings of the British oil and oil & gas fields. Presented in Table 
7-6, the results, with both constant and variable returns to scale, pinpoint the pre-1975 
fields (UK-1 group) as the most efficient fields. The next most efficient group is the UK-
5 group, the post-1985 fields. The statistical test rejects the hypothesis of equality 
between the average efficiencies of each pair of groups at 99% level of significance, in all 
cases. Thus, irrespective of the returns to scale assumption the relative efficiencies are: 
UK-I> Uk-5 > UK-2 > UK- 4 > UK-3. The same conclusion could be made based on the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, with the exception that the significance of the difference 
between UK-3 and UK-4 drops to 96% and 86% under CRS and VRS, respectively. In all 
other cases the null hypothesis of equality is rejected at 99% level of significance. 
The interesting feature of the results is that the pre-1975 fields, which are the oldest fields 
and should have suffered extensively from increasing costs and lower production, are by 
far the most efficient fields. The issue of technological changes during the years after the 
development of these fields adds to the surprise, for the other fields had the opportunity 
to benefit from advanced technology to improve their efficiency. The fact that these fields 
were developed in the time when the government had almost no intervention in the 
companies' procurement policy may justify the efficiency of these fields (i.e. low cost and 
appropriate technology). 
This reason sounds more logical once the efficiency of other groups in taken into 
account. Second in the efficiency ranking comes the UK-5 group whose development and 
production started after the changes with regard to the "buy British" policy. The third and 
fourth in the efficiency ranking are the UK-2 fields and UK-4. While the development of 
the UK-2 fields began in the period of no intervention, the production of the UK-4 fields 
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began in the period of low government intervention. The result is that the more the fields 
distance themselves from the period of government intervention, the more efficient they 
become. 
The efficiency trend of each group over the years of production is shown in Figures 7-1 
and 7-2. Though the efficiency scores of the CRS and VRS are slightly different (as they 
should be, for the reasons explained in Chapter 4), the trend of change over years are very 
much similar. With respect to group UK -1, the efficiency scores have steady 
improvement (except 1974) until 1978 and then begin to decrease, which continues until 
1996. The drop in the efficiency could be attributed to two factors. The first is geological 
factors, explained earlier, that force extra costs to maintain the same level of production. 
The second factor could be the introduction of the government's new policy in 1975 with 
respect to the requirement of the application of domestic goods and services. The 
geological factor is hardly the case because it should first hit the oldest fields in this 
group, namely West Sole and Leman whose production began in 1968 and 1969, 
respectively. The efficiency of these two fields until 1979 did not decrease. The other 
fields in this group were too young to be affected by the geological factors at that stage 
(1977-78). The later decrease in the efficiency of these fields, however, is more difficult 
to detect unless one has access to precise data about the geological characteristics of the 
fields, technological changes, and the amount of domestic and alternative goods and 
services applied in these fields. 
The group UK-2 whose development started in pre-1975 era but came on stream after the 
policy change of 1975, have an early efficiency increase and then maintain their 
efficiency unti11988, when we see a sudden jump in the average efficiency. The increase 
is merely due to the sudden (reported) efficiency improvement of one field (Piper) in 
1988. The reason for the sharp reported efficiency increase in this field is ironically the 
accident that occurred in this field and practically put the field out of production for 
almost five years. The accident caused the shutdown of the field and reduced the 
production level and the production cost (the cost of rebuilding the field is not included in 
this study since it was an extraordinary situation). The reduction in input and output 
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scaled down the field's activity and made it one of the fields with the lowest scale of 
production. DEA usually recognizes these kinds (and the opposite, when they have 
extraordinary high production) of DMU as efficient. 
The rest of the fields in three other groups share the same trend as they have an early 
efficiency raise and then stay, more or less, the same throughout the years of production. 
The early efficiency raise could be due to the new, efficient fields joining the group and! 
or the completion of the construction phases, which sometimes happens after the fields 
come on stream. 
The results of annual performance of the shelf shows, like the Norwegian case, a high 
negative correlation between the efficiency results and the share of domestic goods and 
services from the procurement made in the construction phase of fields' activity. The 
results shows more than 90% (in both DEA approaches) negative correlation between the 
efficiency of the NCS between 1974 and 1991, and the share of British goods and 
services in that period 134. Figures 7-3 and 7-4 illustrate this graphically. Note that in the 
figures, the inefficiency measures have been enlarged ten times in order to have a better 
view of the movement of the two factors. 
The DEA results in the last 3 sections appear to convey the same message. The results 
show significant efficiency differences between the fields based on the timing of their 
construction and production start. The more the fields been affected by the regulatory 
tightness, the less their efficiency has become. In the next chapter the results of DEA is 
being compared to those of Stochastic Frontier Analysis to see whether a different 
approach changes the conclusion. 
Table 7-6: Results of DEA for the UK Fields on Annual Basis 
CRS 
VRS 
UK-l 
0.429 
0.461 
UK-2 
0.151 
0.200 
UK-3 
0.126 
0.142 
UK-4 
0.135 
0.154 
UK-5 
0.233 
0.276 
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Figure 7-1 
The UK: Efficiency Trend by Group of Fields 
CRS-OEA 
1.000 ,---------------__________ --.. 
0.900 r-------------------------1 
0.800 r-------------------------1 
0.700 t----:;,o;:--~!!I!::lII~'w;;;::;;o;;:;;j_----------------I 
0.1:00 r--1~-'W'------__\::___--------------1 
0.600 r----t- --------::!II!I~---_::_:_:_---------1 
0 .400 ~--:~---------~~ ......... <A_---------1 
0.300 t-..... --------------.;w--;:;J.~._~r_=_-------I 
0.200 t=====:~~~~~~~~~~~r!~:SI~!!~ 0.100 +-------.~-
o .000 +-r-T-,---r-.---r-T-,--.-.,......,r--r_,__,_~r--r_,__,_~__r_r_...,..._r_T_,___r__r__,......,..-1 
.... rf>'O .... "''\<::> ,l" .... ~'" .... "''\'0 ~'O .... ~<::> .... "''0", .... i' #'0 .... ~'O #'<::> .... rf>", #'''' .... rf>'o .... rf>'O 
Year 
Figure 7-2 
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134 There is no complete data concerning the share of British goods and services before 1974. Since the 
abolishment of OSO in 1992, there is no official data for the post -1992 period in this regard 
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7-2 Stochastic Frontier Analysis Approach 
As discussed in 6-2, the program Frontier is used to estimate the efficiency of the fields 
in the United Kingdom Continental Shelf applying the parametric approach of SF A. The 
program is based on Battese and Coelli (1992), described in 6-2. 
As in the Norwegian case, the model can be expressed as: 
Log (output) = flo + flllog(fixedcost)+ P2log(variablecost)+(V-U). 
Like the DEA study, this section will also deal with the fields in the UKCS in three 
separate cases: oil fields, oil & gas fields, and aggregate fields in the shelf. 
7-2-1 Oil Fields 
In the same manner as the DEA approach in the previous sections, 67 oil fields, active 
and decommissioned in the United Kingdom Continental Shelf are under study with the 
SFA approach. The results of the SFA study on 67 British oil fields are given in Table 7-
7. 
The results of the parametric SF A approach are quite similar to those of DEA found in 7-
1-1. As far as the average relative efficiencies of the four categories are concerned, the 
fields whose development and production started in the post-1985 period (UK-5), when 
the state had already dropped the requirement to "buy British", have the highest average 
efficiency. The superiority of these fields' average efficiency over the two groups of UK-
3 and UK-4 is significant at 98% and 99% level, respectively. However, the same 
significance level cannot be established when comparing the UK-5 and UK-2. The latter's 
development began when the government made no intervention in the procurement 
decisions of the oil companies. The insignificance of the differences between the average 
efficiencies also includes the UK-2 and UK-3, UK-2 and UK-4, and UK-3 and UK-4. 
The results of SFA are highly correlated with both CRS-DEA and VRS-DEA. The 
statistical test points out 730/0 correlation between SFA and CRS-DEA and 87% between 
SFA and VRS-DEA. The movements of the SFA results against the two DEA approaches 
are depicted in figures 7-5 and 7-6. 
~16 
Despite the above high correlation between the DEA and SF A, the average efficiency of 
the two approaches, under both CRS and VRS, are significantly different (at 99% leyel). 
As mentioned in 6-2, the difference between the results of the two approaches is 
predictable as they are based on different assumptions. 
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Table 7-7: Results of SFA for the UK Oil Fields 
Field Efficiency Field Efficiency Field 
0.823 23 0.699 46 
2 0.962 24 0.815 47 
3 0.764 25 0.909 48 
4 0.910 26 0.685 49 
5 0.718 27 0.829 50 
6 0.921 28 0.832 51 
7 0.732 29 0.901 52 
8 0.762 30 0.871 53 
9 0.804 31 0.933 54 
10 0.870 32 0.771 55 
11 0.806 33 0.850 56 
12 0.578 34 0.822 57 
13 0.781 35 0.844 58 
14 0.820 36 0.910 59 
15 0.714 37 0.933 60 
16 0.848 38 0.945 61 
17 0.610 39 0.903 62 
18 0.888 40 0.932 63 
19 0.911 41 0.909 64 
20 0.928 42 0.849 65 
21 0.914 43 0.881 66 
22 0.596 44 0.880 67 
45 0.906 
Average 0.839 
Oil-2 0.835 
Oil-3 0.782 
Oil-4 0.748 
Oil-5 0.856 
Summary Statistics for 67 UK Oil Fields 
Coefficient Standard t-ratio 
Error 
Constant -0.816 0.0766 -10.648 
Fixed Cost 0.350 0.0864 4.049 
Variable Cost 0.456 0.0849 5.375 
r 0.790 
(J"2 0.047 
Efficiency 
0.889 
0.819 
0.929 
0.906 
0.930 
0.918 
0.875 
0.945 
0.826 
0.633 
0.522 
0.920 
0.775 
0.815 
0.878 
0.816 
0.931 
0.907 
0.851 
0.893 
0.884 
0.891 
Significance 
at 95% 
yes 
yes 
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7-2-2 Oil & Gas Fields 
The results of SFA conducted on 66 British oil & gas fields are shown in Table 7-8. 
According to the statistical tests of the results both fixed and variable costs have 
significant role in determining the efficiency of each oil & gas field. 
The results are quite consistent with the findings in 7-1-2, the DEA approach. According 
to the SF A results, the O&G-1 group has the highest (numerical) average efficiency, 
which is significantly higher than the groups O&G-2 and O&G-3. The low number of 
fields in both the O&G-1 and O&G-4 groups may have affected the statistical test, 
leading to inconclusive test results between the average efficiency of these two groups. 
The O&G-5, whose development and production started after 1985, is significantly (at 
99% level of significance) more efficient than the O&G-3 group. The latter fields were 
developed and brought on stream during the period of heavy government intervention in 
the industry. The significance of the superior efficiency of the O&G-5 group over the 
O&G-2 and O&G-4 groups, however, cannot be established at the 95% level. The latter 
groups were involved in both periods, as their development started in one period, but 
came on stream in the other. 
The results also show a high level of correlation between SF A and DEA, particularly 
when using constant returns to scale approach of DEA. While SFA and VRS-DEA have 
53% correlation, the level rises to over 83% when SFA is tested against CRS-DEA. 
The comparative movements of the efficiency reported by SF A and DEA are depicted in 
figures 7-7 and 7-8. Note that SFA differentiates between noise and inefficiency, while 
DEA regards every deviation from the best practice as inefficiency. In other words, one 
should usually expect higher efficiency reported by SF A when the (positive) noise are 
taken away from the inefficiency. 
The SF A results pave the same path as DEA in recognizing the superior efficiency of 
periods when (1) the government made no intervention in the procurement policy of the 
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companIes, (2) the government intervention was at its minimum (post-1985), and (3) 
either construction cost or production cost had not incurred in the period of 1975-84, 
when government intervention was at its highest. 
Table 7-8: Results of SFA for the UK Oil & Gas Fields 
Field Efficiency Field Efficiency Field Efficiency 
1 0.966 23 0.910 45 0.899 
2 0.952 24 0.903 46 0.953 
3 0.863 25 0.930 47 0.902 
4 0.929 26 0.948 48 0.903 
5 0.882 27 0.946 49 0.919 
6 0.868 28 0.917 50 0.914 
7 0.796 29 0.848 51 0.913 
8 0.838 30 0.931 52 0.857 
9 0.797 31 0.787 53 0.905 
10 0.916 32 0.790 54 0.919 
11 0.671 33 0.794 55 0.549 
12 0.831 34 0.917 56 0.911 
13 0.678 35 0.880 57 0.877 
14 0.925 36 0.863 58 0.942 
15 0.924 37 0.941 59 0.915 
16 0.773 38 0.946 60 0.891 
17 0.859 39 0.926 61 0.837 
18 0.896 40 0.950 62 0.857 
19 0.865 41 0.870 63 0.909 
20 0.940 42 0.943 64 0.879 
21 0.900 43 0.905 65 0.816 
22 0.936 44 0.958 66 0.947 
Average 0.882 
O&G-1 0.959 
O&G-2 0.885 
O&G-3 0.807 
O&G-4 0.849 
O&G-5 0.892 
Summary Statistics for 66 UK Oil & Gas Fields 
Coefficient Standard t-ratio Significance 
Error at 95% 
Constant -1.093 0.064 -17.178 
Fixed Cost 0.189 0.075 2.500 yes 
Variable Cost 0.785 0.075 10.488 yes 
r 0.770 
(J2 0.032 
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Figure 7-7 
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7-2-3 All Fields in the UKCS 
The results from the British oil fields and oil & gas fields indicate the higher average 
efficiency for the fields that were developed and came on stream in the period of minimal 
state intervention in the procurement policy of the companies operating the fields. The 
above analysis, however, did not include the British gas fields as the majority of the 
fields belong to the post-1985 period. The low number of fields in other categories would 
not allow conclusive results to be reached. The inclusion of gas fields can be achieved 
however by allowing all the fields to undergo similar study together. To that end, the 
productions of different fields are converted to oil equivalent unit. 
Table 7-9 summarizes the results of the SFA efficiency measurement. The categorization 
of the fields in the table is as follows: 
• Fields 1-5: Group UK-I, whose development and production began before 1974. 
• Fields 6-15: Group UK-2, whose development started before 1974, but came on 
stream after 1975. 
• Fields 16-32: Group UK-3, whose development and production started between 1975 
and 1984. 
• Fields 33-42: Group UK-4, whose development started between 1975 and 1984, but 
came on stream after 1985. 
• Fields 43-184: Group UK-5, whose development and production started after 1985. 
The results indicate clear efficiency superiority for the periods of "no" and "limited" 
intervention. The average efficiency of the most efficient group, UK-I, is significantly (at 
99% level of significance) higher than the rest of the fields. This result is quite similar to 
the findings of DE A in 7-1-3. 
The second most efficient group, according to the SF A results, is UK-5, another group 
whose development and production began in the period of limited state intervention. The 
supremacy of the average efficiency of this group over UK-3 and UK-4 group is 
statistically significant (at 99%). The significance reduces to 910/0, however. when 
comparing UK-5 with UK-2. The latter group was developed in the pre-1974 era. The 
differences between the average efficiency of the other groups (UK-2, UK-3, and UK-4), 
when comparing two at a time, are not statistically significant. 
The results of SF A are highly correlated with the findings of DEA. While the level of 
correlation between VRS-DEA and SF A is more than 62%, the latter has a correlation 
level of more than 82% with the constant returns to scale assumption of DEA. The 
efficiency measurements of the two approaches are depicted in Figures 7-9 and 7-10. 
The results of DEA and SFA consistently pinpoint the most efficient fields as those 
whose development and production started when the state had no or little intervention in 
the companies' decision-making processes with regard to the application of various goods 
and services. The Group-5 fields (either oil, oil & gas, or aggregate UK fields) whose 
development and production started after 1985 is one of these groups. As in the 
Norwegian case, the problem with attributing the efficiency of this group merely to the 
regulatory change of 1985 is that neither DEA nor SF A identifies the reason for the 
higher efficiency in terms of technical change, scale efficiency change, etc. Though the 
results clearly show the supremacy of this group over the fields whose production or 
development or both started in the period of state intervention, one can challenge the 
results by attributing the efficiency differences to likely technological changes over time. 
DEA and SF A, per se, cannot dispute this. 
The other group of more efficient fields is Group-l (in all three studies of oil, oil & gas 
and aggregate fields), whose development and production started pre-1974. The fact that 
both DEA and SFA identify these fields as the most efficient fields to some extent 
remedies the above problem. If mere technological change was the significant reason for 
post-1985 fields' efficiency, the pre-1974 fields should have suffered the most as they are 
the oldest fields in the shelf and developed with least advanced technology (relative to 
other fields). This, together with the fact that the age of these fields has a significant 
counter-effect on the efficiency of these fields (the older the field the higher the average 
224 
cost of production), should decrease the relative efficiency of this group. Nevertheless, 
Group-l is the most efficient group. 
Despite the above argument, the study tries to distinguish between the varIOUS 
components of efficiency change, using the Malmquist Index approach. However, before 
giving the results of the decomposition, Banker et al.'s procedure is applied to consider 
other causes of inefficiency in the UKCS, apart from development and production costs. 
Table 7-9: Results of SFA for All Fields in the UK 
Field Efficiency 
0.926 
2 0.962 
3 0.960 
4 0.962 
5 0.945 
6 0.701 
7 0.934 
8 0.644 
9 0.817 
10 0.578 
11 0.853 
12 0.852 
13 0.917 
14 0.868 
15 0.839 
16 0.862 
17 0.615 
18 0.635 
19 0.684 
20 0.782 
21 0.692 
22 0.511 
23 0.702 
24 0.896 
25 0.757 
26 0.811 
27 0.758 
28 0.897 
29 0.631 
30 0.802 
31 0.629 
32 0.913 
Field Efficiency 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
0.825 
0.582 
0.849 
0.902 
0.724 
0.840 
0.860 
0.890 
0.859 
0.481 
0.673 
0.785 
0.888 
0.621 
0.447 
0.770 
0.844 
0.820 
0.910 
0.741 
0.813 
0.798 
0.814 
0.900 
0.928 
0.938 
0.856 
0.647 
0.922 
0.787 
0.878 
0.875 
Field Efficiency 
75 0.934 
76 0.927 
77 0.887 
78 0.665 
79 0.847 
80 0.460 
81 0.462 
82 0.853 
83 0.758 
84 0.798 
85 0.908 
86 0.727 
87 0.904 
88 0.919 
89 0.545 
90 0.909 
91 0.865 
92 0.830 
93 0.899 
94 0.736 
95 0.905 
96 0.918 
97 0.922 
98 0.889 
99 0.880 
100 0.858 
101 0.911 
102 0.865 
103 0.937 
104 0.728 
105 0.846 
106 0.919 
Field Efficiency Field Efficiency 
112 0.900 149 0.740 
113 0.849 150 0.773 
114 0.939 151 0.735 
115 0.898 152 0.902 
116 0.907 153 0.853 
117 0.914 154 0.846 
118 0.921 155 0.925 
119 0.952 156 0.942 
120 0.831 157 0.918 
121 0.881 158 0.933 
122 0.763 159 0.807 
123 0.631 160 0.936 
124 0.916 161 0.897 
125 0.764 162 0.953 
126 0.944 163 0.882 
127 0.907 164 0.931 
128 0.838 165 0.882 
129 0.950 166 0.892 
130 0.887 167 0.884 
131 0.921 168 0.909 
132 0.720 169 0.919 
133 0.919 170 0.854 
134 0.898 171 0.891 
135 0.866 172 0.890 
136 0.879 173 0.461 
137 0.835 174 0.854 
138 0.913 175 0.877 
139 0.883 176 0.930 
140 0.916 177 0.879 
141 0.896 178 0.856 
142 0.858 179 0.810 
143 0.908 180 0.753 
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Table 7-9: Results of SFA for All Fields in the UK (continued) 
Field Efficiency Field Efficiency Field Efficiency Field Efficiency Field Efficiency 
33 0.726 70 0.879 107 0.828 144 0.940 181 0.856 
34 0.693 71 0.852 108 0.957 145 0.925 182 0.823 
35 0.753 72 0.817 109 0.905 146 0.900 183 0.757 
36 0.556 73 0.956 110 0.882 147 0.773 184 0.931 
37 0.881 74 0.904 111 0.879 148 0.897 
Average 0.832 
UK-1 0.951 
UK-2 0.800 
UK-3 0.740 
UK-4 0.749 
UK-5 0.846 
Summary Statistics for All UK Fields 
Coefficient Standard t-ratio Significance 
Error at 95% 
Constant -1.084 0.045 -24.041 
Fixed Cost 0.262 0.058 4.514 yes 
Variable Cost 0.695 0.057 12.164 yes 
r 0.840 
(J"2 0.051 
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7-3 The Relative Significance of Fixed and Variable Costs 
As we have seen in 6.l.3, the Data Envelopment Analysis measures the relative 
efficiency of the units in question using the input and output data of the units in question. 
We saw that the units could be ranked according to the efficiency score, but the results do 
not say much about the importance of each input or output in measuring the efficiency. 
That is, in an input oriented analysis, for instance, the role of each input in producing a 
particular efficiency score for the units in question is not obvious. 
In case of the North Sea offshore industry the role of each input variable could be of 
significant importance. This is because many of the fields were subject to various state 
policies with regard to the procurement of goods and services. For instance, the fields 
whose development started before 1974, practically run through 3 distinct periods. The 
construction of the fields began when there was no government control over the 
procurement process of the oil companies. Hence the most of the development cost 
(referred to as fixed-cost in this study) was incurred in that era. The production cost of 
these fields, however, was incurred during pre-1974 period, between 1975 and 1984, and 
after 1985 if the fields were active after 1985. If a test reveals that the production 
(variable) cost plays an insignificant role in constructing the efficiency ranking of the 
fields, any change in the fields' efficiency over the periods will be attributed to the fixed 
cost only. Since these costs mainly occur in one period, this would make life easier for 
the analyst to interpret the results. 
We use the same procedure as in 6.l.3 to evaluate the importance of each variable (fixed 
and variable costs) in the study of the fields active in the UKCS. 
The results of the study for three categories of fields (oil fields, oil & gas fields, and all 
British fields) are given in Tables 7-10 to 7-11. In all cases both fixed and variable costs 
are highly significant (at 99% level of significance). 
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Table 7-10: Relative Significant of Fixed and Variable Costs: The UK Oil Fields 
Efficiency with 
Both Variables 
Field CRS VRS 
0.31 0.38 
2 0.79 1.00 
3 0.27 0.30 
4 0.41 0.51 
5 0.21 0.28 
6 0.48 0.67 
7 0.19 0.26 
8 0.21 0.28 
9 0.28 0.31 
10 0.33 0.55 
11 0.23 0.40 
12 0.14 0.14 
13 0.41 0.58 
14 0.30 0.39 
15 0.24 0.33 
16 0.42 0.52 
17 0.18 0.21 
18 0.46 0.60 
19 0.64 0.82 
20 0.61 0.72 
21 0.65 0.96 
22 0.10 0.14 
23 0.23 0.29 
24 0.45 0.46 
25 0.58 0.78 
26 0.25 0.26 
27 0.08 0.55 
28 0.37 0.45 
29 0.49 0.55 
30 0.37 0.67 
31 0.72 0.81 
32 0.42 0.44 
33 0.59 0.65 
Efficiency with 
Fixed Cost Only 
CRS VRS 
0.14 0.38 
0.29 1.00 
0.13 0.30 
0.16 0.51 
0.11 0.28 
0.16 0.52 
0.06 0.17 
0.07 0.20 
0.12 0.31 
0.09 0.29 
0.07 0.20 
0.05 0.10 
0.31 0.58 
0.10 0.25 
0.06 0.12 
0.22 0.52 
0.07 0.08 
0.15 0.38 
0.32 0.82 
0.24 0.72 
0.36 0.96 
0.03 0.05 
0.06 0.12 
0.19 0.37 
0.18 0.44 
0.11 0.21 
0.01 0.10 
0.10 0.17 
0.20 0.55 
0.10 0.26 
0.28 0.79 
0.20 0.30 
0.34 0.65 
Efficiency with 
Variable Cost 
CRS VRS 
0.09 0.27 
0.31 1.00 
0.07 0.20 
0.15 0.49 
0.05 0.14 
0.21 0.67 
0.09 0.26 
0.09 0.28 
0.09 0.27 
0.18 0.55 
0.13 0.40 
0.05 0.11 
0.07 0.13 
0.13 0.39 
0.16 0.33 
0.10 0.27 
0.06 0.07 
0.21 0.60 
0.15 0.44 
0.23 0.70 
0.14 0.41 
0.07 0.12 
0.14 0.29 
0.14 0.29 
0.28 0.78 
0.07 0.15 
0.08 0.55 
0.21 0.32 
0.18 0.52 
0.23 0.67 
0.26 0.80 
0.11 0.18 
0.12 0.24 
Efficiency with 
Both Variables 
Field CRS VRS 
34 0.545 0.595 
35 0.475 0.487 
36 0.698 0.716 
37 0.846 1.000 
38 1.000 1.000 
39 0.669 0.905 
40 0.234 1.000 
41 0.854 0.868 
42 0.545 0.853 
43 0.726 0.748 
44 0.507 0.736 
45 0.765 0.958 
46 0.508 0.579 
47 0.547 0.587 
48 1.000 1.000 
49 1.000 1.000 
50 0.908 1.000 
51 0.811 0.953 
52 0.652 0.666 
53 0.313 1.000 
54 0.571 0.636 
55 0.113 0.161 
56 0.095 0.101 
57 0.463 0.869 
58 0.366 0.370 
59 0.426 0.428 
60 0.674 0.682 
61 0.291 0.399 
62 0.837 1.000 
63 0.803 0.804 
64 0.155 0.468 
65 0.857 0.931 
66 0.804 0.832 
67 0.546 0.654 
Efficiency with 
Fixed Cost Only 
CRS VRS 
0.267 0.304 
0.196 0.410 
0.255 0.582 
0.281 0.672 
0.412 1.000 
0.382 0.905 
0.063 0.374 
0.288 0.518 
0.420 0.853 
0.335 0.589 
0.139 0.313 
0.426 0.958 
0.176 0.422 
0.245 0.303 
0.232 0.239 
1.000 1.000 
0.289 0.648 
0.240 0.512 
0.218 0.373 
0.129 0.807 
0.220 0.241 
0.041 0.088 
0.026 0.033 
0.118 0.277 
0.120 0.216 
0.144 0.279 
0.186 0.250 
0.076 0.135 
0.352 0.621 
0.257 0.484 
0.043 0.187 
0.365 0.443 
0.637 0.720 
0.224 0.378 
Efficiency with 
Variable Cost 
CRS VRS 
0.136 0.151 
0.164 0.366 
0.271 0.677 
0.367 1.000 
0.346 0.989 
0.138 0.370 
0.147 0.851 
0.364 0.698 
0.088 0.192 
0.199 0.372 
0.304 0.736 
0.162 0.393 
0.209 0.578 
0.157 0.205 
1.000 1.000 
0.1420.149 
0.417 1.000 
0.418 0.953 
0.281 0.512 
0.108 0.663 
0.210 0.224 
0.045 0.094 
0.056 0.069 
0.338 0.774 
0.162 0.310 
0.181 0.376 
0.398 0.566 
0.194 0.333 
0.277 0.475 
0.368 0.739 
0.090 0.381 
0.275 0.352 
0.128 0.141 
0.189 0.311 
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Table 7-11: Relative Significance For Fixed and Variable Costs: The UK Oil & Gas Fields 
Efficiency with 
Both Variables 
Field CRS VRS 
1 1.000 1.000 
2 0.728 0.729 
3 0.472 0.772 
4 0.760 1.000 
5 0.479 1.000 
6 0.490 0.830 
7 0.359 0.472 
8 0.433 0.443 
9 0.374 0.455 
10 0.661 0.856 
11 0.231 0.232 
12 0.386 0.464 
13 0.240 0.258 
14 0.717 0.942 
15 0.621 0.734 
16 0.339 0.347 
17 0.682 0.970 
18 0.593 0.598 
19 0.517 0.523 
20 0.859 0.864 
21 0.499 0.514 
22 0.753 0.918 
23 0.506 0.523 
24 0.536 0.544 
25 0.724 0.824 
26 1.000 1.000 
27 0.849 0.873 
28 0.675 0.717 
29 0.437 0.529 
30 0.721 0.764 
31 0.357 0.403 
32 0.357 0.370 
33 0.367 0.374 
Efficiency with 
Fixed Cost Only 
CRS VRS 
1.000 1.000 
0.728 0.729 
0.216 0.772 
0.270 1.000 
0.195 1.000 
0.141 0.604 
0.106 0.348 
0.160 0.402 
0.113 0.337 
0.206 0.693 
0.078 0.176 
0.144 0.407 
0.066 0.154 
0.262 0.942 
0.217 0.405 
0.096 0.217 
0.538 0.970 
0.243 0.598 
0.193 0.404 
0.174 0.287 
0.499 0.514 
0.202 0.465 
0.393 0.523 
0.181 0.182 
0.202 0.440 
0.398 1.000 
0.347 0.365 
0.229 0.614 
0.099 0.169 
0.264 0.292 
0.168 0.265 
0.357 0.370 
0.101 0.123 
Efficiency with 
Variable Cost 
CRS VRS 
1.000 1.000 
0.711 0.712 
0.280 0.535 
0.489 1.000 
0.326 1.000 
0.342 0.830 
0.248 0.472 
0.278 0.443 
0.255 0.455 
0.450 0.856 
0.154 0.221 
0.276 0.464 
0.172 0.258 
0.462 0.900 
0.543 0.734 
0.240 0.347 
0.226 0.234 
0.363 0.543 
0.328 0.442 
0.744 0.753 
0.392 0.399 
0.620 0.918 
0.417 0.465 
0.536 0.544 
0.583 0.824 
0.626 1.000 
0.849 0.873 
0.447 0.717 
0.406 0.524 
0.721 0.764 
0.252 0.315 
0.217 0.223 
0.281 0.293 
Efficiency with 
Both Variables 
Field CRS VRS 
34 0.637 0.714 
35 0.533 0.535 
36 0.469 0.495 
37 0.828 0.828 
38 1.000 1.000 
39 0.744 0.813 
40 0.876 0.963 
41 0.508 0.528 
42 1.000 1.000 
43 0.600 0.633 
44 1.000 1.000 
45 0.670 0.680 
46 1.000 1.000 
47 0.565 0.573 
48 0.692 0.703 
49 0.687 0.688 
50 0.813 0.876 
51 1.000 1.000 
52 0.586 0.610 
53 0.795 0.857 
54 0.693 0.707 
55 0.146 1.000 
56 0.656 1.000 
57 0.752 0.848 
58 0.988 1.000 
59 0.736 0.913 
60 0.512 0.537 
61 0.450 0.685 
62 0.524 0.753 
63 0.597 0.810 
64 0.548 0.693 
65 0.460 1.000 
66 0.856 1.000 
Efficiency with 
Fixed Cost Only 
CRS VRS 
0.637 0.714 
0.196 0.399 
0.290 0.495 
0.299 0.546 
0.981 1.000 
0.744 0.813 
0.266 0.402 
0.104 0.133 
0.498 1.000 
0.600 0.633 
1.000 1.000 
0.322 0.542 
0.174 0.309 
0.361 0.362 
0.426 0.562 
0.147 0.279 
0.527 0.876 
1.000 1.000 
0.432 0.610 
0.415 0.442 
0.219 0.236 
0.021 0.388 
0.121 0.342 
0.521 0.848 
0.457 0.545 
0.196 0.392 
0.261 0.306 
0.450 0.685 
0.051 0.114 
0.148 0.277 
0.145 0.303 
0.158 1.000 
0.562 0.979 
Efficienc), with 
Variable Cost 
CRS VRS 
0.453 0.483 
0.357 0.464 
0.293 0.356 
0.646 0.824 
0.526 0.543 
0.442 0.469 
0.852 0.963 
0.435 0.457 
0.545 0.695 
0.365 0.370 
0.765 0.779 
0.364 0.367 
1.000 1.000 
0.400 0.417 
0.356 0.367 
0.569 0.649 
0.362 0.363 
0.295 0.315 
0.250 0.254 
0.379 0.417 
0.533 0.558 
0.146 1.000 
0.612 1.000 
0.264 0.268 
0.598 0.672 
0.538 0.739 
0.425 0.467 
0.285 0.363 
0.524 0.753 
0.597 0.810 
0.441 0.620 
0.303 0.878 
0.733 0.980 
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Table 7-12: Relative Significance of Fixed and Variable Costs: All Fields in the UK 
Efficiency with 
Both Variables 
Field CRS VRS 
0.214 0.222 
2 0.562 1.000 
3 0.185 0.193 
4 0.285 0.286 
5 0.154 0.177 
6 0.363 0.379 
7 0.146 0.148 
8 0.155 0.157 
9 0.191 0.191 
10 0.266 0.294 
11 0.192 0.213 
12 0.097 0.098 
13 0.341 0.346 
14 0.224 0.227 
15 0.211 0.216 
16 0.303 0.334 
17 0.125 0.148 
18 0.347 0.352 
19 0.452 0.508 
20 0.424 0.424 
21 0.479 0.581 
22 0.090 0.096 
23 0.199 0.201 
24 0.310 0.327 
25 0.451 0.459 
26 0.174 0.185 
27 0.080 0.383 
28 0.304 0.321 
29 0.337 0.339 
30 0.316 0.328 
31 0.495 0.495 
32 0.293 0.327 
33 0.441 0.460 
34 0.384 0.471 
35 0.328 0.342 
36 0.494 0.496 
37 0.631 0.635 
38 0.691 0.697 
39 0.496 0.571 
40 0.203 0.613 
41 0.632 0.641 
42 0.462 0.469 
43 0.503 0.545 
44 0.432 0.443 
45 0.561 0.575 
46 0.370 0.372 
Efficiency with 
Fixed Cost Only 
CRS VRS 
0.137 0.222 
0.288 1.000 
0.124 0.193 
0.154 0.264 
0.112 0.177 
0.158 0.269 
0.062 0.100 
0.068 0.112 
0.115 0.186 
0.093 0.156 
0.064 0.107 
0.050 0.052 
0.305 0.305 
0.095 0.153 
0.062 0.064 
0.216 0.334 
0.073 0.084 
0.148 0.237 
0.317 0.508 
0.235 0.394 
0.360 0.581 
0.026 0.045 
0.063 0.063 
0.191 0.191 
0.180 0.282 
0.112 0.112 
0.014 0.095 
0.103 0.162 
0.196 0.321 
0.099 0.160 
0.273 0.450 
0.197 0.197 
0.340 0.341 
0.265 0.302 
0.194 0.231 
0.253 0.355 
0.279 0.427 
0.409 0.647 
0.379 0.571 
0.062 0.355 
0.286 0.286 
0.416 0.469 
0.333 0.333 
0.138 0.187 
0.423 0.575 
0.175 0.270 
Efficiency with 
Variable Cost 
CRS VRS 
0.091 0.131 
0.308 1.000 
0.071 0.081 
0.153 0.278 
0.048 0.060 
0.212 0.379 
0.086 0.120 
0.091 0.140 
0.092 0.129 
0.176 0.294 
0.131 0.213 
0.053 0.058 
0.066 0.072 
0.133 0.181 
0.161 0.176 
0.098 0.112 
0.064 0.068 
0.206 0.273 
0.152 0.201 
0.226 0.372 
0.139 0.193 
0.068 0.096 
0.141 0.154 
0.142 0.155 
0.276 0.321 
0.073 0.079 
0.080 0.383 
0.205 0.269 
0.175 0.258 
0.227 0.315 
0.264 0.406 
0.111 0.117 
0.119 0.130 
0.136 0.144 
0.164 0.182 
0.271 0.306 
0.367 0.418 
0.346 0.426 
0.138 0.157 
0.147 0.594 
0.364 0.394 
0.088 0.098 
0.199 0.214 
0.304 0.343 
0.162 0.183 
0.209 0.239 
Efficiency with 
Both Variables 
Field CRS VRS 
47 0.377 0.435 
48 1.000 1.000 
49 0.992 1.000 
50 0.694 0.698 
51 0.651 0.657 
52 0.485 0.493 
53 0.216 0.767 
54 0.394 0.449 
55 0.081 0.102 
56 0.080 0.083 
57 0.422 0.584 
58 0.275 0.279 
59 0.314 0.318 
60 0.571 0.577 
61 0.257 0.272 
62 0.578 0.773 
63 0.613 0.618 
64 0.130 0.277 
65 0.592 0.675 
66 0.689 0.788 
67 0.377 0.493 
68 0.700 0.852 
69 1.000 1.000 
70 0.949 0.966 
71 0.344 0.421 
72 0.671 0.928 
73 0.399 0.440 
74 0.315 0.332 
75 0.132 0.133 
76 0.366 0.380 
77 0.458 0.551 
78 0.218 0.218 
79 0.600 0.688 
80 0.546 0.550 
81 0.589 0.602 
82 0.441 0.446 
83 0.435 0.443 
84 0.393 0.411 
85 0.581 0.588 
86 0.416 0.423 
87 0.702 0.733 
88 0.251 0.256 
89 0.367 0.382 
90 0.580 0.582 
91 0.367 0.374 
92 0.940 1.000 
Efficiency with 
Fixed Cost Only 
CRS VRS 
0.244 0.245 
0.231 0.238 
0.992 1.000 
0.287 0.386 
0.239 0.293 
0.216 0.217 
0.128 0.767 
0.218 0.240 
0.040 0.085 
0.026 0.032 
0.117 0.267 
0.119 0.119 
0.142 0.147 
0.185 0.186 
0.076 0.131 
0.349 0.604 
0.255 0.255 
0.043 0.178 
0.362 0.364 
0.632 0.715 
0.223 0.369 
0.502 0.852 
0.580 1.000 
0.511 0.894 
0.117 0.200 
0.564 0.928 
0.161 0.275 
0.083 0.131 
0.062 0.083 
0.110 0.166 
0.126 0.207 
0.125 0.207 
0.427 0.688 
0.262 0.428 
0.348 0.494 
0.197 0.323 
0.258 0.371 
0.231 0.271 
0.232 0.233 
0.141 0.173 
0.192 0.266 
0.106 0.106 
0.211 0.251 
0.294 0.405 
0.153 0.154 
0.228 0.356 
Efficiency with 
Variable Cost 
CRS VRS 
0.157 0.162 
1.000 1.000 
0.142 0.143 
0.417 0.469 
0.418 0.466 
0.281 0.301 
0.108 0.462 
0.210 0.218 
0.045 0.073 
0.056 0.063 
0.338 0.584 
0.162 0.175 
0.181 0.198 
0.398 0.413 
0.194 0.272 
0.277 0.389 
0.368 0.401 
0.090 0.271 
0.275 0.282 
0.128 0.135 
0.189 0.258 
0.223 0.389 
0.525 0.979 
0.511 0.957 
0.232 0.421 
0.147 0.223 
0.242 0.440 
0.265 0.323 
0.075 0.085 
0.272 0.309 
0.368 0.551 
0.115 0.183 
0.195 0.264 
0.307 0.451 
0.297 0.336 
0.255 0.377 
0.216 0.244 
0.201 0.223 
0.355 0.381 
0.281 0.314 
0.570 0.643 
0.149 0.157 
0.193 0.215 
0.319 0.360 
0.219 0.230 
0.875 1.000 
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Table 7-12: Relative Significance of Fixed and Variable Costs: All Fields in the UK (cont'd) 
Efficiency with Efficiency with Efficiency with Efficiency with Efficiency with Efficiency with 
Both Variables Fixed Cost Only Variable Cost Both Variables Fixed Cost Only Variable Cost 
Field CRS VRS CRS VRS CRS VRS Field CRS VRS CRS VRS CRS VRS 
93 0.511 0.514 0.270 0.366 0.277 0.312 139 0.443 0.444 0.272 0.432 0.205 0.259 
94 0.480 0.594 0.283 0.382 0.243 0.287 140 0.519 0.604 0.184 0.313 0.341 0.604 
95 0.664 0.750 0.539 0.543 0.157 0.161 141 0.439 0.439 0.259 0.439 0.221 0.382 
96 0.505 0.512 0.194 0.270 0.316 0.357 142 0.378 0.393 0.112 0.174 0.283 0.323 
97 0.443 0.474 0.299 0.299 0.166 0.180 143 0.500 0.519 0.184 0.307 0.320 0.518 
98 0.761 0.773 
99 0.516 0.518 
100 0.528 0.551 
101 0.588 0.597 
102 0.689 0.711 
103 0.978 0.988 
104 0.374 0.442 
105 0.474 0.511 
106 0.305 0.412 
107 0.177 0.188 
108 0.597 0.600 
109 0.312 0.962 
1100.901 1.000 
111 0.554 0.600 
1120.4171.000 
113 0.957 0.974 
114 0.519 0.907 
115 0.758 0.943 
116 0.270 0.956 
117 0.670 0.823 
118 0.533 0.663 
119 0.970 1.000 
120 0.697 0.699 
121 0.340 0.374 
122 0.490 0.508 
123 0.333 1.000 
124 0.309 0.352 
125 0.232 0.254 
126 0.285 0.286 
127 0.236 0.249 
128 0.434 0.462 
129 0.153 0.154 
130 0.270 0.280 
131 0.153 0.156 
132 0.476 0.484 
133 0.461 0.530 
134 0.222 0.225 
135 0.609 0.750 
136 0.405 0.405 
137 0.336 0.336 
138 0.555 0.572 
0.232 0.239 
0.207 0.220 
0.301 0.333 
0.370 0.515 
0.467 0.564 
0.350 0.351 
0.201 0.288 
0.287 0.288 
0.131 0.376 
0.084 0.107 
0.182 0.182 
0.094 0.533 
0.360 0.878 
0.301 0.302 
0.194 1.000 
0.394 0.395 
0.260 0.859 
0.522 0.632 
0.085 0.575 
0.277 0.738 
0.291 0.482 
0.524 1.000 
0.387 0.664 
0.210 0.374 
0.249 0.450 
0.179 1.000 
0.128 0.235 
0.098 0.169 
0.151 0.256 
0.103 0.176 
0.195 0.335 
0.075 0.122 
0.130 0.224 
0.061 0.099 
0.254 0.440 
0.171 0.292 
0.091 0.148 
0.528 0.750 
0.240 0.399 
0.179 0.279 
0.166 0.218 
0.556 0.609 
0.315 0.347 
0.278 0.307 
0.259 0.292 
0.255 0.284 
0.638 0.678 
0.201 0.248 
0.224 0.241 
0.180 0.381 
0.100 0.114 
0.439 0.469 
0.232 0.937 
0.551 1.000 
0.297 0.307 
0.238 0.873 
0.576 0.610 
0.286 0.689 
0.269 0.296 
0.192 0.917 
0.403 0.795 
0.286 0.389 
0.521 1.000 
0.371 0.679 
0.155 0.291 
0.269 0.508 
0.179 1.000 
0.185 0.352 
0.138 0.254 
0.155 0.269 
0.138 0.249 
0.250 0.462 
0.085 0.121 
0.151 0.280 
0.094 0.140 
0.257 0.480 
0.294 0.530 
0.134 0.188 
0.125 0.142 
0.201 0.320 
0.181 0.207 
0.413 0.464 
144 0.659 0.659 
145 0.607 0.629 
146 0.449 0.452 
147 0.299 0.307 
148 0.489 0.507 
149 0.258 0.291 
150 0.309 0.314 
151 0.249 0.249 
152 0.543 0.556 
153 0.363 0.363 
154 0.380 0.391 
155 0.595 0.603 
156 1.000 1.000 
157 0.710 0.727 
158 0.651 0.675 
159 0.323 0.330 
161 0.747 0.762 
161 0.565 0.605 
162 1.000 1.000 
163 0.480 0.488 
164 0.636 0.668 
165 0.460 0.474 
166 0.566 0.578 
167 0.448 0.462 
168 0.673 0.710 
169 1.000 1.000 
170 0.512 0.522 
171 0.561 0.608 
172 0.483 0.484 
173 0.083 1.000 
174 0.424 0.597 
175 0.611 0.641 
176 0.713 0.774 
177 0.486 0.514 
178 0.403 0.409 
179 0.378 0.445 
180 0.290 0.399 
181 0.421 0.435 
182 0.374 0.396 
183 0.304 0.908 
184 0.718 0.807 
0.374 0.635 
0.186 0.284 
0.225 0.382 
0.089 0.105 
0.141 0.187 
0.143 0.146 
0.209 0.314 
0.096 0.112 
0.343 0.440 
0.189 0.299 
0.244 0.391 
0.253 0.413 
0.758 1.000 
0.501 0.605 
0.207 0.331 
0.097 0.106 
0.491 0.759 
0.394 0.605 
0.657 0.986 
0.309 0.413 
0.162 0.225 
0.279 0.351 
0.393 0.495 
0.143 0.211 
0.500 0.710 
1.000 1.000 
0.397 0.522 
0.380 0.381 
0.197 0.229 
0.020 0.352 
0.117 0.274 
0.493 0.641 
0.437 0.438 
0.193 0.283 
0.190 0.190 
0.250 0.252 
0.050 0.084 
0.121 0.167 
0.134 0.211 
0.151 0.908 
0.375 0.464 
0.348 0.607 
0.444 0.506 
0.248 0.438 
0.223 0.241 
0.377 0.423 
0.138 0.138 
0.114 0.130 
0.155 0.172 
0.237 0.265 
0.197 0.240 
0.160 0.211 
0.352 0.512 
0.285 0.320 
0.236 0.262 
0.461 0.604 
0.240 0.265 
0.302 0.345 
0.194 0.221 
0.406 0.462 
0.202 0.227 
0.557 0.628 
0.217 0.242 
0.196 0.219 
0.316 0.359 
0.200 0.226 
0.164 0.179 
0.137 0.154 
0.208 0.223 
0.293 0.324 
0.081 1.000 
0.340 0.597 
0.147 0.165 
0.330 0.352 
0.298 0.374 
0.228 0.249 
0.149 0.151 
0.290 0.399 
0.325 0.391 
0.243 0.318 
0.168 0.716 
0.390 0.436 
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7-4 The Significance of Contextual Variables 
In 4.2.4 the contextual variables were referred to as the factors that have the potential to 
influence the inefficiency of the units in question but have not been included in the 
analyses as they could not be regarded as an input to production. As discussed in the 
Norwegian fields' efficiency analysis (6-3), as far as the offshore petroleum industry of 
the North Sea is concerned, these factors could include the number of partners in each 
consortium, the fields' water and reservoir depths. 
As mentioned in 6-3, the program Frontier 4,1 is able to evaluate the significance of these 
variables simultaneous with measuring the efficiency of the fields in question. However, 
again we face the problem of lack of data with regard to some of the fields' reservoir and 
water depth (see 5.4.2 and 5.4.3). Thus, once again we apply Banker et al.'s procedure 
(see 4.2.4), to estimate: 
In(B) = /30 + /31 Z1 + /32 Z2 + /33 Z3 + /34 D) + & , 
~ 
where B is the inefficiency (llefficiency) of the field in question, which is evaluated by 
three approaches of CRS-DEA, VRS-DEA, and SFA.Zl'Z2' and Z3are "number of 
partners", "water-depth", and "reservoir depth", respectively, D) is the dummy variable 
for the fields whose development and production started either before 1974 or after 1985, 
the periods of zero and minimal state intervention, respectively. The results of the 
regressions are given in Tables 7-13 to 7-15. 
The three regression analyses based on each of the approaches are quite consistent in 
finding dummy variable as the only significant (at 990/0 in all cases) factor affecting the 
efficiency of the fields. In the other words, the fields whose development and production 
began during the period of less government intervention are more efficient than the other 
fields. According to the three studies, none of the other factors significantly affects the 
efficiency of the fields. 
Depending on the approach (being CRS-DEA, VRS-DEA, or SFA), the results attribute 
between bout 19-20% (DEA) and 110/0 (SFA) of the inefficiency of the British fields to 
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the variables in question. The figures are close to, but less than, the impact of the 
contextual variables on the efficiency of Norwegian fields. 
Table 7-13: The Impact of Contextual Variables: Based on Inefficiency evaluated by 
CRS-DEA 
Regressor 
Constant 
Partners 
Water Depth 
Reservoir Depth 
Dummy Post-85 
R-Squared 0.193 
Coefficient 
-0.28820 
-0.09403 
0.02409 
0.09577 
-0.24184 
Standard Error T-Ratio 
0.44709 -0.64463 
0.03046 -0.30845 
0.02550 1.1530 
0.05801 1.6507 
0.04276 -5.6557 
Probability Diagnosis 
0.520 Not Significant 
0.758 Not Significant 
0.251 Not Significant 
0.101 Not Significant 
0.000 Significant 
Table 7-14: The Impact of Contextual Variables: Based on Inefficiency evaluated by 
VRS-DEA 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio Probability Diagnosis 
Constant -0.27988 0.41506 -0.67431 0.501 Not Significant 
Partners 0.02288 0.02830 0.10183 0.919 Not Significant 
Water Depth 0.01651 0.02368 0.69725 0.487 Not Significant 
Reservoir Depth 0.09430 0.05861 1.75080 0.082 Not Significant 
Dummy Post-85 -0.23899 0.03968 -6.0202 0.000 Significant 
R-Squared 0.206 
Table 7-15: The Impact of Contextual Variables: Based on Inefficiency evaluated by 
SFA 
Regressor 
Constant 
Partners 
Water Depth 
Reservoir Depth 
Dummy Post-85 
R-Squared 0.116 
Coefficient 
-0.08905 
-0.00140 
0.01132 
0.02098 
-0.04977 
Standard Error T-Ratio 
0.13489 -0.66020 
0.00919 -0.15262 
0.00769 1.47040 
0.01754 1.1987 
0.12901 -3.8584 
Probability Diagnosis 
0.510 Not Significant 
0.879 Not Significant 
0.143 Not Significant 
0.232 Not Significant 
0.000 Significant 
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7-5 Dynamic Efficiency Measurement: Malmquist Index Approach 
The static DEA and SFA approaches in 7-1 and 7-2 provided us with the relative 
efficiency of the British fields in the three categories of oil fields, oil & gas fields, and all 
the fields in the UKCS. We discussed earlier that these approaches do not account for 
factors like technological improvement when measuring efficiency. In other words, when 
the improvement in efficiency of the fields in two distinct periods is concerned, the above 
approaches are silent on the question of whether the difference between the efficiencies is 
because of better management or simply because the managers had access to more 
advanced technology. 
In Chapter 6, the Malmquist Index approach was applied to examine this distinction 
where possible. The same approach is made in this section. The same difficulty arises, 
however, as the study can only be conducted when the fields in question were active in at 
least two periods of "nonintervention" and "intervention". This is because decomposition 
of efficiency into various components makes sense only when the unit in question is 
being compared to its own performance in some other period. Having this criterion in 
mind, three groups of fields are eligible for this study. 
The first group consists of the fields whose development and production started before 
1975. These fields were active in all three periods of pre-1975, 1975-84, and post-1985. 
Thus the Malmquist Index approach could be used to decompose the efficiency changes 
of this group over three periods. However, since the Malmquist Index approach uses 
DEA-like linear programming (see 4-5-6), and when the number of units in question is 
few (less than 3 times the sum of inputs and outputs, see 5-1) DEA is not a good 
efficiency measurement approach, the Malmquist approach is not suitable as there are 
only five fields in this group. 
The second group consists of the fields whose development started before 1975 but came 
on stream between 1975 and 1984. These fields were active in two periods: 1975-84 and 
post-1985. However, the above problem of the low number of fields in the category 
hinders the application of Malmquist approach to this category. 
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One way of overcoming the problem is to mIX Group-2, and the fields whose 
development and production started between 1975 and 1984 (the third group). The 
Malmquist Index approach can be used for the aggregate of these two groups of fields 
over the two periods of activity, namely 1975-84 and post-1985. Since both groups were 
active in both periods, and since one is concerned about the decomposition of the 
efficiency change, combining these two groups does not compromise the interpretation of 
the results. 
7.5.1 Efficiency Change Over Two Periods 
The results of the Malmquist Index study are summarized in Table 7-16. The expected 
feature of the results is the decrease in scale efficiency (column [4]) of the fields in the 
post-1985 era compare to the previous part. The reduction in scale efficiency happened to 
both UK -2 and UK -3 groups, while the former group suffered more. This, as mentioned 
earlier, is due to the geological characteristics of the fields, as they allow less production 
and higher cost per unit of production. Being the older fields of the two groups, the UK-2 
fields are naturally expected to lose more scale efficiency than the other group. 
The unexpected result, however, concerns the negative technical change (column [2]), a 
reduction of close to 40%, in both UK-2 and UK-3 cases, after the policy change of 1985. 
Since the development of all these fields started in periods other than post-1985 (for UK-
2 it started before 1975, and for UK-3 between 1975 and 1984), and the fields have not 
undergone major structural changes after 1985, the technical change seems to be mostly 
related to the production technology (variable costs). 
The results (column [1]) assure efficiency gain for both groups after the policy change of 
1985. The efficiency gain of UK-3 is significantly higher (at 940/0 level of significance) 
than the UK-2 group. The difference between the efficiency gain of the two becomes 
lower once we disregard the technical and scale efficiency changes (column [2]). More 
than 50% pure efficiency gain after 1985 shows the effect of the regulatory change on the 
performance of these fields. 
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The regulatory change of 1985 provided oil companies with the opportunity to apply 
inputs based on their efficiency. Despite the fact that the construction phase of the UK-3 
group took place during the period of state intervention, and that these costs were carried 
on to post-1985 (period of less state intervention), the performance of these fields in the 
latter period offset the impact of the choice of inefficient goods and services in the early 
period. 
Table 7-16: Malmquist Decomposition for UK-2 & UK-3 Fields 
Post-1985 Change Compare to Pre-1984 Performance 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Efficiency Technical Pure Efficiency Scale Efficiency Totl. Factor 
Field Change Change Change Change Prod. Change 
1 0.959 0.685 1.639 0.585 0.657 
2 0.793 0.548 0.949 0.835 0.434 
3 1.196 0.697 3.075 0.389 0.834 
4 0.970 0.551 1.008 0.963 0.535 
5 0.505 0.830 1.230 0.411 0.420 
6 1.494 0.549 1.687 0.885 0.819 
7 1.337 0.665 1.437 0.930 0.890 
8 0.889 0.601 0.937 0.949 0.535 
9 2.223 0.549 3.023 0.735 1.219 
10 0.982 0.549 0.954 1.030 0.539 
11 3.118 0.549 3.106 1.004 1.711 
12 1.561 0.549 2.052 0.761 0.857 
13 1.228 0.584 1.610 0.763 0.718 
14 1.209 0.573 1.164 1.039 0.693 
15 1.410 0.549 0.808 1.746 0.774 
16 4.129 0.558 1.786 2.312 2.304 
17 0.239 0.819 0.919 0.260 0.196 
18 0.776 1.044 1.010 0.768 0.810 
19 4.989 0.819 4.574 1.091 4.087 
20 1.272 0.563 1.315 0.968 0.717 
21 1.368 0.549 1.568 0.873 0.750 
22 0.759 0.549 0.846 0.897 0.417 
23 6.442 0.566 5.673 1.136 3.647 
24 0.925 0.653 1.321 0.701 0.604 
25 2.149 0.549 1.679 1.280 1.179 
26 0.743 0.548 0.833 0.893 0.408 
27 1.852 0.549 1.833 1.010 1.016 
G. average 1.313 0.612 1.529 0.859 0.804 
UK-2 1.056 0.616 1.442 0.733 0.651 
UK-3 1.493 0.61 1.583 0.943 0.911 
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7.5.2 Distance Between the Production Periods 
The problem with applying the Malmquist Index when the units in question have not 
been active in periods of time under study hinders us to estimate the efficiency change for 
the Group-S, whose development and production began after 1985. Not being able to use 
the Malmquist Index makes it impossible to decomposing the efficiency differences 
between the fields belonging to different groups according to their development and 
production start. 
Despite the above problem, one could still use the distance function procedure to measure 
the distance between one group of fields and the frontier formed by the other group. 
Though this method does not provide a concrete explanation regarding the source of 
efficiency differences between the groups, it allows the analyst to evaluate the efficiency 
differences from a different angle than that provided by DEA and SF A. 
The procedure applied in this section is similar to the study in 6.4.2. We will study the 
position of Group-3 relative to the frontier made by the best practices of Group-5 and 
vise versa. To that end we consider three cases of oil fields, oil & gas fields, and the 
aggregate fields of United Kingdom. That is to say, the study compares Oil-3 with Oil-S, 
O&G-3 with O&G-S, and finally UK-3 with UK-So 
The other groups of British fields are not suitable for this study for two reasons. First, 
recalling that this study is based on DEA-like linear programming, the low number of 
fields in other groups prevents valid results. Second, Group-2 and Group-4 are cross-
period fields in the sense that their development and production starting dates do not 
belong to the same period of government intervention policy. Having their fixed and 
variable costs incurred in different periods disturbs the interpretation of the results with 
regard to regulatory change in 1985. 
The results for the distance of the fields in Group-3 (Group-5) in relation to the frontier 
made by Group-S (Group-3) are shown in Tables 7-1 7 to 7-19. The results consistently 
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indicate the superior efficiency of the fields whose development and production started 
after the regulatory change of 1985 compared to the previous period's fields. 
The oil fields, whose development started between 1975 and 1984 have performed, on 
average, less than 30% as efficiently as the best post-1985 fields. The oil & gas fields 
have slightly better situation by performing at about 43% efficiency compared to the 
post-1985 fields. The aggregation of the fields decreases the average performance of the 
1975-84 fields (Group UK-3) to less than 300/0 of the post-1985 fields (Group UK-5). 
The results of the distance function approach are consistent with those of DEA and SF A 
in pinpointing the post-1985 (group-5) fields as more efficient than Group-3. As far as 
the oil fields are concerned, the post-1985 fields have, on average, performed more than 
38% better than the most efficient fields in the former period. The relative efficiency of 
the post-1985 fields significantly increases to more than 400% when the study turns to 
the Oil & gas case. When studying the sum of all fields belonging to the two groups, the 
UK -3 fields appear to have a significantly higher frontier than their frontier in the oil and 
oil & gas fields cases. The new frontier reduces the distance to just above 11 % in favour 
of the post-1985 fields. 
As far as the oil fields are concerned, 70% of the post-1985 fields (Oil-5) are performing 
in a more efficient manner than the fields whose production began between 1975 and 
1984 (Oil-3). The figure rises to 90% when focusing on the oil & gas fields. However, 
the higher frontier made by the entire UK-3 fields causes only 53% of the UK-5 fields to 
be above the frontier made by UK-3. At the same time, there is no field from Group-3 
with a better performance of Group-5 in any of the categories of oil, oil & gas, and 
aggregate UKCS fields. 
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Table 7-17: Efficiency of Each Group Relative to the Best Practices of the Other Group: 
Oil Fields 
Efficiency of pre-84 Efficiency of Post-8S Efficiency of Post-8S Efficiency of Post-8S 
relative to Post-8S relative to Pre-84 Relative to Pre-84 relative to Pre-84 
Field Frontier Field Frontier Field Frontier Field Frontier 
1 0.967 18 1.110 35 1.360 
0.484 2 1.516 19 1.531 36 0.731 
2 0.193 3 1.388 20 1.760 37 1.290 
3 0.207 4 1.576 21 2.339 38 0.246 
4 0.276 5 0.321 22 1.617 39 0.265 
5 0.325 6 0.665 23 0.692 40 1.590 
6 0.23 7 1.056 24 1.790 41 0.760 
7 0.137 8 1.301 25 1.365 42 0.892 
8 0.405 9 0.595 26 1.720 43 1.872 
10 0.378 27 1.432 44 0.912 
11 0.966 28 1.844 45 1.963 
12 1.139 29 1.082 46 1.730 
13 1.067 30 1.291 47 0.424 
14 1.614 31 4.706 48 2.012 
15 0.997 32 3.254 49 2.073 
16 1.427 33 1.963 50 1.275 
17 1.298 34 1.968 
Mean 0.282 Mean 1.383 
Table 7-18: Efficiency of Each Group Relative to the Best Practices of the Other Group: 
Oil & Gas Fields 
Efficiency of pre-84 Efficiency of Post-8S Efficiency of Post-8S Efficiency of Post-8S 
relative to Post-8S relative to Pre-84 relative to Pre-84 relative to Pre-84 
Field Frontier Field Frontier Field Frontier Field Frontier 
1 2.255 18 11.279 35 4.656 
0.359 2 1.057 19 1.068 36 2.827 
2 0.433 3 0.737 20 2.661 37 1.581 
3 0.374 4 1.634 21 3.208 38 1.993 
4 0.661 5 8.807 22 11.502 39 0.454 
5 0.232 6 2.180 23 11.468 40 1.326 
6 0.388 7 6.276 24 5.874 41 1.985 
7 0.240 8 6.529 25 0.979 42 2.583 
8 0.717 9 2.050 26 2.130 43 1.234 
10 1.519 27 9.625 44 3.629 
11 12.660 28 16.064 45 7.875 
12 1.029 29 1.227 46 1.407 
13 1.455 30 2.251 47 3.438 
14 10.768 31 4.227 48 1.437 
15 1.502 32 2.746 49 0.661 
16 6.091 33 1.259 50 8.792 
17 0.841 34 3.073 
Mean 0.426 Mean 4.078 
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Table 7-19: Efficiency of Each Group Relative to the Best Practices of the Other Group: All Fields 
Field 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
Efficiency of pre-84 
Relative to Post-85 
Frontier 
0.385 
0.154 
0.165 
0.208 
0.272 
0.196 
0.107 
0.341 
0.671 
0.245 
0.317 
0.251 
0.464 
0.167 
0.294 
0.159 
0.529 
Mean 0.290 
Field 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
Efficiency of Post-85 
relative to Pre-84 
Frontier 
0.801 
0.850 
0.905 
0.841 
0.266 
0.551 
0.652 
1.077 
0.357 
0.313 
0.800 
0.732 
0.883 
1.055 
0.580 
0.745 
0.739 
0.705 
1.055 
1.428 
1.487 
0.851 
0.573 
1.417 
0.738 
1.014 
1.186 
0.983 
0.815 
0.774 
3.896 
1.759 
1.625 
1.629 
1.093 
0.465 
0.842 
0.174 
0.220 
1.316 
0.629 
0.705 
1.550 
0.755 
1.231 
1.432 
0.351 
1.251 
Field 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
95 
96 
Efficiency of Post -85 
relative to Pre-84 
Frontier 
1.121 
0.812 
1.432 
0.472 
1.110 
1.196 
1.271 
0.994 
0.934 
0.850 
1.384 
1.096 
2.220 
0.580 
0.796 
1.243 
0.853 
3.410 
1.078 
1.036 
1.037 
1.231 
0.873 
2.166 
1.229 
1.141 
1.226 
1.353 
2.486 
0.789 
1.007 
0.701 
0.389 
1.709 
0.903 
2.146 
1.173 
0.925 
2.245 
1.116 
1.459 
0.750 
1.569 
1.132 
0.936 
0.870 
0.706 
1.610 
Field 
97 
98 
99 
100 
101 
102 
103 
104 
105 
106 
107 
108 
109 
110 
111 
112 
113 
114 
115 
116 
117 
118 
119 
120 
121 
122 
123 
124 
125 
126 
127 
128 
129 
130 
131 
132 
133 
134 
135 
136 
137 
138 
139 
140 
141 
142 
Efficiency of Post-85 
relative to Pre-84 
Frontier 
0.935 
1.327 
0.947 
1.104 
1.247 
1.422 
1.729 
0.967 
0.869 
1.467 
0.551 
0.606 
0.603 
1.129 
0.768 
0.782 
1.373 
1.739 
1.327 
1.797 
0.936 
1.520 
1.073 
2.039 
0.989 
2.168 
0.975 
1.079 
1.231 
1.194 
1.773 
0.861 
1.101 
1.140 
0.314 
1.324 
0.964 
1.506 
1.162 
0.890 
0.762 
1.128 
1.267 
0.947 
0.655 
1.521 
Mean 1.113 
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7.6 Concluding Remarks 
The UKCS offshore activity began by the state's green light to the international oil 
companies to explore and exploit petroleum in the United Kingdom Continental Shelf 
with the least state intervention. The activity began in the first half of the 1960s with the 
oil companies' unofficial commitment to the domestic economy without any obligation to 
apply any level of domestic goods and services. The change in regulatory framework of 
the British petroleum industry in 1975 made the oil companies face the possibility of 
exclusion from the state's short list in the licensing rounds if failing to prove their 
benevolence towards the British economy by favouring domestic goods and services. The 
companies were forced to make potentially uneconomic decisions in their procurement 
processes. The European Commission's interference in the matter put an end to the 
requirement to "buy British" in 1985. The main objective of this chapter was to examine 
the relative efficiency of the fields during the different periods of regulatory policy. 
The chapter studied the relative efficiency of the British fields in three categories: oil 
fields, oil & gas fields, and aggregate British fields. Each category is divided in up to five 
groups based on the development and production start-date of the fields. Group-l 
(referred to as Oil-I, O&G-l, and UK-l depending on the category in question) consists 
of the fields whose development and production started before 1974. Group-2 is formed 
by fields whose development started before 1974, but came on stream between 1975 and 
1984. The fields whose development and production started in the latter period form 
Group-3. The fourth group, namely Group-4, consists of those fields whose development 
started between 1975 and 1985, but came on stream after 1985. The fields whose 
development and production started after 1985 form Group-5. 
The static efficiency measurement based on DEA and SF A yielded some consistent 
results. In both the oil & gas and aggregate fields categories the Group-l appeared to be 
the most efficient group. These fields are the oldest fields in the UKCS and suffer from 
two drawbacks. The first is that geologically the fields require more investment for each 
unit of production as they grow older. The oil in the deeper layers is more solid and 
require technical manipulation (such as injection of steam) to return it to extractable 
2.+2 
liquidity. Further, the lower oil reservoir requires artificial pressure for extraction. Both 
of these characteristics make the extraction of old fields more costly than the new fields. 
The second issue is the technological advancement of the industry through the years of 
production. The fields in Group-1 were developed more than three decades ago with the 
technology available at that time. Assuming technological progress in developing the new 
fields, these fields, other things equal, are expected to be less efficient than the fields 
developed after them. However, despite these two shortcomings these fields are identified 
as the most efficient points. 
The fact that these fields were developed in the time when there was no state intervention 
in the procurement decision of the oil companies might be the reason for the high 
efficiency of these fields. The efficiency ranking of other groups make this suspicion 
stronger. According to the results, Group-5 is the next most efficient group.135 The fact 
that these fields where developed and came on stream when the requirement to "buy 
British" was dropped could strengthen our view that the fields were conducted in a more 
efficient manner when the companies were free to choose between various alternative 
inputs. Further evidence comes with the results of the fields whose development and 
production started during the time when the state was in its highest control over the 
companies' procurement policy. These fields turned out to be the least efficient fields 
among the five groups. 
However, the efficiency results of DEA and SF A could be questioned, as they do not take 
into account the technical progress of the units in question over time. In other words, one 
could argue that the higher efficiency of the post-1985 over the fields whose development 
and/or production phase began during the period of state intervention could merely be 
due to the technological progress, which were not available before 1985. Though the 
Malmquist approach is able to decompose the efficiency change into various components 
to measure the effects of technical and scale efficiency change, the basic requirement of 
this methodology (the units in question should be active in both periods) rules out the 
\35 Note that in the Oil fields' category, where there is no field in Group-I, Group-5 is the most efficient 
one. 
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possibility of examining the effect of technical change in making post-1985 the more 
efficient fields. 
Despite the above difficulty, the result of the Malmquist Index approach for Group-3 
could be used to infer something about the technical situation before and after 1985. The 
decomposition of total factor productivity shows that (1) both Group-2 and Group-3 had 
higher efficiency after the regulatory change of 1985, and (2) both groups suffer from the 
negative (about 400/0) technical change over the two periods. The first result shows that 
though the construction of these fields had already finished by 1985, these fields could, 
probably, enjoy the relative freedom in their production phase to reduce the variable costs 
of the fields. The second result, on the other hand, suggests that if there were significant 
technical change, there was no reason for Group-2 and Group-3 fields to suffer from 
negative technical change over the two periods. Thus, the efficiency improvement 
indicated by DEA, SFA, and Malmquist studies could be interpreted as the better 
performance of the fields during the periods of state non/less intervention 
The study also applied the approach made by Banker et al. to examine the effect of 
contextual variables on the inefficiency of the fields in question. The study attributes 
between 11 % and 20% of the inefficiency to number of partners in the consortium, water 
depth, and reservoir depth of the fields, with none of them having significant impact on 
the efficiency of the fields. The results of regression analysis do indicate, however, the 
significant efficiency difference between the periods of heavy state intervention and the 
periods when the state had no, or limited, intervention. These results also indicate the 
better performance of the oil companies during the period of no state intervention. 
Chapter Eight: Comparative Analysis of the Efficiency in the 
United Kingdom and Norwegian Continental Shelves 
Introduction 
During the life time of North Sea petroleum production, Norway and the UK have 
experienced both similarities and disparities in their licensing procedure, in general, and 
procurement requirements, in particular. We have seen that at the beginning both 
countries set terms and conditions loose enough to attract many international oil 
companies into the newly born oil region. However, as early as 1972 in Norway and 1975 
in the UK that policy changed and both countries applied pressure to bring the oil 
companies to the negotiation tables with domestic offshore suppliers. 
The year 1985 marked the time of deregulation in the two countries, though the changing 
polices took on different forms. In the UK, the requirement to "buy British" was 
withdrawn while the scrutiny of the companies' procurement documents remained in 
place. In Norway Statoil's ties with the offshore suppliers was loosened, while the "buy 
Norwegian" policy remained intact. Both countries loosened the tightness on one account 
and, at the same time, tried to keep the domestic offshore suppliers in the activity. With 
these, as we have seen in Chapters 6 and 7, the petroleum industries of the two countries 
experienced relatively higher efficiency after 1985. The question, however, is whether 
the two deregulated industries experienced similar policy implications. 
At the very early stages of petroleum activity, the natural, geological, and geopolitical 
similarities between the two shelves brought about similarities between the two counties' 
policy to attract international investment. After about four decades of activity the two 
countries still rely on international oil companies to carry on (mostly in the UK and partly 
in Norway) operations and make necessary investment. Regardless of the country of 
registration, most of the international oil companies in the two shelves are sister 
companies. This provides them with the opportunity to focus on the other shelf if the 
mother-company finds the return to capital on one shelf unsatisfactory. In this case the 
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relative efficiency of the fields in operation (and consequently the rate of return on capital 
invested in the two shelves) is a matter of concern for both parties (governments and 
companies) involved. One should expect capital drain from one shelf if the regulatory 
framework makes it impossible for the companies to maintain a certain level of return 
(and efficiency). 
This chapter is to compare the relative efficiency of the Norwegian and British offshore 
petroleum industries. The comparison is made for four categories. First, the oil & gas 
fields whose development and production began during the period of heavy intervention 
(1975-85 in the UK, and pre-1984 in Norway) are to be compared. This provides us with 
the different impacts, if any, of the two policies on the efficiency of the two shelves. 
The second study includes the oil & gas fields in both shelves whose development started 
after 1985. Though in the UK the period of non-intervention also includes the pre-1975 
period, the fields whose development and production started in that period are omitted 
from the study due to the difficulty of interpreting the results in the light of (likely) 
technological changes between the two periods. 
The third part compares the oil & gas fields in the two shelves over the whole period of 
the two shelves' activity. The fourth study includes all fields in the two shelves regardless 
of their production and timing of development. The chapter comes to an end with some 
concluding remarks. 
8.1 Oil & Gas Fields Developed in the Period of Intervention 
Table 8-1 summarizes the results of DEA and SFA for 21 British and Norwegian oil & 
gas fields whose development and production started when the requirement to "buy 
domestic" influenced the authorities' decision in setting up the consortiums. Bearing in 
mind that the first eight fields belong to the UKCS and the remaining thirteen belong to 
the NCS, the CRS-DEA and SF A results indicate no significant difference between the 
average efficiency of the fields in the two shelves. According to VRS-SF A, howeyer, the 
2.+6 
Norwegian fields are significantly (at 99% level of significance) more efficient than the 
British ones. 
The Kolmogorov-Smimov test gives the same results as the Student t-test. According to 
this, the CRS-DEA and SFA results do not reject the hypothesis that the two countries' 
efficiency scores belong to the same distribution. The test, however, rejects the 
hypothesis at 99% level of significance with regard to the VRS-DEA efficiency results. 
The results of SF A give all fields in the two shelves an equal (to 3 decimal place) 
efficiency score of 99.6%. This may be due to the low number of observations and/or the 
fact that, unlike DEA, SFA differentiates between inefficiency and statistical noise. In the 
present case, SF A recognizes all the differences between the fields as noise and considers 
all fields as almost efficient. 
According to the variable return to scale assumption of DEA, 9 Norwegian fields are on 
the frontier (against 2 British fields). Five of these fields probably achieve their efficiency 
VRS-DEA score because of the size of their operations, which are the largest among the 
21 fields. 
According to two of the three approaches, the average efficiencies of the fields in the two 
shelves are not significantly different. In other words, the policy applied by the two 
countries, other parameters equal, led the oil companies active in the two continental 
shelves to perform, by and large, similarly. As discussed earlier in this chapter, this was 
predictable, as the governments' insistence on applying domestic goods and services was 
similar, that most of the firms active in one shelf has a sister company active in the other 
shelf. 
The matter of controversy, however, may be the deregulation of 1985. Does the 
abolishment of the "buy British" requirement in the UK have different effects on the 
performance of the companies than the Norwegian changing policy with regard to Statoil 
as the monitoring instrument? 
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Table 8-1: The Oil & Gas Fields of the UKCS and NCS 
During the Period of Heavy Intervention 
Field Country CRS-DEA VRS-DEA SFA 
1 UK 0.559 0.565 0.996 
2 UK 0.617 0.692 0.996 
3 UK 0.575 0.603 0.996 
4 UK 0.995 1.000 0.996 
5 UK 0.333 0.494 0.996 
6 UK 0.582 0.594 0.996 
7 UK 0.387 0.526 0.996 
8 UK 1.000 1.000 0.996 
9 Norway 0.666 1.000 0.996 
10 Norway 1.000 1.000 0.996 
11 Norway 1.000 1.000 0.996 
12 Norway 0.431 1.000 0.996 
13 Norway 0.827 1.000 0.996 
14 Norway 0.323 1.000 0.996 
15 Norway 0.455 0.915 0.996 
16 Norway 0.754 0.783 0.996 
17 Norway 1.000 1.000 0.996 
18 Norway 0.650 1.000 0.996 
19 Norway 1.000 1.000 0.996 
20 Norway 0.489 0.961 0.996 
21 Norway 0.670 0.696 0.996 
Average 0.682 (0.058) 0.849 (0.038) 0.996 (0.000) 
The UK 0.631 (0.061) 0.684 (0.041) 0.996 (0.000) 
Norway 0.713 (0.058) 0.950 (0.010) 0.996 (0.000) 
The numbers in brackets are variance. 
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8.2 Oil & Gas Fields Developed in the Post-1985 Period 
The post-1985 fields include 50 British and 20 Norwegian fields whose development and 
production started after the policy changes of 1985. The results of DEA and SFA are 
shown in Table 8-2. 
According to the Student t-test there is no significant difference between the average 
efficiency of the two shelves. Further, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test does not reject the 
hypothesis that the efficiency scores of the two shelves belong to the same distribution at 
a significant level of 95%. 
However, as far as VRS-DEA measurement is concerned, the Norwegian fields have lost 
their significant numerical advantages over the UK fields in the period of heavy 
intervention. This may indicate the more significant effect of the new British policy on 
the efficiency of the fields developed after 1985. 
While the regulatory change in each shelf gave the post-1985 superior efficiency over the 
former period fields (see Chapter 6 and 7), the cross-shelf average relative efficiencies 
seem to be similar. Thus, if the abolition of the "buy British" requirement paved the way 
for the international oil companies active in the UKCS to perform more efficiently, the 
"wing-cutting" of Statoil, one could claim, had a similar effect on the performance of the 
companies active in the NCS, at least according to CRS-DEA and SF A. 
With a pessimistic approach, if the companies active in the NCS could not fully enjoy the 
absence of Statoil as the formal monitoring instrument, the companies in the UKCS could 
not fully enjoy the abolishment of the requirement. In the UK, the requirement was taken 
away while the scrutiny was still in place, and in Norway, the monitoring instrument lost 
its position while the requirement remained intact. The above results suggest that despite 
their appearances, the two policies had similar effect on the performance of the 
companies active in the two shelves. 
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Table 8-2: The Oil & Gas Fields of the UKCS and NCS During the Period of less Intervention 
Field Country CRS-DEA VRS-DEA SFA 
1 UK 
2 UK 
3 UK 
4 UK 
5 UK 
6 UK 
7 UK 
8 UK 
9 UK 
10 UK 
11 UK 
12 UK 
13 UK 
14 UK 
15 UK 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
35 UK 
Average 
UK 
Norway 
0.604 
0.480 
0.440 
0.809 
0.604 
0.666 
0.493 
0.380 
0.634 
0.848 
0.622 
0.563 
0.405 
0.484 
0.304 
0.379 
0.320 
0.741 
0.443 
0.413 
0.696 
1.000 
0.744 
0.778 
0.482 
0.850 
0.600 
1.000 
0.559 
1.000 
0.510 
0.610 
0.633 
0.702 
0.713 
0.513 
0.443 
0.826 
0.692 
0.863 
0.856 
0.386 
0.661 
1.000 
0.629 
0.615 
0.522 
0.505 
0.378 
0.382 
0.339 
0.758 
0.447 
0.431 
0.697 
1.000 
0.800 
0.783 
0.507 
0.872 
0.626 
1.000 
0.561 
1.000 
0.527 
0.620 
0.636 
0.759 
0.855 
0.868 
0.826 
0.918 
0.877 
0.912 
0.886 
0.857 
0.905 
0.938 
0.929 
0.891 
0.788 
0.903 
0.745 
0.757 
0.733 
0.903 
0.844 
0.833 
0.925 
0.944 
0.919 
0.935 
0.813 
0.936 
0.892 
0.955 
0.880 
0.937 
0.882 
0.891 
0.887 
0.907 
1.000 1.000 0.919 
0.612 (0.053) 0.711 (0.051) 0.859 (0.009) 
0.601 (0.037) 0.701 (0.040) 0.864 (0.007) 
0.639 (0.096) 0.736 (0.081) 0.859 (0.013) 
The numbers in brackets are variance. 
Field Country CRS-DEA VRS-DEA 
36 UK 
37 UK 
38 UK 
39 UK 
40 UK 
41 UK 
42 UK 
43 UK 
44 UK 
45 UK 
46 UK 
47 UK 
48 UK 
49 UK 
50 UK 
51 Norway 
52 Norway 
53 Norway 
54 Norway 
55 Norway 
56 Norway 
57 Norway 
58 Norway 
59 Norway 
60 Norway 
61 Norway 
62 Norway 
63 Norway 
64 Norway 
65 Norway 
66 Norway 
67 Norway 
68 Norway 
69 Norway 
70 Norway 
0.512 
0.670 
0.592 
0.113 
0.633 
0.624 
0.807 
0.642 
0.453 
0.487 
0.500 
0.541 
0.484 
0.386 
0.811 
0.419 
1.000 
0.402 
0.270 
0.607 
0.225 
0.909 
0.545 
0.387 
0.524 
0.830 
0.185 
1.000 
1.000 
0.852 
0.970 
0.252 
0.398 
1.000 
1.000 
0.557 
0.687 
0.632 
1.000 
1.000 
0.714 
0.926 
0.874 
0.487 
0.688 
0.736 
0.745 
0.680 
1.000 
1.000 
0.447 
1.000 
0.629 
0.552 
0.697 
0.346 
0.931 
1.000 
0.794 
0.594 
0.849 
0.198 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
0.260 
0.417 
1.000 
1.000 
SFA 
0.845 
0.893 
0.894 
0.462 
0.874 
0.871 
0.935 
0.891 
0.860 
0.662 
0.777 
0.872 
0.838 
0.779 
0.939 
0.850 
0.965 
0.785 
0.641 
0.878 
0.619 
0.949 
0.872 
0.822 
0.878 
0.940 
0.638 
0.952 
0.949 
0.926 
0.947 
0.690 
0.829 
0.882 
0.936 
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8.3 Aggregate Oil & Gas Fields 
This section is to investigate the relative efficiency of the two shelyes in question with 
regard to the performance of all oil & gas fields, irrespective of the development starting 
date. This gives us a picture of the fields' performance over the whole period of actiyity. 
The study, thus, focuses on 66 British and 37 Norwegian oil & gas fields. The results are 
shown in Table 8-3. 
The results are, by and large, consistent with those of the two previous sections. The 
insignificant difference between the average efficiencies of the two fields indicates the 
similarity between the effect of the two countries' general petroleum policies. The 
similarities between the two shelves' performance (in all CRS-DEA, VRS-DEA, and 
SF A) were not rejected by either of the two tests. 
The results in Table 8-3 also confirm the superior efficiency of the British fields whose 
development started before 1974. Despite the statistical insignificance of the difference 
between the two shelves' average efficiencies, the two previous studies showed that the 
Norwegian oil & gas fields in both categories of pre-1984 and post-1985 enjoy higher 
efficiency over the British fields. The advantage, however, is reversed when comparing 
all the oil & gas fields. This is due to high efficiency (average of almost 600/0 and 80% 
with CRS and VRS, respectively) of the British fields whose development started before 
1975. This is against about 36% and 46% average efficiency of the British fields 
developed during 1975-84 period, and 60% and 68% average efficiency of post-1985 
fields (with CRS and VRS, respectively). The same difference is established by the SF A 
approach. According to the latter approach the fields developed pre-1975 are significantly 
more efficient than the fields whose development started between 1975 and 1984. 
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Table 8-3: The Oil & Gas Fields of the UKCS and NCS During the Two Periods 
Field Country CRS-DEA VRS-DEA SFA Field Country CRS-DEA VRS-DEA SFA 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
Average 
The UK 
Norway 
1.000 
0.723 
0.387 
0.647 
0.397 
0.431 
0.315 
0.367 
0.326 
0.569 
0.194 
0.322 
0.213 
0.597 
0.531 
0.295 
0.604 
0.480 
0.440 
0.809 
0.496 
0.666 
0.474 
0.380 
0.634 
0.848 
0.585 
0.563 
0.405 
0.467 
0.301 
0.356 
0.320 
0.632 
0.443 
1.000 
0.723 
0.553 
1.000 
0.761 
0.742 
0.423 
0.405 
0.367 
0.766 
0.194 
0.405 
0.220 
0.869 
0.611 
0.300 
0.713 
0.501 
0.443 
0.826 
0.508 
0.736 
0.481 
0.386 
0.661 
0.976 
0.596 
0.603 
0.522 
0.498 
0.378 
0.365 
0.339 
0.706 
0.447 
0.553 0.649 
(0.053) (0.062) 
0.560 0.659 
(0.042) (0.048) 
0.541 0.629 
(0.074) (0.089) 
0.960 
0.941 
0.855 
0.917 
0.872 
0.845 
0.769 
0.816 
0.769 
0.898 
0.642 
0.810 
0.642 
0.913 
0.902 
0.734 
0.859 
0.877 
0.836 
0.910 
0.881 
0.915 
0.895 
0.860 
0.907 
0.937 
0.923 
0.899 
0.775 
0.896 
0.740 
0.774 
0.740 
0.897 
0.852 
0.845 
(0.009) 
0.853 
(0.008) 
0.831 
(0.012) 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
58 UK 
59 UK 
60 UK 
61 UK 
62 UK 
63 UK 
64 UK 
65 UK 
66 UK 
67 Norway 
68 Norway 
69 Norway 
The numbers in brackets are variance. 
0.413 
0.696 
1.000 
0.744 
0.778 
0.482 
0.850 
0.600 
1.000 
0.559 
1.000 
0.502 
0.610 
0.633 
0.702 
1.000 
0.512 
0.670 
0.592 
0.113 
0.633 
0.624 
0.807 
0.642 
0.445 
0.448 
0.500 
0.541 
0.484 
0.386 
0.779 
0.366 
0.805 
0.516 
0.423 
0.697 
1.000 
0.789 
0.783 
0.507 
0.872 
0.616 
1.000 
0.561 
1.000 
0.526 
0.620 
0.636 
0.759 
1.000 
0.557 
0.687 
0.632 
1.000 
1.000 
0.714 
0.926 
0.874 
0.486 
0.674 
0.736 
0.745 
0.680 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
0.942 
0.516 
0.845 
0.923 
0.937 
0.912 
0.930 
0.810 
0.932 
0.893 
0.949 
0.878 
0.929 
0.877 
0.886 
0.884 
0.903 
0.911 
0.847 
0.884 
0.886 
0.449 
0.851 
0.870 
0.925 
0.874 
0.853 
0.666 
0.760 
0.854 
0.820 
0.752 
0.926 
0.848 
0.864 
0.917 
Field Country CRS-DEA VRS-DEA 
70 Norway 0.220 
71 Norway 0.453 
72 Norway 0.161 
73 Norway 0.223 
74 Norway 0.412 
75 Norway 0.598 
76 Norway 0.375 
77 Norway 0.585 
78 Norway 0.263 
79 Norway 0.434 
80 Norway 0.290 
81 Norway 0.395 
82 Norway 0.544 
83 Norway 0.765 
84 Norway 0.403 
85 Norway 1.000 
86 Norway 0.402 
87 Norway 0.270 
88 Norway 0.607 
89 Norway 0.225 
90 Norway 0.870 
91 Norway 0.545 
92 Norway 0.387 
93 Norway 0.524 
94 Norway 0.830 
95 Norway 0.185 
96 Norway 1.000 
97 Norway 1.000 
98 Norway 0.852 
99 Norway 0.970 
100 Norway 0.252 
101 Norway 0.398 
102 Norway 0.906 
103 Norway 1.000 
0.223 
0.474 
0.165 
0.233 
0.511 
1.000 
0.378 
0.805 
0.276 
0.443 
0.303 
0.503 
0.914 
1.000 
0.408 
1.000 
0.482 
0.411 
0.697 
0.346 
0.909 
0.688 
0.461 
0.582 
0.849 
0.198 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
0.260 
0.403 
0.906 
1.000 
SFA 
0.704 
0.875 
0.590 
0.703 
0.871 
0.919 
0.807 
0.896 
0.647 
0.674 
0.695 
0.815 
0.909 
0.932 
0.857 
0.960 
0.814 
0.681 
0.879 
0.613 
0.942 
0.888 
0.848 
0.887 
0.934 
0.648 
0.948 
0.945 
0.925 
0.945 
0.705 
0.842 
0.895 
0.925 
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8.4 All the Fields in the UKCS and NCS 
To test the consistency of results when the other fields, whose production is either oil or 
gas, are included in the study this section is to investigate the relative efficiency of all 
fields in the two shelves, regardless of their development start-time. To make the DEA 
studies possible, the production of fields is converted to oil equivalent and the DEA 
analysis is based on one output. 
The result of the DEA and SF A analysis is presented in Table 8-4. Again, the results, 
verified by both t-test and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, confirm the insignificant 
difference between the average performance of the two shelves. Thus, if the companies' 
performance over the years is directly affected by the regulatory framework, the effects 
across the two countries have been more or less the same. 
To examine the significance of the fixed and variable costs in the study, the Banker et al. 
procedure, described in 4-2-3 is applied. The results indicate the significance of both 
variables at the 99% level under both constant and variable returns to scale. 
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Table 8-4: All Fields of the Two Shelves 
Field Country CRS-DEA VRS-DEA SFA 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
0.214 
0.557 
0.185 
0.283 
0.154 
0.355 
0.143 
0.152 
0.190 
0.256 
0.184 
0.096 
0.336 
0.219 
0.153 
0.303 
0.124 
0.340 
0.452 
0.422 
0.479 
0.085 
0.190 
0.309 
0.439 
0.189 
0.080 
0.292 
0.335 
0.301 
0.493 
0.293 
0.438 
0.384 
0.326 
0.490 
0.619 
0.687 
0.494 
0.193 
0.220 0.683 
1.000 0.924 
0.191 0.631 
0.283 0.792 
0.170 0.571 
0.358 0.838 
0.143 0.593 
0.152 0.611 
0.191 0.665 
0.256 0.748 
0.184 0.659 
0.098 0.497 
0.340 0.701 
0.220 0.698 
0.156 0.589 
0.325 0.740 
0.147 0.543 
0.341 0.813 
0.492 0.847 
0.422 0.873 
0.549 0.849 
0.096 0.461 
0.194 0.642 
0.327 0.766 
0.441 0.866 
0.196 0.620 
0.410 0.423 
0.318 0.737 
0.337 0.823 
0.301 0.785 
0.494 0.896 
0.314 0.725 
0.439 0.804 
0.433 0.784 
0.341 0.793 
0.494 0.884 
0.622 0.916 
0.694 0.930 
0.547 0.847 
0.631 0.618 
Field Country CRS-DEA VRS-DEA SFA 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
0.621 
0.456 
0.392 
0.413 
0.561 
0.365 
0.377 
1.000 
0.991 
0.678 
0.629 
0.476 
0.215 
0.253 
0.080 
0.077 
0.397 
0.270 
0.309 
0.546 
0.244 
0.379 
0.599 
0.125 
0.590 
0.681 
0.375 
0.697 
1.000 
0.947 
0.331 
0.654 
0.388 
0.295 
0.130 
0.348 
0.431 
0.233 
0.599 
0.539 
0.637 0.909 
0.467 0.784 
0.398 0.757 
0.416 0.848 
0.571 0.870 
0.366 0.829 
0.421 0.800 
1.000 0.947 
1.000 0.904 
0.685 0.922 
0.638 0.913 
0.490 0.868 
0.767 0.649 
0.267 0.631 
0.099 0.449 
0.082 0.444 
0.584 0.821 
0.277 0.730 
0.315 0.771 
0.568 0.888 
0.272 0.692 
0.605 0.712 
0.613 0.905 
0.283 0.524 
0.666 0.898 
0.751 0.862 
0.477 0.810 
0.827 0.919 
1.000 0.958 
0.959 0.955 
0.392 0.822 
0.854 0.890 
0.410 0.857 
0.295 0.786 
0.132 0.563 
0.349 0.816 
0.431 0.873 
0.233 0.727 
0.662 0.896 
0.540 0.904 
Field Country CRS-DEA VRS-DEA SFA 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
95 
96 
97 
98 
99 
100 
101 
102 
103 
104 
105 
106 
107 
108 
109 
110 
111 
112 
113 
114 
115 
116 
117 
118 
119 
120 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
0.586 
0.433 
0.399 
0.391 
0.566 
0.399 
0.660 
0.245 
0.366 
0.574 
0.358 
0.908 
0.507 
0.478 
0.648 
0.491 
0.443 
0.724 
0.503 
0.526 
0.587 
0.689 
0.944 
0.372 
0.472 
0.299 
0.174 
0.568 
0.296 
0.878 
0.550 
0.411 
0.934 
0.513 
0.758 
0.258 
0.654 
0.530 
0.969 
0.679 
0.600 0.911 
0.434 0.869 
0.402 0.832 
0.409 0.839 
0.583 0.895 
0.405 0.837 
0.665 0.924 
0.254 0.701 
0.380 0.826 
0.580 0.907 
0.372 0.801 
0.936 0.949 
0.513 0.890 
0.583 0.866 
0.651 0.874 
0.495 0.880 
0.459 0.835 
0.738 0.927 
0.513 0.879 
0.548 0.894 
0.597 0.904 
0.693 0.913 
0.975 0.944 
0.440 0.810 
0.510 0.866 
0.412 0.736 
0.187 0.610 
0.585 0.897 
0.997 0.729 
1.000 0.935 
0.599 0.894 
1.000 0.815 
0.966 0.943 
0.902 0.869 
0.863 0.914 
0.983 0.688 
0.823 0.905 
0.652 0.883 
1.000 0.958 
0.679 0.936 
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Table 8-4: All Fields of the Two Shelves (continued) 
Field Country CR5-DEA VRS-DEA SFA 
121 UK 0.340 0.371 0.833 
122 UK 
123 UK 
124 UK 
125 UK 
126 UK 
127 UK 
128 UK 
129 UK 
130 UK 
131 UK 
132 UK 
133 UK 
134 UK 
135 UK 
136 UK 
137 UK 
138 UK 
139 
140 
141 
142 
143 
144 
145 
146 
147 
148 
149 
150 
151 
152 
153 
154 
155 
156 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
Average 
The UK 
Norway 
0.485 
0.331 
0.302 
0.227 
0.283 
0.232 
0.426 
0.151 
0.267 
0.149 
0.472 
0.447 
0.217 
0.599 
0.403 
0.333 
0.527 
0.442 
0.500 
0.437 
0.358 
0.484 
0.656 
0.578 
0.444 
0.284 
0.463 
0.257 
0.309 
0.242 
0.542 
0.360 
0.379 
0.582 
0.999 
0.499 0.904 
0.592 0.846 
0.346 0.810 
0.241 0.727 
0.283 0.786 
0.234 0.729 
0.441 0.878 
0.152 0.610 
0.271 0.774 
0.149 0.604 
0.479 0.899 
0.490 0.882 
0.217 0.695 
0.713 0.861 
0.404 0.861 
0.335 0.812 
0.532 0.893 
0.443 0.868 
0.548 0.898 
0.437 0.881 
0.360 0.826 
0.484 0.889 
0.657 0.932 
0.580 0.909 
0.444 0.883 
0.303 0.737 
0.467 0.873 
0.290 0.717 
0.314 0.757 
0.245 0.705 
0.556 0.890 
0.361 0.830 
0.388 0.829 
0.583 0.912 
1.000 0.938 
0.452 0.511 0.812 
(0.048) (0.060) (0.014) 
0.445 0.501 0.810 
(0.045) (0.055) (0.014) 
0.483 0.554 0.824 
(0.059) (O.079) (0.014) 
Field Country CRs-DEA VR5-DEA SFA 
157 UK 0.710 0.710 0.911 
158 
159 
160 
161 
162 
163 
164 
165 
166 
167 
168 
169 
170 
171 
172 
173 
174 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
0.622 
0.306 
0.747 
0.565 
1.000 
0.480 
0.595 
0.458 
0.566 
0.428 
0.673 
1.000 
0.508 
0.561 
0.471 
0.071 
0.399 
175 UK 0.597 
176 UK 0.711 
177 UK 0.473 
178 UK 0.397 
179 UK 0.291 
180 UK 0.290 
181 UK 0.398 
182 UK 0.361 
183 UK 0.300 
184 UK 0.712 
185 Norway 0.351 
186 Norway 0.586 
187 Norway 0.499 
188 Norway 0.205 
189 Norway 0.410 
190 Norway 0.126 
191 Norway 0.219 
192 Norway 0.375 
0.623 0.919 
0.312 0.771 
0.759 0.929 
0.594 0.887 
1.000 0.948 
0.488 0.869 
0.600 0.915 
0.473 0.866 
0.567 0.882 
0.431 0.859 
0.699 0.902 
1.000 0.918 
0.520 0.845 
0.585 0.880 
0.479 0.869 
0.908 0.421 
0.596 0.821 
0.634 0.870 
0.773 0.922 
0.512 0.857 
0.407 0.833 
0.291 0.667 
0.399 0.706 
0.433 0.824 
0.393 0.793 
0.909 0.733 
0.806 0.922 
1.000 0.828 
0.876 0.864 
0.508 0.904 
0.207 0.678 
0.419 0.860 
0.127 0.554 
0.225 0.681 
0.395 0.852 
The numbers in brackets are variance. 
Field Country CR5-DEA VR5-DEA SFA 
193 Norway 0.526 1.000 0.910 
194 Norway 0.291 
195 Norway 0.568 
196 Norway 0.196 
197 Norway 0.260 
198 Norway 0.228 
199 Norway 0.361 
200 Norway 0.468 
201 Norway 0.709 
202 Norway 0.367 
203 Norway 1.000 
204 Norway 0.359 
205 Norway 0.269 
206 Norway 0.607 
207 Norway 0.152 
208 Norway 0.806 
209 Norway 0.467 
210 Norway 0.376 
211 Norway 0.410 
212 Norway 0.699 
213 Norway 0.156 
214 Norway 0.867 
215 Norway 0.787 
216 Norway 0.826 
217 Norway 0.746 
218 Norway 0.206 
219 Norway 0.362 
220 Norway 0.601 
221 Norway 1.000 
222 Norway 0.842 
223 Norway 0.736 
224 Norway 0.524 
225 Norway 0.418 
226 Norway 0.773 
227 Norway 0.321 
228 Norway 0.202 
0.294 0.782 
0.732 0.890 
0.210 0.630 
0.354 0.667 
0.275 0.676 
0.446 0.800 
0.548 0.897 
0.963 0.928 
0.368 0.836 
1.000 0.955 
0.416 0.798 
0.390 0.674 
0.692 0.879 
0.189 0.574 
0.831 0.939 
0.531 0.877 
0.426 0.831 
0.411 0.871 
0.703 0.928 
0.158 0.604 
0.867 0.946 
0.789 0.941 
1.000 0.925 
0.749 0.940 
0.208 0.675 
0.365 0.824 
0.816 0.892 
1.000 0.929 
0.846 0.941 
0.791 0.937 
0.524 0.905 
0.423 0.842 
0.776 0.939 
0.322 0.761 
0.204 0.668 
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8.5 Summary and Concluding Remarks 
The regulatory change of 1985 in the UK was simultaneous to the Norwegian decision to 
reduce Statoil's role and responsibilities with regard to, among others, its supporting role 
for the domestic offshore supply industry. Do these changes have different effects on the 
efficiency of the fields' within the two shelves? 
The results of this chapter have, in most of the cases, given a negative answer to this 
question. We have seen in the two previous chapters that the changes in the two countries 
resulted in more efficient performance of the fields developed and brought on stream 
after 1985. Thus, the regulatory changes, other factors equal, seem to have positive 
effects on the performance of each shelf. When the comparative study of these two 
shelves is in question, however, the results, by and large, do not establish significant 
difference between the two countries' average efficiencies either before or after 1985. 
The results are not surprising. In the UK, the requirement to "buy British" was dropped 
under the pressure imposed by the European Commission, while the scrutiny of the 
companies' procurement policy remained intact. The authorities could no longer officially 
ignore the companies' application for new licenses if their record of contribution to the 
domestic economy were not raised to the authorities' satisfaction. This, however, did not 
mean that the companies' procurement behavior would not, in effect, harm (contribute to) 
their application process. If that were not the case, the state would not bother to monitor 
companies' actions. The situation, thus, seems to bring about a partial freedom for the 
companies, while knowing that perhaps in the major contracts they would unofficially be 
penalized for their misconduct against the national economy. 
The situation in Norway is seemingly the opposite, though with similar effect as the study 
suggests. The Norwegian authorities lost Statoil as their major monitoring instrument 
while having the "buy Norwegian" requirement intact. The responsibility of monitoring 
the oil companies' procurement behavior was vested in the Oil Directorate. The 
difference between Statoil and the Oil Directorate in performing the task was that Statoil 
was close to both the international oil companies and the Norwegian offshore supply 
256 
industry, and thus aware of both sides' weaknesses and strengths, at least more than the 
Norwegian Oil Directorate. In addition, the presence of Statoil in all consortiums' Boards 
of Directors, and the official privileges vested in it gave Statoil both knowledge and 
opportunity to enforce its decisions in favour of the domestic offshore suppliers. The Oil 
Directorate did not have that knowledge and relationship with the consortia, at least not 
as much as Statoil (see Nelson 1991). Thus, in Norway, too, the companies had more 
freedom than they had with Statoil, but maybe not as much as they wished. 
The competitiveness between the two countries does not allow for radical difference 
between the performance of the oil companies active in the two shelves in terms of 
efficiency and profitability. At the same time, the affects of the petroleum industry on the 
offshore-supply industry would not allow for a total abandonment of the latter by the 
government. Perhaps the changing policies of 1985 were a compromise between these 
two issues. 
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Chapter Nine: Summary and Discussion 
9.1 Summary 
The foundation for North Sea petroleum activity was established in 1958 by the first 
International Conference on the Law of Sea. The Conference considered issues regarding 
jurisdiction over the seabed adjacent to the continent and adopted the Convention on the 
Continental Shelf, the Geneva Convention, which was signed by 46 countries. The 
Convention gave each coastal state sovereign rights over its continental shelf for the 
purpose of exploring and exploiting its natural resources lying on or beneath their 
continental shelves to a water depth of 200 meters, or to a depth where natural resources 
might be exploited. 
The discovery of the Groningen gas field in the northern coastal regIOn of the 
Netherlands in 1959 aroused great interest in the new potentially petroleum-rich region. 
Though it took the two countries a few years to respond to the international oil 
companies' approach for further surveys, the ratification of the Geneva Convention in 
1964 initiated exploration in both the Norwegian and United Kingdom Continental Shelf. 
The process of petroleum production was initiated in 1964 and 1965 in the UK and 
Norway, respectively. The first production came on stream in 1967 (West Sole, the UK) 
and 1971 (Ekofisk, Norway). Ever since the production start, Norway and the UK have 
had steady oil and gas production. 
The significance of North Sea petroleum production is mirrored in the importance of the 
industry at both international and national levels. The petroleum production of the 
Norwegian and United Kingdom Continental Shelves started almost at the same time as 
the world experienced its vulnerability to the decisions made by OPEC. North Sea oil 
soon became a reliable alternative for a part of the export from the OPEC countries. 
Today, the aggregate oil and gas reserves of the UKCS and NCS account for about 90/0 of 
the worlds proven reserves. In 1999, more than 7.5% and 6.5% of the world's oil and gas 
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production, respectively, came from North Sea. Norway and the UK are ranked as the 
world's 6th and 9th major oil producers, respectively, with Norway as the second oil 
exporter in the world. 
In domestic level, in 1996 the offshore petroleum industry accounted for 2.5% and 15.6% 
of British and Norwegian GDP, respectively. In the same year, more than 330,000 and 
73,000 British and Norwegian workers, respectively, were, in one way or another, 
involved in the respective continental shelves. 
Since the start of oil and gas production in the UKCS and NCS, more than £250 billion 
has been paid to the British and Norwegian governments in the form of taxes and 
royalties. 
The total capital investment of the industry during the deVelopment and production 
period of nearly three decades of the UKCS and NCS activity is well above £140 billion, 
and £150 billion, respectively, in 1994 values. The significance of the investment to the 
two countries' economies is highlighted by addressing the share of domestic suppliers 
from the total procurement made in the two shelves. While in the beginning of 1970s the 
share of British and Norwegian offshore suppliers was barely 20%, they reached 79% and 
64% in 1979, respectively. The increase in the shares continued until 1987 when the 
British and Norwegian offshore-related industries supplied about 87% and 750/0 of the 
total procurement made in the UKCS and NCS, respectively. After 1987 the share of 
domestic goods and services began to drop and reached to the levels of 78% for the UK 
in 1991 and 690/0 for Norway in 1996. 
The global importance of the North Sea oil and gas has been appreciated in vast volumes 
of literature. In addition, many economists have studied the impacts of the North Sea 
petroleum resources on the economies of the two countries in question, from various 
perspectives. However, the interaction between the regulatory frameworks of the two 
countries and the performance of the oil companies involved in the two shelves' activity 
seems to be overlooked. The importance of the issue rests, mainly, on the fact that the 
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government intervention in the daily operation of the fields and in the decisions made by 
the operators could have caused the loss of enormous capital invested in the activity. 
One of the objectives of this study was to investigate whether the drastic increases in the 
share of domestic goods and services were because of the efficiency of these goods and 
services. The alternative scenario was that being aware of the incapability of domestic 
goods and services to compete with alternative ones, the two governments applied 
regulations strong enough to force the international oil companies to apply domestic 
goods and services. If the latter is the case, the international oil companies active in the 
NCS and UKCS have suffered from inefficiency resulting from application of inefficient 
inputs. 
The two shelves began petroleum activity under soft regulatory regimes that would attract 
the attention of international oil companies. All these companies had to prove were their 
financial and technological ability to conduct petroleum exploration and production 
activities. These conditions attracted a number of oil companies. As far as regulating the 
activity was concerned, the major difference between these two countries and the rest of 
the oil producing nations was that both Norway and the UK adopted a discretionary 
system to evaluate applications for exploration and production licenses. In this system, 
the winner of the auction was the company (or a group of companies) who could 
convince the authorities of having the most suitable (overall) working plan. This was 
against the bonus-based auctioning system used in many other oil producing countries, 
(i.e. the USA) in which the winner is the bidder of the highest price for the territory in 
question. 
The discretionary system began to show its toughness for winning a production license 
when the two countries decided to impose stricter requirements. In Norway the 
requirement of the companies' contribution to the national economy by the means of 
applying as much domestic goods and services was enforced by the establishment of the 
state-owned oil company, Statoil, and Norwegian Oil Directorate. The requirement was 
soon adopted by the UK, where British National Oil Corporation and Offshore Supply 
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Office (OSO) came into existence in 1975. While in Norway Statoil was given privileges 
on the Board of Directors of each and every consortium to assure the share of domestic 
suppliers in NCS procurement, in the UK, the Memorandum of Understanding between 
the state and international oil companies enabled the OSO to monitor almost all 
procurement documents. In both countries, the oil companies were briefed that their 
hesitance in compliance with the requirement would result in their exclusion from future 
consortia. 
The governments' commitments to higher domestic shares in procurements were 
followed in earnest. On some occasions, the oil companies who were trying to disregard 
the requirement in favour of non-domestic inputs were confronted with the government's 
tough reaction and either had to switch to a (less competitive) domestic supplier or to 
have their applications for more licenses rejected. 
By the beginning of the 1980s, however, the course of actions began to change. In the 
UK, the long-term goal of self-sufficiency in petroleum was reached and BNOC was no 
longer needed to serve this purpose. In addition, the European Commission had received 
complaints regarding the British discriminatory policy. The UK officially withdrew the 
requirement but the OSO was still in force to monitor the oil companies' procurement 
activity. It was only in 1992 that the government announced the monitoring system 
unnecessary and abolished the OSO. 
In Norway, on the other hand, the problem was of a domestic nature. Statoil's role in 
handling the state's share of the NCS, in addition to the privileges it was given, made it 
too large a company to handle. It was decided that the company should be stripped of 
many of its privileges, which naturally reduced the company's role as a policy instrument. 
From 1985 the company was no longer the caretaker of the Norwegian offshore supply 
industry, which was now to be supported by the Oil Directorate, an apparently lower-
level body to perform the task. The requirement to "buy Norwegian", however, remained 
intact until 1995 when the involvement of the European Commission, once again, solved 
the issue in favour of free trade. 
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Is the correlation between the increases in the level of domestic goods and services and 
the toughness of the regulatory systems incidental? Economic theories suggest not. 
Assuming each oil company to be a price taker, the recent energy economics literature 
suggests that in evaluating a petroleum exploration/production activity one should 
concentrate on the cost of the activity. The profit maximizing oil companies would 
choose the most efficient inputs. Whereas, inefficient inputs imposed by the regulatory 
framework would force the companies to distance from choosing the optimum level of 
various inputs. In this light, the discretionary bidding system applied by the two countries 
seems problematic. 
The theoretical approach to the issue of applying an auction system finds the bonus-based 
auctions generally yield the first-best outcome for the owner of the resources. In other 
words, the discretionary system does not provide the government with the best outcome. 
Given this, why might the governments chose to apply a second-best option? 
Political economists believe that the first priority of policy makers is not necessarily 
maximizing the social welfare. They pinpoint the environment where the government's 
policies are formed and assert that governments are influenced by various interest groups, 
seeking the most possible "rent" from the activity in question. In this scenario the 
interests of these groups are guaranteed and the policy makers, in tum, receive 
contribution for the cost of their election campaigns, and votes from these groups. Thus, a 
discretionary system may be a powerful tool to control rules and regulation in favour of 
one or a number of interest groups. 
Thus, theoretically, one should expect inefficiency in the performance of the fields active 
in the two shelves. This seems to be particularly the case once paying attention to the 
increasing level of apparently inefficient goods and services (efficient and competitive 
goods and services do not need protectionist policies). However, lack of empirical studies 
prevents one of having hard evidence. 
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As far as the question of efficiency in the North Sea petroleum industry is concerned, the 
lack of empirical studies seems to stem from the difficulty of gathering the relevant data. 
Overcoming this problem by gathering a unique (to the best of my knowledge) data 
concerning various aspects of the activity in the UKCS and NCS, I have had the 
information necessary for implementing such empirical study. The information includes 
the annual production by type; development and production costs; development and 
production start date; operator; water depth; and reservoir depth. While the above data are 
available for each field brought on stream in the UKCS and NCS on an annual basis, the 
annual (aggregate) level of domestic goods and services for each shelf is also available. 
The parametric stochastic frontier analysis and non-parametric data envelopment analysis 
are the most common approaches to address the relative (static) efficiency of producers. 
The Malmquist index approach was also applied to measure the efficiency of fields over 
time. In addition, other techniques were also used to address the role of contextual 
variables, as well as the significance of each input in the efficiency of the fields. 
To investigate the relationship between the efficiency (or rather the inefficiency) of the 
fields and the level of domestic goods and services one could use two approaches. The 
first approach is to measure the average (in)efficiency of each year of production and 
evaluate its correlation with the level of domestic goods and services. The second 
approach is to measure the efficiency of each field relative to other fields in each shelf. 
With this approach, however, one needs a benchmark for comparing the efficiency 
scores. With the current question before us the benchmark could be the time of policy 
changes in the UK and Norway. In the UK, the strictness of "buy domestic" requirement 
started in 1975 and officially ended in 1985 (though the monitoring system was still in 
place). In Norway, the requirement started almost with the start of production in the NCS. 
Thus, the operators' efficiency in the period of heavy intervention could be studied 
against its performance when the requirement was not as strict. 
Another issue to study was the question of the nature of the changes in the two countries 
and their relative implications for the oil companies active in the two shelves. The 
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regulatory change in 1985 aimed at the requirement to "buy British" while the OSO was 
still monitoring the oil companies' activity. In Norway, the case was the opposite. The 
requirement to "buy Norwegian" remained intact, while a weaker monitoring instrument, 
(Oil Directorate), replaced Statoil. The question is whether these changes caused different 
efficiency implications for the oil companies active in the two shelves. 
As far as the effect of regulatory changes in Norway is concerned, the study focused on 
44 fields brought on stream during the petroleum activity of the NCS. A multiple analysis 
of these fields was presented, focusing first on 37 of these fields, which produce both oil 
and gas, and then including the other seven fields six of which produce only oil and the 
last one produces only gas. In each study, the fields were categorized into three groups 
according to the timing of development and production start. 
As far as the static analyses of DEA and SF A were concerned, the results showed higher 
efficiency in the operationships of the fields whose development and production started 
after 1985, compared to those whose development and production started pre-1984, in 
both 37-field and 44-field analyses. The significance of the difference between the two 
categories were, by and large, approved by the Student t-test, but faced difficulties when 
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test were used to show if the two efficiency estimations came 
from different distributions. 
The difference between the group of fields whose development started pre-1984 and 
came on stream post-1985 and the other two groups was insignificant. Considering the 
fact that the other tests showed that both development (fixed) costs and production 
(fixed) costs play significant roles in determining the efficiency of the fields, the fact that 
the fixed costs of these fields were incurred in the pre-1984 era, and variable costs were 
incurred in the aftermath of the 1985 changes makes the results predictable. 
The last stage of the static efficiency measurement was to consider every single year of 
each field's production as an observation. The efficiency scores of the 431 units generated 
were categorized according to the year of production. With this the annual average 
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efficiency scores were tested against the share of domestic goods and services of the total 
procurement of the NCS in each year. The results show high negative correlation (77% 
with respect to VRS-DEA and 86% with respect to CRS-DEA) between the two factors. 
This shows how the increase in the use of domestic goods and services decreased the 
average efficiency of the fields in production. 
The study also evaluated the significance of the fixed and variable costs on measuring the 
efficiency of the Norwegian fields. The results indicated the significance of the fixed 
costs on the performance of the post-1985 fields. However, the same category of cost 
played an insignificant role when measuring the efficiency of the pre-1984 fields. The 
variable costs, on the other hand, playa significant role in measuring the efficiency of the 
pre-1984, post-1985, and aggregate fields. 
The evaluation of the significance of various costs on measuring the efficiency of the 
Norwegian fields seems to reemphasis the effect of the regulatory changes of 1985. The 
fixed costs of the pre-1984 fields were incurred pre-1985, but the same infrastructure was 
used post-1985. The regulatory change increased the operator's freedom in choosing the 
supplier of the goods and services applied in the operation phase of the fields' activity. 
This may be the reason for the significance role of the variable costs, and not the fixed 
costs, when measuring the efficiency of the pre-1984 fields. 
For the post-1985 fields, however, the post-1985 regulatory change affected the 
operator's decision with regard to the choice of input in both development and production 
phases. This seems to be reflected in the results of the study, which indicate the 
significance of both fixed and variable costs in measuring the relative efficiency of the 
post-1985 fields. 
To check whether, besides the inputs, other factors played a significant role in the 
efficiency results of the fields, the Banker et al. procedure for finding the significance of 
contextual variables was applied. The depth of water, depth of reservoir, and the number 
of partners in each consortium were the suspected elements partly responsible for the 
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inefficiency incurred in the shelf. The results of regression analysis attributed between 
220/0 and 26% of the inefficiency to these (contextual) variables, while none of these 
played a significant role in the resulting inefficiency. 
In measunng the significance of contextual variables, a dummy variable was also 
included to capture the effect of 1985 regulatory change. The results confirmed the 
significance of positive (negative) effects of the change on the efficiency (inefficiency) of 
the fields in question. 
The efficiency analysis of the NCS continued by examining the issue on a dynamic basis. 
Although the results of static efficiency measurement reveal the relative efficiency of the 
units in question, they do not pinpoint the cause of efficiency when the activity of the 
units in question is carried out in different period of times. The Malmquist index 
approach decomposes the changes into efficiency change, technological change, scale 
efficiency change, and pure efficiency change. The latter is the efficiency change with the 
assumption of no scale and technological change. The main requirement of the approach 
is that the units in question should have run during the periods under study so that the 
changes before and after a specified time could be measured. 
With regard to the time of regulatory change, 1985, the only group that fulfils the 
requirement was the group of fields whose development and production started before 
1984. These fields were active in both pre-1984 and post-1985 periods. One should 
notice that the development costs of these fields were incurred pre-1984 and thus affect 
the efficiency of post-1985 activity of these fields. In other words, one could not expect 
huge efficiency changes as the development phase of these fields did not enjoy the 
freedom of input choice (if it was the case) enjoyed by the fields whose development 
started after 1985. Nevertheless, the results of Malmquist approach show an average 
increase of about 10% in the fields' pure efficiency after 1985. 
Though no other group was in production in both periods, the study went one step further 
by measuring the efficiency of the fields whose development and production started after 
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1985, relative to the best practices of the pre-1984 fields. The results show that on 
average the post-1985 fields are 330% more efficient than the fields in the former period. 
Though this approach does not provide the exact relative efficiency of the fields, it gives 
a flavor of the relative efficiency of the two periods in the sense that if the average 
efficiency of the post-1985 fields is 330% better than the best practices of the pre-1984 
fields, the real difference (including the not-efficient pre-1984 fields) should be much 
higher than 330%. 
Identical procedure was applied for the fields in the UKCS. The fields, however, were 
divided in 5 groups according to the time of their development and production start. As 
we have seen, the change in the policy first occurred in 1975. Before this period the 
operators had freedom in choosing the necessary inputs from the sources of their choice. 
After 1975 (inclusive) the firms were required (and monitored) to comply with the state's 
requirement with regard to the application of domestic goods and services. After 1985, 
the requirement was dropped while the scrutinizing of the operators procurement was in 
place. 
Based on the above categorization, the study was conducted for the fields based on their 
production. The first study was conducted for 66 fields that produce both oil and gas. The 
second study concerned 67 fields with oil as their only production. Finally, all 184 fields 
(51 gas-producing fields in addition to the 67 and 66 fields mentioned above) underwent 
study. 
The results of the study in all three cases were quite consistent in identifying the fields 
whose both development and production began during 1975-84 as the least efficient 
fields. As far as the oil fields were concerned, the post-1985 fields had the highest 
average efficiency, followed by the fields whose development started pre-1975 and came 
on stream between 1975 and 1984, inclusive. Since the development phase of the latter 
started before 1974 the companies were to freely choose the suppliers of the necessary 
inputs. The oil fields did not have any field whose both development and production 
started before 1974. 
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With regard to the oil & gas fields and aggregate UKCS fields, the studies pinpointed the 
fields whose development and production started before 1974 as the most efficient fields. 
This is remarkable because on the one hand the technology applied to develop these 
fields belongs to the 1960s and early 1970s, which should, supposedly, be less efficient 
than the later technology. On the other hand, these are the oldest fields in the region and 
require more investment (production cost) to produce one unit of production than new 
fields. However, despite these negative characteristics these fields had the best 
input/output ratio. The fact that the input procurement of these fields was not regulated 
by the state might be the reason for their efficiency. Further, the post-1985 fields are the 
next most efficient fields, followed by the fields whose development started pre-1974 but 
came on stream between 1975 and 1984. The least efficient fields were the fields whose 
development and production started during the period of state intervention, 1975-1984. 
Regarding each year of production as a unit under study was the next step of the study. 
The results not only verified the previous results in identifying the pre-1974 fields (both 
development and production started before 1974), followed by post-1985 fields (whose 
both development and production started after 1985), as the most efficient fields, but also 
showed that there is a 90% (for both DEA approaches) negative correlation between the 
annual efficiency and the share of domestic goods and services from the total 
procurement made in that year. 
Two additional studies were carried out to measure the significance of fixed and variable 
costs and contextual variables. The first study shows the significance of both fixed and 
variable costs at 99% level. The second study, however, did not recognize any of the 
contextual variables as significantly influencing the efficiency of the fields in question. 
Depending on the approach of study being CRS-DEA, VRS-DEA, or SF A, between 110/0 
and 20% of the inefficiency of the fields in the UKCS was attributed to the three 
contextual variables. 
The Malmquist index and Distance approaches were also applied to the fields in the 
UKCS. With regard to the efficiency change over the period of regulatory change, All 
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the fields that were active in both pre-1984 and post-1985 periods were under 
consideration. The fields whose development and production started before 1974 were 
excluded from the study based on the low number of fields in this group. The result of the 
Malmquist approach showed 44% and 58% more efficiency in the post-1985 
performance of the fields whose development started before 1974 and came on stream 
between 1975 and 1984, and the group of fields whose both development and production 
started between 1975 and 1984, respectively. 
The Distance approach also revealed higher efficiency of the post-1985 fields relative to 
the fields whose development and production started during the period of intervention. 
With respect to the oil fields' the former fields have, on average, performed 38% more 
efficient than the best practices (most efficient) of the latter fields. When the oil & gas 
fields go under study, the supremacy of the post-1985 fields reaches the level of 400% 
more efficiency than the best practices of fields developed during the period of 
intervention .. However, this reduces to 111 % when studying all 184 fields of the UKCS. 
The results of DEA, SF A, Malmquist, and Distance approaches all indicate the relatively 
better performance of the fields in the NCS and UKCS whenever the regulatory 
framework did not restrict the oil companies' freedom in applying their own choice of 
goods and services. The last point to investigate, however, was whether the two countries' 
policies, both before and after 1985, had different impacts on the performance efficiency 
of the oil companies active in the two shelves. 
The comparative efficiency of the NCS and UKCS was carried out on two categories. 
First, 37 Norwegian and 66 British oil & gas fields underwent study. According to CRS-
DEA and SF A there is no significant difference between the pre-1984 performance of the 
oil & gas fields of the shelves. The VRS assumption of DE A, however, pinpoints Norway 
as the most efficient sector, at 99% level of significance. The average efficiency of the oil 
and gas fields in the two shelves, both after-1985 and in overall, does not show 
significant difference regardless of the analytical approach. 
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In the second instance, all 184 British fields underwent a comparative study with all 44 
Norwegian fields. The results, once again, show no significant difference between the 
performance of the fields regardless of the level of regulatory strictness. The overall 
performance of the two shelves does not significantly differ either. 
9.2 Discussion 
The study has been the first of its kind to look at the efficiency of activity in the United 
Kingdom and Norwegian Continental Shelves, and resulted in the following findings: 
(1)- there were inefficiencies in the performance of the UKCS and NCS petroleum 
activity. (2)- a significant cause of the inefficiency of the two shelves was the 
inefficiency of the inputs used in the development and production phases. (3)- in periods 
when the regulatory regime strictly required the application of domestic goods and 
services and when the monitoring instruments were strong the inefficiencies were higher 
than other periods. (4)- the inefficiency of each year of activity was highly correlated 
with the share of domestic goods and services from the total procurement of each shelf. 
The results of this study help in the evaluation of the policies pursued by the UK and 
Norway in their respective continental shelves, particularly with respect to the use of 
inputs. Two questions of immediate interests are "Were these policies successful"? and 
"What are their net welfare effect"? 
The answer to the first question depends in part on the objectives set for the policies. The 
material presented in Chapter 2 suggests that both governments were keen to develop 
their domestic offshore-supply industries, partly in order to maximize the gain to 
domestic labour (and the balance of payments) and partly to ensure security of supply. 
The figures presented confirm that this happened. While with the beginning of the 
activity neither of the two countries was technologically capable to contribute to the 
supply of these inputs, after less than two decades more than 3/4 of the inputs were 
supplied by domestic suppliers. The petroleum production of the UKCS changed the 
UK's position of net importer in the early years of the 1970s to a net exporter by the end 
of the same decade. 
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However, this question can also be considered on another level: from the perspective of 
policy design, it is interesting that the mechanism adopted by the governments 
(effectively monitoring arrangements to oversee their principal-agent relationship with 
the fields' operators) appear to have achieved this goal. Mere pronouncements, insisting 
on the use of domestic goods and services, were not considered sufficient for the job. In 
Norway, 8tatoil's presence on the Board of Directors of practically all consortia, its 
voting strength, due to its minimum 51 % share of each field, and its vetoing privilege 
could undermine the decisions made by the other partners. These, in addition to 8tatoil's 
power to single-handedly determine the supplier of up to £1 million worth of goods and 
services in each instance, could easily determine the source of suppliers of goods and 
services. The same structure also prevailed in the UKC8. The role of 8tatoil was given to 
the 080 in the UK. Though the Office was scrutinizing the companies' affair from the 
outside, the fact that BNOC could provide the authorities with the additional information 
that 080 might have lacked, would compensate for the absence of an inside monitor. In 
effect, the share of domestic suppliers in the UK paved the same path of the Norwegian 
suppliers in Norway. 
It would be interesting to consider whether other instances of government intervention 
(beyond UK and Norwegian oil) have this characteristic. We might conjecture that such 
arrangements would be most common where a large number of principal-arrangements 
would be in place over many years and where the agents (in our case, the commercial oil 
companies) were particularly well informed and experienced players. In such 
circumstances, the government's need for 'information gathering' might be most acute. 
With respect to the question of the net welfare effect of the policies, the methodology 
employed in this thesis comes into its own: it has identified the role of policy (or, at least 
results are consistent with such a role of policy) by identifying inefficiencies consistent 
with it. Thus, we can say that, while the policy may have been effective in achieving its 
immediate goals, it did so at a cost: lower output than an unconstrained input choice 
might have achieved. This is what suggests that the policies themselves did influence 
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input-choice, as it does not seem plausible that commercial companies (with 
multinational opportunities for profit) would freely choose inefficient input combinations. 
This seems to be an important, potentially general, conclusion: that policy can have 
opportunity costs. This thesis has not demonstrated that Norwegian and UK policy had a 
negative net impact on welfare (such a complete cost-benefit analysis would require data 
on economic benefits of employment over time, the value of security of supply, the costs 
of administrating the policies and of any rent-seeking activity that may have preceded 
them, etc.) It does, however, add to a long literature suggesting that there may be costs 
associated with government intervention that should not be ignored when policy actions 
are being considered. 
Though the changing policies of the two countries in 1985 aimed different aspects of the 
government-oil companies relationship, in effect both resulted in more freedom for the 
latter. 
The major influence of Statoil on the fate of domestic offshore suppliers stemmed from 
the fact that Statoil was practicing its duties from within the core of activity. The 
company had access to all information concerning the relative quality of domestic and 
foreign goods and services, and could inform the authorities about the various aspects of 
other companies concerns and decisions. The state and oil companies' relationship was an 
example of the best possible principal-agent relationship, as far as the welfare of the 
former was concerned. The Norwegian authorities had the regulation, the scrutiny 
instrument and the power to enforce their decision with regard to domestic suppliers. 
After all, no company would want to be excluded from the NCS offshore activity. 
In the UK, on the other hand, the OSO was monitoring all aspects of the procurement 
process of the oil companies. The latter had to report the name of the companies invited 
to bid for the required goods and services, the amount of purchase and the reason for 
purchasing the inputs from foreign sources before a contract was final. Any disagreement 
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between the government and the oil companies could result in the exclusion of the latter 
from future licensing rounds. 
Therefore the insignificant difference between the two shelves' performance in the period 
of heavy regulation should not come as a surprise. Besides similar policies, the majority 
of the companies active in one shelf could find its sister company in the other. If the 
efficiency of a company in a shelf was significantly lower than the other sister 
companies, capital could easily flow from the less efficient shelf to the more efficient 
one, or even to the other part of the globe. Less efficiency, other things equal, means less 
return to capital and less profitability to the investor. Below a certain level of return to 
capital, the companies would reconsider their further involvement in the shelf. Lack of 
evidence for a company's total withdrawal from either of the two shelves suggests that 
despite the tightness of the regulatory framework, the companies' rate of return was still 
at a satisfactory level. The policies seem to be enforced subject to participation 
constraint. 
The international oil companies seem to benefit from Statoil's changing position away 
from its monitoring activity and its role as caretaker of the offshore supply industry role. 
Although the Oil Directorate replaced Statoil as the scrutiny instrument, it lacked many 
aspects that made Statoil so successful in performing its task. The Directorate was 
performing from outside the arena with no indication of the Norwegian companies 
providing it with relevant missing information. The Directorate, naturally, lacked the 
ability and expertise possessed by Statoil due to the latter's direct involvement in the 
activity for more than 12 years. 
However, although one of the chains in the Norwegian principal-agent relationship. 
namely the scrutiny ability of the principal, was weakened, the state was still not totally 
paralyzed in safeguarding the interests of Norwegian offshore industry. On one hand the 
oil companies' future involvement in the shelfs activity was still mainly dependent on the 
level of domestic goods and services they were applying. On the other hand, one can 
hardly assume that after three decades of activity, the Norwegian offshore suppliers were 
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as inefficient as they were at the beginning of NCS offshore activity. This may be the 
reason of reduction in the share of Norwegian goods and services, relative to the pre-
change era, but still high enough to avoid the companies' exclusion from future licensing 
rounds. 
The principal-agent relationship in the UK also lost its (mandated) equilibrium when the 
state could no longer impose the requirement to "buy British". Officially, the requirement 
was dropped and could not be used against companies. In addition, the fact that, unlike 
Norway, the oil companies in the UK could (and would, in almost every case) apply for 
licenses in a group might reduce the state's unofficial retaliatory policy for low 
application of domestic goods and services. 
The result of the changes in the UK was the decrease in the application of domestic goods 
and services. The share of these inputs from the total procurement of the UKCS, 
however, remained high enough to satisfy the state's requirement, and apparently 
moderate enough for the companies to carry on their exploration and production activity 
in the shelf. The likely efficiency gain of domestic goods and services during the years of 
UKCS activity, and perhaps the need not to upset the authorities, kept the share of 
domestic goods and services around 80% after the changes in 1985. Maybe this was 
convincing proof of the maturity of the British offshore-related industry, which resulted 
in the decision that the services of the OSO were no longer a necessity. 
9.3 Further Research 
The fact that this study is the first analysis of the efficiency of the North Sea petroleum 
industry does not imply its completeness. Future studies may increase both the scope and 
scale of the present work. In this regard two improvements to the current study should be 
done. 
The first concerns the improvement in details and extent of data. Though the available 
data set could be improved in some respects. For instance, the data regarding the use of 
domestic goods and services covered the share of these inputs on an aggregated annual 
basis without specifying the domestic goods and services used in each field. Further, the 
study could better address the source of inefficiencies if the details of both development 
and production costs were available. 
The second issue is that current study has focused on the issue of domestic goods and 
services and its impact on the performance of the oil companies. Though a major issue in 
determining the efficiency of inputs, the issue of imposing a particular set of inputs, 
however, is only one of the issues that can affect the performance of the operating oil 
companies. Other issues, such as the different tax regimes and the country's depletion 
policy could have also had impacts on the efficiency of the operationships. 
Another supplement to this study could be the theoretical approach to the issue. The 
relationship between the state and the oil companies responsible for the daily activities of 
the fields can be modeled in light of the principal-agent theory. State (the principal) 
delegates the task to the oil companies (agent) to manage the construction phase of the 
fields and produce petroleum. The oil company however, has a dual responsibility, 
towards both the state and the other oil companies in the consortia. This relationship and 
the interaction between these three parties could be the subject of a theoretical study 
involving two principals and one agent. 
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Appendix One: Break-Down of Costs and Depletion Rate 
Before we begin with the break-down of costs, it should be noted that all financial data 
for the UK and Norway have been deflated to 1995 prices using the relevant GDP 
deflators. 
The nature of oil & gas fields causes a lag between the development and production start. 
This lag can vary according to the individual field's natural characteristics, as well as the 
technology applied. While the majority of development costs of a field are incurred in 
this period, the infrastructure is to be used for the entire lifetime of the field. Hence these 
costs should be spread across the lifetime of the fields and an appropriate depreciation 
policy is required. 
The fixed costs of developing a field, before and during the production period can be 
distributed between the years of production according to the following formula: 
1 / ( 1 ) (t -1)( 1 ) /-1 ( t -i)( 1 ) FC =-d+ p.- - - d- p. 
/ n ~ n-i+1 Inn ~ n-i+1 n-i+l I (A 1-1) 
where FC, is the fixed cost for year t, n is the lifetime of the field, d is the construction 
cost incurred in the development phase, p is the construction cost incurred while the field 
was under production, and i is a scalar. The intuition behind (A2-1) is as follows: 
• All the fixed costs incurred before the first year of production (in the developing 
phase) are spread evenly between the years of production throughout the lifetime of 
that field. Depletion rate, however, reduces the share of fixed costs as the fields grow 
older. 
• After the start of production, any investment is spread between the remammg 
production years. For this purpose the official136 estimate of each field's lifetime is 
used. 
\36 Brown Book (DTA) for England, and Oil Directorate's (confidential) Report to Storting (1996) for 
Norway. 
276 
• The depletion rate of the incurred investment varies according to the lifetime of each 
field. The third part of the equation depletes the cost incurred in the development 
phase. The final part deals with the depletion of the construction costs incurred while 
the field was already producing. Note that the depletion does not begin before the 
second year of production. 
• It is assumed that the infrastructure of the fields has no value after the fields cease 
production. In reality, some of these may be used as storage for the products of other 
fields, generating some revenue for the owners. In this case the infrastructure is not 
worthless. However, as this happens rarely, and because there is no official estimate 
for the value of each field if it is used as storage, these exceptional cases have been 
ignored. 
It is assumed that the field bears no additional cost once it ceases production. Though the 
firms are responsible for the removal of the infrastructure after production stops, the costs 
incurred are ignored in (A 1-1) because of the lack of reliable estimates for removal cost. 
Table A1-1 illustrates the above procedure. Note that in the above example the field will 
cease production in 2001. 
Table A 1-1: An Example of the Break-Down of Costs 
PRODUCTION FIXED COST VARIABLE COST 
Nominal Real (1995) Broken-down Nominal Real (1995) 
Oil Gas Fixed Costs Fixed Costs Fixed Costs Prod. Costs Prod. Costs 
000' bId mil.sm3 Mil. Pounds Mil. Pounds Mil. Pounds Mil. Pounds Mil. Pounds 
1984 39.00 64.71 
1985 20.0 1.16 46.00 72.22 8.06 26.30 41.29 
1986 28.0 1.62 1.00 1.52 7.68 39.00 59.29 
1987 28.0 1.62 6.00 8.68 7.78 39.20 56.72 
1988 13.0 0.75 10.00 13.64 8.23 20.40 27.84 
1989 22.0 1.28 8.00 10.20 8.43 25.60 32.63 
1990 18.0 1.04 15.00 17.97 9.28 25.90 31.03 
1991 14.0 0.81 0.00 0.00 8.50 21.80 24.52 
1992 11.5 0.67 0.00 0.00 7.73 22.40 24.09 
1993 8.5 0.49 10.00 10.42 8.12 21.10 21.98 
1994 8.5 0.49 8.00 8.20 8.24 15.10 15.47 
1995 5.9 0.34 2.00 2.00 7.49 14.00 14.00 
1996 5.5 0.32 0.00 0.00 6.42 12.20 11.83 
1997 2.5 0.15 0.00 0.00 5.35 10.90 10.31 
1998 4.0 0.23 0.00 0.00 4.28 10.70 10.00 
1999 3.5 0.20 0.00 0.00 3.21 10.00 9.18 
Total 192.9 11.19 145.00 209.56 108.80 314.60 390.18 
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APP ANDIX TWO: Other DEA Models 
A2-1 The Additive Model 
The Additive Model relates the efficiency results to the economic concept of Pareto 
optimality. The input-oriented Additive model is formulated as the following: 
Minimize: Zo = -f3. S+ - f3. S-
Subject to: 
YA-S+ = Yo 
-XA-S- =-Xo 
f3'A=l 
A,S+ ,S- ~ 0 
Where A is a N x 1 vector of constants, Y and X are the output and input vectors, 
respectively, Ss are the slack variables, f3 is a (1 x N) matrix of 1. 
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DMUs for which Z* = 0 are efficient and determine the piecewise linear envelopment 
surface, while the DMUs for which Z* < 0 are inefficient and lie beneath the surface. 
Optimal values for the slack variables obtained from solving the Additive model measure 
the distance between the DMU in question and the projected point on the frontier. Thus a 
DMU is inefficient if both slack variables (S+ and S-) are non zero. In this case Z· will 
be negative. The additive model selects the point on the envelopment surface that 
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maximizes this distance in the northwesterly direction. The value of A for each DMU 
indicates the efficiency measure of that DMU. 
A2-2 The Multiplicative Model: 
In contrast to the above mentioned piecewise linear envelopment, the Multiplicative 
model allows a piecewise log-linear or a piecewise Cobb-Douglas envelopment. The 
efficiency measures in this model result from the application of the Additive model to the 
logarithms of the original data values. Hence, all interpretations and comments above 
continue to apply, but in the transformed space (Log (X), Log (Y)). 
Minimize: Zo = -j3. S+ - j3. S-
Subject to: 
LOg(Y)A - S+ = Log(Yo) 
LOg(X)A+S- = Log(Xo) 
j3'A=l 
A,S+ ,S- ~ 0 
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